Monday, August 27, 2018

HOW TRUMP LOOKS FROM HERE [Israel ]

Posted on August 26, 2018 by Vic Rosenthal

http://abuyehuda.com/2018/08/how-trump-looks-from-here/



After I returned to Israel about four years ago, I found that American politics seemed stranger and stranger to me. I thought it would be interesting to discuss how it looks from here, and what the trends portend both for Americans and Israelis. I’m not offering an analysis of US politics and society – I haven’t been back since I left, and I have to depend on what people tell me and on the mainstream, alternative, and social media. Rather, I’m describing my perceptions as an Israeli Jew who is also a former American. So forgive me if my descriptions of American politics and society are inaccurate. They describe what I see and hear.

The 2016 pre-election period and the election itself seemed to be characterized by a degree of animosity and plain meanness that I wasn’t accustomed to, for all the years that I had lived in the US. And instead of calming down, the past two years have seen an increase, if anything, in the hostility between Right and Left, or rather between pro- and anti-Trump forces. The opposition has mobilized much of the media on its side, a legal web is being woven to entangle Trump, and if the Democrats obtain a majority in the House this November, it’s likely that an attempt will be made to impeach him (although it is almost unthinkable that the necessary 2/3 vote in the Senate necessary to convict and remove him from office could be obtained). Trump, on the other hand, can and does fight back with the considerable powers of the President.

“Moderate Republicans” are mostly extinct and “moderate Democrats” are an endangered species. Hyper-partisanship is the rule, with both sides apparently more concerned with hurting their enemies than solving problems. At the same time, the Democratic Party is not the Democratic Party of the past anymore, not even the party of the Clintons. The progressive wing, empowered by default after Hillary’s loss, seems to be steering the party. There appears to be a more aggressive, take no prisoners attitude toward the present administration. The overall electorate is changing too, with younger people and immigrants gaining the right to vote, and older voters dying off.

In the larger society, some things stand out. Expressions of Jew-hatred in America, both from the Left and the Right, are increasing. There is the phenomenon of Imams openly preaching against Jews, something which may have always existed but only recently hit the media. The same old neo-Nazis are out there, but it seems that they are less inhibited about public displays of antisemitism. Left-wing Jew-hatred, usually starting as “criticism of Israeli policy” has grown to include traditional themes of Jewish control of media and banks, conspiracy theories about the Rothschilds, and more. Attacks on Israel from the left have become more and more irrational, veering into blood libel territory, as illustrated by the recent statements of an Episcopal bishop. Democrats and younger people are showing less sympathy for Israel and more for the Palestinian Arabs. Support for Israel is becoming more and more a partisan issue.

Frustration with everyday concerns like health care is more and more seen as a political issue, with one side or the other being blamed, depending on the complainer’s political orientation. There seems to be real anger on both sides in connection with immigration policy. I have friends in both camps: the pro-Trump people say that he is doing a good job in a difficult situation, but that the Democratic opposition would wreck the country if they got into power. The anti-Trumpers think he is the Devil, corrupt, a racist, and a danger to democracy who must be removed at all cost. In general, it seems that the Left is more shrill and even fanatic, but that may just be because they are on the outside trying to get back in.

And now the part that will be controversial in America. How does President Trump look from an Israeli point of view? Leaving aside everything else, what effects have his policies had on Israel?

The answer, to the chagrin of many of my American friends, is this: no recent American president has done as much for the Jewish state as Donald Trump.

This was emphasized for most Israelis by the comparison with his predecessor, Barack Obama. Obama gave us a standard of comparison, starting from the days before his inauguration when his staff summoned Tzipi Livni to Washington to tell her that the IDF had better be out of Gaza by Inauguration Day (it was); through eight years of manufactured crises, slights, insults to our PM (who can forget an anonymous administration official calling him a “chickenshit”?); through pressure to refrain from construction in the territories (we did), to release murderous prisoners (we did), and to not bomb the Iranian nuclear project (we didn’t); through the use of Obama Administration consultants and State Department money to try to influence our election against Netanyahu; through a cutoff of supplies in wartime and a ban on flights to our international airport; through the funding of terrorism and the guarantee that Iran would ultimately have nuclear weapons by the Iran deal; and finally, to Obama’s lame duck period when America did not vote against an anti-Israel Security Council resolution for the first time since Jimmy Carter was President. And these are just a few things off the top of my head.

So when Donald Trump finally righted a historic wrong by recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and when he proved that he meant it by moving the embassy to Jerusalem, as three previous US presidents had failed to do, Israelis felt a breath of fresh air from Washington. When he withdrew from the Iran deal and re-imposed sanctions, mitigating the damage already done by the previous administration’s cash payments to the terrorist regime, Israelis saw that he understood the danger emanating from the Iranian regime as Obama had not. When he cut funding for the Palestinian Authority when it refused to stop paying terrorists, they saw that he would stop giving the Palestinians a free pass. And when his administration announced that it would no longer accept the unique institution of Palestinian “refugees,” an arrangement created by the Arab states as a multigenerational weapon against Israel and – until Trump – acquiesced to in the West out of a combination of cowardice and anti-Israeli bias, they realized that for the first time in decades, a breakthrough against the stalemate in the region was possible.

And I for one am grateful, like many people here. But sometimes I think that our leadership is assuming that the new situation will continue forever. Trump may be President for the next 6 years, he may remain for only two more, or his political enemies may succeed in cutting his term even shorter, or entangling him in a legal struggle that will prevent him from doing more than defending himself for the remainder of his term. They are certainly trying hard enough.

Here is a scenario: the Democrats win control of the House in November. They immediately vote a bill of impeachment against Trump. Trump, threatened with an avalanche of charges and accusations, resigns. VP Mike Pence takes over; he continues Trump’s policies, but lacks Trump’s charisma (I can hear my liberal friends gagging, but what else is it?) and is defeated in the 2020 election by a progressive Democrat, like Elizabeth Warren or even Michelle Obama. It could happen.

If – when – the opposition regains power in America, there is likely to be a strong reaction against Trump’s policies in every arena. As always, nothing stands out as a target the way we do. A progressive president and administration could be as bad or worse for Israel as Obama was.

Therefore it is important for Israel to take advantage of the present climate to solve as many of its problems as possible. Would it be better to fight Hamas or Hezbollah (or both) with Trump or Michelle Obama in the White House? What about deporting the illegal migrants in South Tel Aviv? Building in strategic parts of the territories? Getting UNRWA out of Gaza? Annexing all or part of Judea and Samaria? For Israel, the implication is clear. It’s unfortunately rare that we have such wide-ranging support from an American administration. Let’s not let it go to waste.


