Thursday, June 28, 2012

IDF chief of staff-turned-vice premier: 'We are not bluffing' Moshe Ya'alon tells Ari Shavit he is preparing for war. He suggests you do the same. By Ari Shavit | Jun.14, 2012

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IDF chief of staff-turned-vice premier: 'We are not bluffing'
Moshe Ya'alon tells Ari Shavit he is preparing for war. He suggests you do the same.
By Ari Shavit | Jun.14, 2012     FROM HAARATZ  Questions in blue .  contentious questions in red



Exactly seven years ago, I interviewed the chief of staff. On the eve of his retirement from the Israel Defense Forces, Moshe “Bogie” Ya’alon spoke with an expressionless face against the Gaza disengagement, against a Palestinian state and against giving terrorism a “tailwind.” He predicted that Hamas would seize control of the Gaza Strip and that rockets would rain down on Israeli cities. But when, at the end of the interview, we were joined by the Israel Defense Forces spokeswoman and a Haaretz photographer, the chief of staff became a different person. As the photographer had him pose in his office, he started telling jokes.
With a mischievous smile on his face and a naughty twinkle in his eye, the tall, bespectacled officer had everyone roaring with laughter at ethnic jokes, accent jokes and small-town jokes. Suddenly he was no longer a tough chief of the General Staff in a starched uniform, but a delightful jester bursting with life. If I describe this scene to my readers, I said to the IDF spokeswoman, they will think I was on some sort of drug: No one will believe that behind the stone face that Chief of Staff Ya’alon puts on lurks this affable, free-spirited Bogie with a terrific sense of humor.
A great many things have been burned into people’s minds since that standup act on the 14th floor of the IDF tower in the Kirya defense headquarters in Tel Aviv. To the astonishment of many, Hamas did in fact seize control of Gaza and did indeed rain down rockets on Israeli cities. To the amazement of others, Ya’alon did not pursue a career as a school principal in the Arava, but pursued a political career and has even done well in politics. Within a few years, the dairy farmer from Kibbutz Grofit, north of Eilat, became one of the most right-wing leaders of the right wing.
True, Bogie has surprised the “national camp” time and again. He spoke out against the exclusion of women from public events due to religious strictures, opposed racism against migrants and objected to the silencing of reporters. He supported same-sex marriage and the right of Supreme Court Justice Salim Joubran not to sing the national anthem.
But despite his partial “otherness,” this son of the Labor Movement became the hero of the followers of Jabotinsky, the hero of the settlement project and the hero of hawkishness. It is only in regard to the Iranian issue that the minister of strategic threats is perceived as a dove. In closed conversations he reiterates his deep concern about the influence wielded by Ehud Barak on Benjamin Netanyahu, and about the possibility that the former will drag the latter into a wanton Iranian adventure.
In the modest living room of his kibbutz home, where he lives with his wife Ada, Ya’alon sits across from me in shorts, a blue shirt and sandals. He gets up to make a cup of black coffee and pushes a dish of dates toward me. This time he doesn't tell jokes. In a very accurate and concentrated way, the vice premier describes a harsh reality. That is why he agreed to give this unprecedented interview. Ya'alon believes the time has come to narrow the gap between what he knows and what we know. He believes it is time to tell the people of Israel what they are up against.
Moshe “Bogie” Ya’alon, could a war erupt this year?
“I hope not. I hope that in regard to Iran it will be possible to say, as the old saw goes, that the work of the just is done by others. But obviously we are preparing for every possibility. If I am not for myself, who will be for me?”
If you had to provide a comprehensive intelligence assessment today, would you say that the probability of a war in the year ahead is negligible, low, middling or high?
“The probability of an initiated attack on Israel is low. I do not see an Arab coalition armed from head to foot deploying on our borders − not this year, not in the year after and not in the foreseeable future. Despite the trend toward Islamization in the Middle East, we enjoy security and relative quiet along the borders. But the No. 1 challenge is that of Iran. If anyone attacks Iran, it’s clear that Iran will take action against us. If anyone, no matter who, decides to take military action against Iran’s nuclear project, there is a high probability that Iran will react against us, too, and will fire missiles at Israel. There is also a high probability that Hezbollah and Islamist elements in the Gaza Strip will operate against us. That possibility exists, and it’s with a view to that possibility that we have to deploy.”
What the vice premier is telling me is that we are close to the moment of truth regarding Iran.
“Definitely. When I was director of Military Intelligence, in the 1990s, Iran did not possess one kilogram of enriched uranium. Today it has 6,300 kilograms of uranium enriched to a level of 3.5 percent and about 150 kilograms enriched to a level of 20 percent. When I was chief of staff, in the first decade of this century, Iran had a few hundred centrifuges, most of which were substandard.
“At present there are about 10,000 centrifuges in Natanz and in Kom, which are enriching about eight kilograms of uranium a day. Since this government took office in 2009, the number of centrifuges in Iran has almost doubled and the amount of enriched uranium has increased sixfold. The meaning of these data is that Iran already today has enough enriched uranium to manufacture five atomic bombs. If Iran is not stopped, within a year it will have enough uranium for seven or eight atomic bombs.
“In addition, the Iranians apparently possess a weapons development system which they are hiding from the international supervisory apparatus. The Iranians also have 400 missiles of different types, which can reach the whole area of Israel and certain parts of Europe. Those missiles were built from the outset with the ability to carry nuclear warheads. So the picture is clear. Five years ago, even three years ago, Iran was not within the zone of the nuclear threshold. Today it is. Before our eyes Iran is becoming a nuclear-threshold power.”
But to build a nuclear bomb Iran needs uranium enriched to a level of 90 percent and above. At the moment it is still not there.
“True, but if Iran goes confrontational and goes nuclear, it has the capability to enrich uranium to above 90 percent within two or three months. Even if it does not build a standard nuclear bomb, within less than six months it will be in possession of at least one primitive nuclear device: a dirty bomb.”
If so, maybe it’s already too late. The Iranians won and we lost and we have to resign ourselves to Iran’s being in possession of nuclear weapons in the near future.
“Absolutely not. It will be disastrous if we or the international community become resigned to the idea of a nuclear Iran. The regime of the ayatollahs is apocalyptic-messianic in character. It poses a challenge to Western culture and to the world order. Its scale of values and its religious beliefs are different, and its ambition is to foist them on everyone. Accordingly, it is an obligation to prevent this nonconventional regime