For America, it’s not up to me to tell you what to do. You are still the greatest nation in the world. May you regain the unity and common purpose needed for your republic to survive for another few hundred years.


Department of Defense MAY now be implicated in "Spygate targeting of President Trump.”   August 27, 2018 


Much of the MSM and a collection of former senior officials [now retired] from the US intelligence community very prominently voiced their public “ outrage" and their "condemnation of Donald Trump" for terminating John Brennan’s security clearance.


 Now, these same "guardians of the public trust" are maintaining a wall of silencein the face of what appears to be a major political hit job coordinated by former senior officials from the Obama administration--the termination of the security clearance of former pentagon analyst and White House National Security Council Director Adam Lovinger.

 Lovinger’s sins?

 He questioned the outlandishly high payments made to Stefan Halper who has been identified as being used an informant by the Obama administration against President Trump’s campaign,for what appears to be Halper’s participation in attempting to trap several Donald Trump campaign staffers into the appearance of them engaging in questionable actions. 

 Also, Lovinger raised serious concerns regarding lucrative government contracts awarded to Long Term Strategy Group, a consulting firm owned by Chelsea Clinton’s friend Jacqueline Newmyer Deal 


Defense Department SUED on Behalf of Whistleblower Who Lost Security Clearance after Raising Questions about Prominent Trump Spygate Figure


This massive cover-up makes Watergate look like nothing— complete theater designed to oust a Republican president.
Former Pentagon Analyst and White House National Security Council Director Lovinger questioned lucrative contracts with Trump Campaign Spy Stefan Halper, as well as Long Term Strategy Group, a firm owned Chelsea Clinton’s friend Jacqueline Newmyer Deal
(Washington, DC)– Judicial Watch announced it filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit on behalf of former Pentagon analyst and White House National Security Council (NSC) senior director Adam S. Lovinger, whose security clearance was pulled after he raised concerns regarding lucrative government contracts awarded to Stefan Halper, who has been identified as being used an informant by the Obama administration against President Trump’s campaign, as well as Long Term Strategy Group, a consulting firm owned by Chelsea Clinton’s friend Jacqueline Newmyer Deal (Adam S. Lovinger v. U.S. Department of Defense(No. 1:18-cv-01914)).
The Washington Timesreported on the contracts in question: “According toUSASpending.gov, Mr. Halper was paid $411,000 by Washington Headquarters Services on Sept. 26, 2016, for a contract that ran until this March.” Also, “a string of contracts totaling $11 million [was granted] to D.C. consulting firm Long Term Strategy Group. It is headed by Jacqueline Newmyer Deal, a self-described ‘best friend’ of Chelsea Clinton.”
Lovinger filed his complaint in the fall of 2016. In May 2017, Lovinger’s security clearance was initially suspended by Barbara Westgate, the Director of Washington Headquarters Services and an Obama-appointee. A few months later, the Pentagon’s Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF)“issued an unfavorable clearance determination and Mr. Lovinger’s clearance was revoked,” a Defense Department spokesman informed The Washington Times. The CAF is part of the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) and reports directly to Westgate.
In September 2017, Lovinger filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint against the CAF, which determines security clearance eligibility of non-intelligence personnel, Westgate and James H. Baker, the DOD’s Director of Net Assessment who recommended the contract awards to Halper and Long Term Strategy Group.
In December 2017, Lovinger filed a Privacy Act request seeking:
Any and all emails or similar electronic messaging transmissions referencing the word “Lovinger;” whether in the title or body of said communications(s); between May 1, 2017 and present; to, from, or copied to the following individuals:
A. Mr. Edward Fish, Director DoD CAF
B. Mr. Daniel Purtill, Deputy Director DoD CAF
C. Mr. Ronald Freels, Adjudications Directorate Chief.
In March 2018, the DOD responded, treating his request as both a Privacy Act and a Freedom of Information (FOIA) requestand admitting it found 75 pages of responsive documents but was withholding them all in their entirety. Lovinger was informed that Fish, against whom the whistleblower complaint had been filed, had also been the official who determined the documents should be withheld.
In April 2018, Lovinger appealed the DOD’s determination. Over four months later, the appeal has not been addressed. Washington Headquarters Services has refused repeated requests to recuse itself from further involvement in this case despite an apparent conflict of interest.Under existing DOD policy, WHS officials reporting to Westgate will be the final arbiter of Lovinger’s case, which cannot be appealed to the courts.
Also, the DOD has yet to comply with Lovinger’s Privacy Act Request.
Before his work on the NSC, Lovinger was a strategic affairs analyst in the Office of Net Assessment at the Pentagon, where he specialized in issues related to U.S.-India relations, the Persian Gulf, and sub-Saharan Africa. He also is an attorney and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and McCort School of Public Policy.
“Mr. Lovinger was targeted because he blew the whistle on Stefan Halper and a Clinton crony getting suspicious Defense contracts,” said Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton. “It is disturbing that the Defense Department may now be implicated in Spygate targeting of President Trump.”
Lovinger is also represented by Sean M. Bigley, a national-security attorney and a partner at Bigley Ranish LLP.


Department of Defense MAY now be implicated in "Spygate targeting of President Trump.”
Date: August 27, 2018 


Much of the MSM and a collection of former senior officials [now retired] from the US intelligence community very prominently voiced their public “ outrage" and their "condemnation of Donald Trump" for terminating John Brennan’s security clearance.


 Now, these same "guardians of the public trust" are maintaining a wall of silencein the face of what appears to be a major political hit job coordinated by former senior officials from the Obama administration--the termination of the security clearance of former pentagon analyst and White House National Security Council Director Adam Lovinger.

 Lovinger’s sins?

 He questioned the outlandishly high payments made to Stefan Halper who has been identified as being used an informant by the Obama administration against President Trump’s campaign,for what appears to be Halper’s participation in attempting to trap several Donald Trump campaign staffers into the appearance of them engaging in questionable actions. 

 Also, Lovinger raised serious concerns regarding lucrative government contracts awarded to Long Term Strategy Group, a consulting firm owned by Chelsea Clinton’s friend Jacqueline Newmyer Deal 


Defense Department SUED on Behalf of Whistleblower Who Lost Security Clearance after Raising Questions about Prominent Trump Spygate Figure


This massive cover-up makes Watergate look like nothing— complete theater designed to oust a Republican president.
Former Pentagon Analyst and White House National Security Council Director Lovinger questioned lucrative contracts with Trump Campaign Spy Stefan Halper, as well as Long Term Strategy Group, a firm owned Chelsea Clinton’s friend Jacqueline Newmyer Deal
(Washington, DC)– Judicial Watch announced it filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit on behalf of former Pentagon analyst and White House National Security Council (NSC) senior director Adam S. Lovinger, whose security clearance was pulled after he raised concerns regarding lucrative government contracts awarded to Stefan Halper, who has been identified as being used an informant by the Obama administration against President Trump’s campaign, as well as Long Term Strategy Group, a consulting firm owned by Chelsea Clinton’s friend Jacqueline Newmyer Deal (Adam S. Lovinger v. U.S. Department of Defense(No. 1:18-cv-01914)).
The Washington Timesreported on the contracts in question: “According toUSASpending.gov, Mr. Halper was paid $411,000 by Washington Headquarters Services on Sept. 26, 2016, for a contract that ran until this March.” Also, “a string of contracts totaling $11 million [was granted] to D.C. consulting firm Long Term Strategy Group. It is headed by Jacqueline Newmyer Deal, a self-described ‘best friend’ of Chelsea Clinton.”
Lovinger filed his complaint in the fall of 2016. In May 2017, Lovinger’s security clearance was initially suspended by Barbara Westgate, the Director of Washington Headquarters Services and an Obama-appointee. A few months later, the Pentagon’s Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF)“issued an unfavorable clearance determination and Mr. Lovinger’s clearance was revoked,” a Defense Department spokesman informed The Washington Times. The CAF is part of the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) and reports directly to Westgate.
In September 2017, Lovinger filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint against the CAF, which determines security clearance eligibility of non-intelligence personnel, Westgate and James H. Baker, the DOD’s Director of Net Assessment who recommended the contract awards to Halper and Long Term Strategy Group.
In December 2017, Lovinger filed a Privacy Act request seeking:
Any and all emails or similar electronic messaging transmissions referencing the word “Lovinger;” whether in the title or body of said communications(s); between May 1, 2017 and present; to, from, or copied to the following individuals:
A. Mr. Edward Fish, Director DoD CAF
B. Mr. Daniel Purtill, Deputy Director DoD CAF
C. Mr. Ronald Freels, Adjudications Directorate Chief.
In March 2018, the DOD responded, treating his request as both a Privacy Act and a Freedom of Information (FOIA) requestand admitting it found 75 pages of responsive documents but was withholding them all in their entirety. Lovinger was informed that Fish, against whom the whistleblower complaint had been filed, had also been the official who determined the documents should be withheld.
In April 2018, Lovinger appealed the DOD’s determination. Over four months later, the appeal has not been addressed. Washington Headquarters Services has refused repeated requests to recuse itself from further involvement in this case despite an apparent conflict of interest.Under existing DOD policy, WHS officials reporting to Westgate will be the final arbiter of Lovinger’s case, which cannot be appealed to the courts.
Also, the DOD has yet to comply with Lovinger’s Privacy Act Request.
Before his work on the NSC, Lovinger was a strategic affairs analyst in the Office of Net Assessment at the Pentagon, where he specialized in issues related to U.S.-India relations, the Persian Gulf, and sub-Saharan Africa. He also is an attorney and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and McCort School of Public Policy.
“Mr. Lovinger was targeted because he blew the whistle on Stefan Halper and a Clinton crony getting suspicious Defense contracts,” said Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton. “It is disturbing that the Defense Department may now be implicated in Spygate targeting of President Trump.”
Lovinger is also represented by Sean M. Bigley, a national-security attorney and a partner at Bigley Ranish LLP.

Friday, August 24, 2018

John Brennan may be key to entire 'Russian collusion" narrative. Kremlin sources will quiet leaving CIA "in dark" about Putins plans

 Julian Barnes  and Matthew Rosenberg’s article in the New York Times, August 24, 2018,Kremlin Sources Go Quiet, Leaving C.I.A. in the Dark About Putin’s Plans for Midterms  can serve as a useful vehicle for extending our understanding about the uses, abuses and limitations of intelligence inputs.

 At times, my involvement with the intelligence community has  been  very deep, sometimes it has been marginal, and  much
of the time it has been nonexistent.

 As many of us who participate, I have often been given a great deal of detail about a very small aspect of some intelligence problem. Thus, I have not seen the big picture until after the event unfolded. For example, when the U-2  was flying,  Amram Katz   of RAND, who  was an expert in photography, lenses, etc., was frantically trying to interest the Pentagon in a combination of photo capabilities and avionics capabilities. He was rejected on all his approaches and was very frustrated. It was only after  the U-2  was shot down by the Soviets that he discovered that his ideas had been accepted and had  been made operational. My role was related. At RAND  I worked with several other researchers on Soviet missile capabilities. I had viewed photo reconnaissance photographs of Soviet sites. These were not anywhere near commercial  aviation routes. The photography was sensational. I assumed that it was a Soviet military pilot. Only afterwards  did I learn that  this sensational photography was a result of Katz’ system design.


 Shortly thereafter, Just about everyone in aerospace in Southern California claimed that they were aware of the U-2. Katz   and I are probably the only two aerospace scientists who claimed to have 100% complete ignorance of this operation.

 Another example is the testimony of Secretary of State Colin Powell concerning the mysterious highly machined  tubes that were discovered to be in the possession of Saddam Hussein. The US Department of Energy, leading the intelligence community ,came up with certain explanations which were presented by Sec. Powell to the UN as  part of  the "conclusive proof" of Saddam Hussein’s nefarious intentions.

I and others had previously concluded that this was part of Saddam Hussein’s attempt to establish his  capability to produce nuclear weapons. AQ Kahn, in his efforts to establish a Pakistani nuclear  capability, commissioned various projects that would test the industrial capability for the precision needed to produce certain components.  Kahn issued purchase orders in order to test certain companies, certain procedures, etc.   This was exactly the same approach that we used on the CIA global Explorer program.  However, due to a shielding of Sec. Powell by his  State department office  chief of staff [a military officer who had been his public relations person in the Pentagon  and had a gigantic ego] this information  was not incorporated and thus Powell had a very public humiliation for presenting misleading testimony  to the United Nations on a crucial issue.

 It has to been my experience in the intelligence community, like in most bureaucracies, the store of  reliable information is at the bottom [working level]. When I was involved with Joe Loftus on the analysis of US intelligence failures. [including the inability of US and British intelligence to locate  the  launch sites of the German V-1  and V-2 rockets; the cascading cheerleading intelligence reports about the Germans retreating and not having any capability to launch an offensive operation just before they launched the Battle of the Bulge, etc.] we found out that compartmentalization was a problem. Another problem was that each level of  command tended to  re-write  the information to improve the grammar and to “smooth out” any ambiguities and/or doubts. That meant that at the top there was no one in the room who had any inkling of the original information and and its  sources, except for the numerical  [or other] ratings that the community itself attached to the source and to the information.

 My favorite source of information on Soviet and now Russian efforts and capabilities is the Russian Academy of Engineering. My principal source was a classmate and friend for more than 50 years.  Utilizing the Academy's robust discussions it is obvious that  energy is the big Achilles’ heel of Russian development and stability.

 Sometime back, I reported that Pres. Putin had disdain for both Hillary Clinton and  Donald Trump. However, Putin   believed that given Hillary Clinton’s announced intention to limit drilling, limit fracking, and otherwise cut back on US energy production capabilities and Putin’s direct  experience with Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, Putin’s preference was Hillary Clinton.Putin had a much  greater preference in sowing confusion and  dissension within the United States. Thus, well before the election  Russian efforts were primarily to create divisions. But, Russian anti- Trump and anti-Clinton efforts [which were minimal in scope and ineffective in  result] were ,early in the campaign, divided 50-50. But when it appeared certain from all the polls and commentary that Hillary was sure to win, Russian efforts were then  primarily directed against  Clinton, in their attempt to damage her, as the expected winner.

 ANY STATEMENT  THAT PUTIN/ RUSSIA ATTEMPTED TO TILT THE ELECTION TO TRUMP IS ACTUALLY CLAIMING THAT PUTIN HAD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF US POLITICS THAN THE NY TIMES, THE WASHINGTON POST, CBS, NBC, ABC, CNN AND THE REST OF THE US  MSM

The key to the entire "Russian collusion" probably  involves   a thorough of examination of John Brennan as the central player of its initiation.

John  Brennan was the CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996 when Islamic terrorists bombed the Khobar Towers [Location‎: ‎Khobar, Saudi Arabia ] killing 20 and injuring 496.  Most of the dead and injured were US service personnel.   Brennan’s  conversion to Islam, while on  CIA duty in Saudi Arabia is still a story to be explored.

John Brennan was the original US contact with British intelligence which was then  used as the "source of information" which served as the basis for the opening of US intelligence surveillance under FISA warrants. John Brennan was the source of the so-called "dossier" which he then transmitted to James Comey. John Brennan and James Comey selected the ad hoc committee which claimed  to   have special access to a close associate of Putin in the Kremlin [and reported that the committee had direct knowledge that Putin had either directly ordered or had explicitly approved Russian meddling in the US 2016 presidential election].

Later, John Brennan testified that the Russian interference was intended to help tip the election away from Hillary Clinton and to Donald Trump. Since Donald Trump's election victory, John Brennan has become much more outspoken as a public critic , claiming that there was direct collusion by Donald Trump and Trump’s election committee with the Russians, etc. etc. Placing John Brennan under oath and intensively   questioning him as to his full involvement from beginning to end would do a lot to clear up current national division  could help put the nation on a course that would effectively allow the US counter North Korea, Iran, and China.

*******
Kremlin Sources Go Quiet, Leaving C.I.A. in the Dark About Putin’s Plans for Midterms
 JULIAN E. BARNES and MATTHEW ROSENBERG New York Times  Aug. 24, 2018

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/us/politics/cia-russia-midterm-elections.html?nl=top-stories&nlid=60863050ries&ref=cta



Vital C.I.A. informants in or close to the Kremlin have largely gone silent ahead of November’s midterm elections, American officials said.Christopher Furlong/Getty Images
WASHINGTON — In 2016, American intelligence agencies delivered urgent and explicit warnings about Russia’s intentions to try to tip the American presidential election — and a detailed assessment of the operation afterward — thanks in large part to informants close to President Vladimir V. Putin and in the Kremlin who provided crucial details.

But two years later, the vital Kremlin informants have largely gone silent, leaving the C.I.A. and other spy agencies in the dark about precisely what Mr. Putin’s intentions are for November’s midterm elections, according to American officials familiar with the intelligence.

The officials do not believe the sources have been compromised or killed. Instead, they have concluded they have gone to ground amid more aggressive counterintelligence by Moscow, including efforts to kill spies, like the poisoning in March in Britain of a former Russian intelligence officer that utilized a rare Russian-made nerve agent.

Current and former officials also said the expulsion of American intelligence officers from Moscow has hurt collection efforts. And officials also raised the possibility that the outing of an F.B.I. informant under scrutiny by the House intelligence committee — an examination encouraged by President Trump — has had a chilling effect on intelligence collection.

Technology companies and political campaigns in recent weeks have detected a plethora of political interference efforts originating overseas, including hacks of Republican think tanks and fake liberal grass-roots organizations created on Facebook. Senior intelligence officials, including Dan Coats, the director of national intelligence, have warned that Russians are intent on subverting American democratic institutions.

But American intelligence agencies have not been able to say precisely what are Mr. Putin’s intentions: He could be trying to tilt the midterm elections, simply sow chaos or generally undermine trust in the democratic process.

The officials, seeking to protect methods of collection from Russia, would not provide details about lost sources, but acknowledged the degradation in the information collected from Russia. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to reveal classified information. A spokesman for the C.I.A. declined to comment.

To determine what the Russian government is up to, the United States employs multiple forms of intelligence, including intercepted communications and penetrated computer networks.


Emergency crews investigate the site where Sergei Skripal and his daughter were found poisoned in Britain. C.I.A. informants in Russia are believed to be underground, fearing aggressive campaigns by Moscow to hunt spies.Ben Stansall/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
The United States continues to intercept Russian communication, and the flow of that intelligence remains strong, said current and former officials. And Russian informants could still meet their C.I.A. handlers outside Russia, further from Moscow’s counterintelligence apparatus.

But people inside or close to the Kremlin remain critical to divining whether there is a strategy behind seemingly scattershot efforts to undermine American institutions.

Spies and informants overseas also give American intelligence agencies early warning about influence campaigns, interference operations or other attempts to compromise the United States. That information, in turn, can improve the ability of domestic agencies, like the Department of Homeland Security and the F.B.I., to quickly identify and attempt to stop those efforts.

Because clandestine meetings can take months to set up and complete, a lengthy lag can pass before the C.I.A. realizes a key source has gone silent, according to former officials. It is rare for the agency to discover immediately that informants have eroded or are running scared. Only after several missed meetings might C.I.A. officers and analysts conclude that a source has decided it is too dangerous to pass information.

In 2016, American intelligence officials began to realize the scope of Russia’s efforts when they gathered intelligence suggesting that Moscow wanted to use Trump campaign officials, wittingly or not, to help sow chaos. John O. Brennan, the former director of the C.I.A., testified before the House Intelligence Committee in May 2017 about a tense period a year earlier when he came to believe that Mr. Putin was trying to steer the outcome toward a victory for Mr. Trump.

Mr. Brennan described the broad outlines of the intelligence in his congressional testimony, and his disclosures backed up the accounts of the information provided by the current and former officials. “I was convinced in the summer that the Russians were trying to interfere in the election. And they were very aggressive,” Mr. Brennan told lawmakers.

This year, Mr. Coats issued a series of warnings saying the Russian government, and Mr. Putin in particular, is intent on undermining American democratic systems.

At an appearance this month at the White House, Mr. Coats said intelligence agencies “continue to see a pervasive messaging campaign by Russia to try and weaken and divide the United States.” He added that those efforts “cover issues relevant to the elections.”

We know that trolls on social media are trying to sow discord on contentious subjects like race, guns and abortion, but how do they do it? Here is a visual guide to their strategy.Aug. 21, 2018
But officials said there has been no concrete intelligence pointing to Mr. Putin ordering his own intelligence units to wade into the election to push for a certain outcome, beyond a broad chaos campaign to undermine faith in American democracy. Intelligence agencies do not believe Mr. Putin has changed his strategy; instead, officials believe they simply do not have the same level of access to information from the Kremlin’s inner circle.

Intelligence collection appears to have suffered after Russia expelled officials from American diplomatic outposts there in retaliation for the United States removing 60 Russian officials this year, said John Sipher, a 28-year veteran of the C.I.A. who served in Moscow in the 1990s and later ran the agency’s Russia program.

The C.I.A.’s Moscow presence, according to former officers, was always small, at least in light of the importance of the target, the difficulty of spycraft and the amount of counterintelligence the Russians dedicated to thwarting American spies.

“The Russians kicked out a whole bunch of our people,” Mr. Sipher said. “Our station in Moscow is probably really small now and they are under incredible surveillance.”

Mr. Putin has also said he is intent on killing so-called traitors, comments he made just ahead of the high-profile assassination attempt of the former Russian intelligence officer, Sergei V. Skripal.

“The Russians are very focused and upset,” Mr. Sipher said. “They have shown they are willing to kill sources.”

Informants close to Putin are very rare, according to current and former officials. The United States, in recent years, has had only a few, and at times been reliant on only one or two for the most important insights on Mr. Putin, according to former officials. If those people go silent for their own protection, it can make it very hard for the agency to look inside Moscow.

The United States still should have a clear view of Mr. Putin’s strategies and intention to interfere in Democratic elections, said Michael Carpenter, a Russia expert and former Obama administration official. He pointed to fake social media accounts created as part of Russian intelligence operations that have drummed up support for white nationalists and the Black Lives Matter movement, and have supported far right, far left and pro-Russian candidates in the United States and in Europe.

Dan Coats, the director of national intelligence, issued warnings in recent weeks that Russia is intent on undermining American democratic systems.Erin Schaff for The New York Times
“Clearly Russia is playing both sides of controversial issues precisely to sow chaos. But that said it is not just chaos, there are certain candidates Russia prefers to see in office,” said Mr. Carpenter, now at the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement. “The Russians are trying to support anti-establishment and pro-Russian candidates, not just in the U.S. but everywhere.”

Still, there is little doubt about the crucial nature of informants, said Seth G. Jones, who leads the transnational threats project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a policy research organization.

“It is essential to have sources coming from inside the government. It was during the Cold War and it is today,” Mr. Jones said. “There are multiple ways to collect intelligence against your adversary, in this case the Russian government. But sources can provide you things you might not otherwise get, like documents, intelligence assessments.”

Sources can provide photographs of Russian documents and intelligence that are hard to intercept electronically, and that can help the United States figure out what Russia is targeting, not just with its election meddling but with its attempts to infiltrate financial systems, the power grid and other critical infrastructure, Mr. Jones said.

The full reasons the sources have gone silent are not known. But current and former officials also said the exposure of sources inside the United States has also complicated matters.

This year, the identity of an F.B.I. informant, Stefan Halper, became public after House lawmakers sought information on him and the White House allowed the information to be shared. Mr. Halper, an American academic based in Britain, had been sent to talk to Trump campaign advisers who were under F.B.I. scrutiny for their ties to Russia.

Current American officials said there is no direct evidence that the exposure of Mr. Halper has been cited by overseas informants as a source of concern.

But the officials said that some allies have cited the exposure of the informant and other intelligence leaks in curbing some of the intelligence they share. And former spies believe that, long-term, the exposure will hurt overseas collection.

“Publicizing sources is really bad for the business,” Mr. Sipher said. “The only thing we can offer people is that we will do anything in our power to protect them. And anything that wears away at that trust, hurts.”

Wednesday, August 22, 2018

Why Innocent People Plead Guilty



Jed S. Rakoff        New York Review of Books   November 20, 2014 Issue

https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/?insrc=whc




The criminal justice system in the United States today bears little relationship to what the Founding Fathers contemplated, what the movies and television portray, or what the average American believes.

To the Founding Fathers, the critical element in the system was the jury trial, which served not only as a truth-seeking mechanism and a means of achieving fairness, but also as a shield against tyranny. As Thomas Jefferson famously said, “I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” The Constitution further guarantees that at the trial, the accused will have the assistance of counsel, who can confront and cross-examine his accusers and present evidence on the accused’s behalf. He may be convicted only if an impartial jury of his peers is unanimously of the view that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and so states, publicly, in its verdict.

The drama inherent in these guarantees is regularly portrayed in movies and television programs as an open battle played out in public before a judge and jury. But this is all a mirage. In actuality, our criminal justice system is almost exclusively a system of plea bargaining, negotiated behind closed doors and with no judicial oversight. The outcome is very largely determined by the prosecutor alone.

In 2013, while 8 percent of all federal criminal charges were dismissed (either because of a mistake in fact or law or because the defendant had decided to cooperate), more than 97 percent of the remainder were resolved through plea bargains, and fewer than 3 percent went to trial. The plea bargains largely determined the sentences imposed.

While corresponding statistics for the fifty states combined are not available, it is a rare state where plea bargains do not similarly account for the resolution of at least 95 percent of the felony cases that are not dismissed; and again, the plea bargains usually determine the sentences, sometimes as a matter of law and otherwise as a matter of practice. Furthermore, in both the state and federal systems, the power to determine the terms of the plea bargain is, as a practical matter, lodged largely in the prosecutor, with the defense counsel having little say and the judge even less.

It was not always so. Until roughly the end of the Civil War, plea bargains were exceedingly rare. A criminal defendant would either go to trial or confess and plead guilty. If the defendant was convicted, the judge would have wide discretion to impose sentence; and that decision, made with little input from the parties, was subject only to the most modest appellate review.

After the Civil War, this began to change, chiefly because, as a result of the disruptions and dislocations that followed the war, as well as greatly increased immigration, crime rates rose considerably, and a way had to be found to dispose of cases without imposing an impossible burden on the criminal justice system. Plea bargains offered a way out: by pleading guilty to lesser charges in return for dismissal of the more serious charges, defendants could reduce their prison time, while the prosecution could resolve the case without burdening the system with more trials.

The practice of plea bargaining never really took hold in most other countries, where it was viewed as a kind of “devil’s pact” that allowed guilty defendants to avoid the full force of the law. But in the United States it became commonplace. And while the Supreme Court initially expressed reservations about the system of plea bargaining, eventually the Court came to approve of it, as an exercise in contractual negotiation between independent agents (the prosecutor and the defense counsel) that was helpful in making the system work. Similarly, academics, though somewhat bothered by the reduced role of judges, came to approve of plea bargaining as a system somewhat akin to a regulatory regime.

Thus, plea bargains came to account, in the years immediately following World War II, for the resolution of over 80 percent of all criminal cases. But even then, perhaps, there were enough cases still going to trial, and enough power remaining with defense counsel and with judges, to “keep the system honest.” By this I mean that a genuinely innocent defendant could still choose to go to trial without fearing that she might thereby subject herself to an extremely long prison term effectively dictated by the prosecutor.

All this changed in the 1970s and 1980s, and once again it was in reaction to rising crime rates. While the 1950s were a period of relatively low crime rates in the US, rates began to rise substantially in the 1960s, and by 1980 or so, serious crime in the US, much of it drug-related, was occurring at a frequency not seen for many decades. As a result, state and federal legislatures hugely increased the penalties for criminal violations. In New York, for example, the so-called “Rockefeller Laws,” enacted in 1973, dictated a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment for selling just two ounces (or possessing four ounces) of heroin, cocaine, or marijuana. In addition, in response to what was perceived as a tendency of too many judges to impose too lenient sentences, the new, enhanced sentences were frequently made mandatory and, in those thirty-seven states where judges were elected, many “soft” judges were defeated and “tough on crime” judges elected in their place.

At the federal level, Congress imposed mandatory minimum sentences for narcotics offenses, gun offenses, child pornography offenses, and much else besides. Sometimes, moreover, these mandatory sentences were required to be imposed consecutively. For example, federal law prescribes a mandatory minimum of ten years’ imprisonment, and a maximum of life imprisonment, for participating in a conspiracy that distributes five kilograms or more of cocaine. But if the use of a weapon is involved in the conspiracy, the defendant, even if she had a low-level role in the conspiracy, must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years’ imprisonment, i.e., ten years on the drug count and five years on the weapons count. And if two weapons are involved, the mandatory minimum rises to forty years, i.e., ten years on the drug count, five years on the first weapons count, and twenty-five years on the second weapons count—all of these sentences being mandatory, with the judge having no power to reduce them.

In addition to mandatory minimums, Congress in 1984 introduced—with bipartisan support—a regime of mandatory sentencing guidelines designed to avoid “irrational” sentencing disparities. Since these guidelines were not as draconian as the mandatory minimum sentences, and since they left judges with some limited discretion, it was not perceived at first how, perhaps even more than mandatory minimums, such a guidelines regime (which was enacted in many states as well) transferred power over sentencing away from judges and into the hands of prosecutors.

One thing that did become quickly apparent, however, was that these guidelines, along with mandatory minimums, were causing the virtual extinction of jury trials in federal criminal cases. Thus, whereas in 1980, 19 percent of all federal defendants went to trial, by 2000 the number had decreased to less than 6 percent and by 2010 to less than 3 percent, where it has remained ever since.

The reason for this is that the guidelines, like the mandatory minimums, provide prosecutors with weapons to bludgeon defendants into effectively coerced plea bargains. In the majority of criminal cases, a defense lawyer only meets her client when or shortly after the client is arrested, so that, at the outset, she is at a considerable informational disadvantage to the prosecutor. If, as is very often the case (despite the constitutional prohibition of “excessive bail”), bail is set so high that the client is detained, the defense lawyer has only modest opportunities, within the limited visiting hours and other arduous restrictions imposed by most jails, to interview her client and find out his version of the facts.

The prosecutor, by contrast, will typically have a full police report, complete with witness interviews and other evidence, shortly followed by grand jury testimony, forensic test reports, and follow-up investigations. While much of this may be one-sided and inaccurate—the National Academy of Science’s recently released report on the unreliability of eyewitness identification well illustrates the danger—it not only gives the prosecutor a huge advantage over the defense counsel but also makes the prosecutor confident, maybe overconfident, of the strength of his case.

Against this background, the information-deprived defense lawyer, typically within a few days after the arrest, meets with the overconfident prosecutor, who makes clear that, unless the case can be promptly resolved by a plea bargain, he intends to charge the defendant with the most severe offenses he can prove. Indeed, until late last year, federal prosecutors were under orders from a series of attorney generals to charge the defendant with the most serious charges that could be proved—unless, of course, the defendant was willing to enter into a plea bargain. If, however, the defendant wants to plead guilty, the prosecutor will offer him a considerably reduced charge—but only if the plea is agreed to promptly (thus saving the prosecutor valuable resources). Otherwise, he will charge the maximum, and, while he will not close the door to any later plea bargain, it will be to a higher-level offense than the one offered at the outset of the case.

In this typical situation, the prosecutor has all the advantages. He knows a lot about the case (and, as noted, probably feels more confident about it than he should, since he has only heard from one side), whereas the defense lawyer knows very little. Furthermore, the prosecutor controls the decision to charge the defendant with a crime. Indeed, the law of every US jurisdiction leaves this to the prosecutor’s unfettered discretion; and both the prosecutor and the defense lawyer know that the grand jury, which typically will hear from one side only, is highly likely to approve any charge the prosecutor recommends.

But what really puts the prosecutor in the driver’s seat is the fact that he—because of mandatory minimums, sentencing guidelines (which, though no longer mandatory in the federal system, are still widely followed by most judges), and simply his ability to shape whatever charges are brought—can effectively dictate the sentence by how he publicly describes the offense. For example, the prosecutor can agree with the defense counsel in a federal narcotics case that, if there is a plea bargain, the defendant will only have to plead guilty to the personal sale of a few ounces of heroin, which carries no mandatory minimum and a guidelines range of less than two years; but if the defendant does not plead guilty, he will be charged with the drug conspiracy of which his sale was a small part, a conspiracy involving many kilograms of heroin, which could mean a ten-year mandatory minimum and a guidelines range of twenty years or more. Put another way, it is the prosecutor, not the judge, who effectively exercises the sentencing power, albeit cloaked as a charging decision.


Brittany Murray/Long Beach Press-Telegram/AP ImagesBrian Banks and his lawyer from the Innocence Project at the dismissal of his wrongful conviction on rape and kidnapping charges, Long Beach, California, May 2012. Banks, who had been a high school football star with a scholarship to USC at the time of his arrest, served five years in prison for a crime he never committed after accepting a plea bargain under the advisement of his original lawyer.
The defense lawyer understands this fully, and so she recognizes that the best outcome for her client is likely to be an early plea bargain, while the prosecutor is still willing to accept a plea to a relatively low-level offense. Indeed, in 2012, the average sentence for federal narcotics defendants who entered into any kind of plea bargain was five years and four months, while the average sentence for defendants who went to trial was sixteen years.

Although under pressure to agree to the first plea bargain offered, prudent defense counsel will try to convince the prosecutor to give her some time to explore legal and factual defenses; but the prosecutor, often overworked and understaffed, may not agree. Defense counsel, moreover, is in no position to abruptly refuse the prosecutor’s proposal, since, under recent Supreme Court decisions, she will face a claim of “ineffective assistance of counsel” if, without consulting her client, she summarily rejects a plea bargain simply as a negotiating ploy.

Defense counsel also recognizes that, even if she thinks the plea bargain being offered is unfair compared to those offered by other, similarly situated prosecutors, she has little or no recourse. An appeal to the prosecutor’s superior will rarely succeed, since the superiors feel the need to support their troops and since, once again, the prosecutor can shape the facts so as to make his superior find his proposed plea acceptable. And there is no way defense counsel can appeal to a neutral third party, the judge, since in all but a few jurisdictions, the judiciary is precluded from participating in plea bargain negotiations. In a word, she and her client are stuck.

Though there are many variations on this theme, they all prove the same basic point: the prosecutor has all the power. The Supreme Court’s suggestion that a plea bargain is a fair and voluntary contractual arrangement between two relatively equal parties is a total myth: it is much more like a “contract of adhesion” in which one party can effectively force its will on the other party.

As for the suggestion from some academics that this is the equivalent of a regulatory process, that too is a myth: for, quite aside from the imbalance of power, there are no written regulations controlling the prosecutor’s exercise of his charging power and no established or meaningful process for appealing his exercise of that power. The result is that, of the 2.2 million Americans now in prison—an appalling number in its own right—well over two million are there as a result of plea bargains dictated by the government’s prosecutors, who effectively dictate the sentences as well.

A cynic might ask: What’s wrong with that? After all, crime rates have declined over the past twenty years to levels not seen since the early 1960s, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that our criminal justice system, by giving prosecutors the power to force criminals to accept significant jail terms, has played a major part in this reduction. Most Americans feel a lot safer today than they did just a few decades ago, and that feeling has contributed substantially to their enjoyment of life. Why should we cavil at the empowering of prosecutors that has brought us this result?

The answer may be found in Jefferson’s perception that a criminal justice system that is secret and government-dictated ultimately invites abuse and even tyranny. Specifically, I would suggest that the current system of prosecutor-determined plea bargaining invites the following objections.

First, it is one-sided. Our criminal justice system is premised on the notion that, before we deprive a person of his liberty, he will have his “day in court,” i.e., he will be able to put the government to its proof and present his own facts and arguments, following which a jury of his peers will determine whether or not he is guilty of a crime and a neutral judge will, if he is found guilty, determine his sentence. As noted, numerous guarantees of this fair-minded approach are embodied in our Constitution, and were put there because of the Founding Fathers’ experience with the rigged British system of colonial justice. Is not the plea bargain system we have now substituted for our constitutional ideal similarly rigged?

Second, and closely related, the system of plea bargains dictated by prosecutors is the product of largely secret negotiations behind closed doors in the prosecutor’s office, and is subject to almost no review, either internally or by the courts. Such a secretive system inevitably invites arbitrary results. Indeed, there is a great irony in the fact that legislative measures that were designed to rectify the perceived evils of disparity and arbitrariness in sentencing have empowered prosecutors to preside over a plea-bargaining system that is so secretive and without rules that we do not even know whether or not it operates in an arbitrary manner.

Third, and possibly the gravest objection of all, the prosecutor-dictated plea bargain system, by creating such inordinate pressures to enter into plea bargains, appears to have led a significant number of defendants to plead guilty to crimes they never actually committed. For example, of the approximately three hundred people that the Innocence Project and its affiliated lawyers have proven were wrongfully convicted of crimes of rape or murder that they did not in fact commit, at least thirty, or about 10 percent, pleaded guilty to those crimes. Presumably they did so because, even though they were innocent, they faced the likelihood of being convicted of capital offenses and sought to avoid the death penalty, even at the price of life imprisonment. But other publicized cases, arising with disturbing frequency, suggest that this self-protective psychology operates in noncapital cases as well, and recent studies suggest that this is a widespread problem. For example, the National Registry of Exonerations (a joint project of Michigan Law School and Northwestern Law School) records that of 1,428 legally acknowledged exonerations that have occurred since 1989 involving the full range of felony charges, 151 (or, again, about 10 percent) involved false guilty pleas.

It is not difficult to perceive why this should be so. After all, the typical person accused of a crime combines a troubled past with limited resources: he thus recognizes that, even if he is innocent, his chances of mounting an effective defense at trial may be modest at best. If his lawyer can obtain a plea bargain that will reduce his likely time in prison, he may find it “rational” to take the plea.

Every criminal defense lawyer (and I was both a federal prosecutor and a criminal defense lawyer before going on the bench) has had the experience of a client who first tells his lawyer he is innocent and then, when confronted with a preview of the government’s proof, says he is guilty. Usually, he is in fact guilty and was previously lying to his lawyer (despite the protections of the attorney–client privilege, which many defendants, suspicious even of their court-appointed lawyers, do not appreciate). But sometimes the situation is reversed, and the client now lies to his lawyer by saying he is guilty when in fact he is not, because he has decided to “take the fall.”

In theory, this charade should be exposed at the time the defendant enters his plea, since the judge is supposed to question the defendant about the facts underlying his confession of guilt. But in practice, most judges, happy for their own reasons to avoid a time-consuming trial, will barely question the defendant beyond the bare bones of his assertion of guilt, relying instead on the prosecutor’s statement (untested by any cross-examination) of what the underlying facts are. Indeed, in situations in which the prosecutor and defense counsel themselves recognize that the guilty plea is somewhat artificial, they will have jointly arrived at a written statement of guilt for the defendant to read that cleverly covers all the bases without providing much detail. The Supreme Court, for its part, has gone so far (with the Alford plea of 1970) as to allow a defendant to enter a guilty plea while factually maintaining his innocence.

While, moreover, a defendant’s decision to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit may represent a “rational,” if cynical, cost-benefit analysis of his situation, in fact there is some evidence that the pressure of the situation may cause an innocent defendant to make a less-than-rational appraisal of his chances for acquittal and thus decide to plead guilty when he not only is actually innocent but also could be proven so. Research indicates that young, unintelligent, or risk-averse defendants will often provide false confessions just because they cannot “take the heat” of an interrogation. Although research into false guilty pleas is far less developed, it may be hypothesized that similar pressures, less immediate but more prolonged, may be in effect when a defendant is told, often by his own lawyer, that there is a strong case against him, that his likelihood of acquittal is low, and that he faces a mandatory minimum of five or ten years in prison if convicted and a guidelines range of considerably more—but that, if he acts swiftly, he can get a plea bargain to a lesser offense that will reduce his prison time by many years.

How prevalent is the phenomenon of innocent people pleading guilty? The few criminologists who have thus far investigated the phenomenon estimate that the overall rate for convicted felons as a whole is between 2 percent and 8 percent. The size of that range suggests the imperfection of the data; but let us suppose that it is even lower, say, no more than 1 percent. When you recall that, of the 2.2 million Americans in prison, over 2 million are there because of plea bargains, we are then talking about an estimated 20,000 persons, or more, who are in prison for crimes to which they pleaded guilty but did not in fact commit.

What can we do about it? If there were the political will to do so, we could eliminate mandatory minimums, eliminate sentencing guidelines, and dramatically reduce the severity of our sentencing regimes in general. But even during the second Obama administration, the very modest steps taken by Attorney General Eric Holder to moderate sentences have been met by stiff opposition, some from within his own department. For example, the attorney general’s public support for a bipartisan bill that would reduce mandatory minimums for certain narcotics offenses prompted the National Association of Assistant US Attorneys to send an “open letter” of opposition, while a similar letter denouncing the bill was signed by two former attorney generals, three former chiefs of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and eighteen former US attorneys.

Reflecting, perhaps, the religious origins of our country, Americans are notoriously prone to making moral judgments. Often this serves salutary purposes; but a by-product of this moralizing tendency is a punitiveness that I think is not likely to change in the near future. Indeed, on those occasions when Americans read that someone accused of a very serious crime has been permitted to plea bargain to a considerably reduced offense, their typical reaction is one of suspicion or outrage, and sometimes not without reason. Rarely, however, do they contemplate the possibility that the defendant may be totally innocent of any charge but is being coerced into pleading to a lesser offense because the consequences of going to trial and losing are too severe to take the risk.

I am driven, in the end, to advocate what a few jurisdictions, notably Connecticut and Florida, have begun experimenting with: involving judges in the plea-bargaining process. At present, this is forbidden in the federal courts, and with good reason: for a judge to involve herself runs the risk of compromising her objectivity if no bargain is reached. For similar reasons, many federal judges (including this one) refuse to involve themselves in settlement negotiations in civil cases, even though, unlike the criminal plea bargain situation, there is no legal impediment to doing so. But the problem is solved in civil cases by referring the settlement negotiations to magistrates or special masters who do not report the results to the judges who handle the subsequent proceedings. If the federal rule were changed, the same could be done in the criminal plea bargain situation.

As I envision it, shortly after an indictment is returned (or perhaps even earlier if an arrest has occurred and the defendant is jailed), a magistrate would meet separately with the prosecutor and the defense counsel, in proceedings that would be recorded but placed under seal, and all present would be provided with the particulars regarding the evidence and issues in the case. In certain circumstances, the magistrate might interview witnesses or examine other evidence, again under seal so as not to compromise any party’s strategy. He might even interview the defendant, under an arrangement where it would not constitute a waiver of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

The prosecutor would, in the meantime, be precluded from making any plea bargain offer (or threat) while the magistrate was studying the case. Once the magistrate was ready, he would then meet separately with both sides and, if appropriate, make a recommendation, such as to dismiss the case (if he thought the proof was weak), to proceed to trial (if he thought there was no reasonable plea bargain available), or to enter into a plea bargain along lines the magistrate might suggest. No party would be required to follow the magistrate’s suggestions. Their force, if any, would come from the fact that they were being suggested by a neutral third party, who, moreover, was a judicial officer that the prosecutors and the defense lawyers would have to appear before in many other cases.

Would a plan structured along these lines wholly eliminate false guilty pleas? Probably not, but it likely would reduce their number. Would it present new, unforeseeable problems of its own? Undoubtedly, which is why I would recommend that it first be tried as a pilot program. Even given the current federal rules prohibiting judges from involving themselves in the plea-bargaining process, I think something like this could be undertaken, since most such rules can be waived and the relevant parties could here agree to waive them for the limited purposes of a pilot program.

I am under no illusions that this suggested involvement of judges in the plea-bargaining process is a panacea. But would not any program that helps to reduce the shame of sending innocent people to prison be worth trying?

Letters

‘Why the Innocent Plead Guilty’: An Exchange January 8, 2015


Plea Bargains & Prosecutors: An Exchange December 18, 2014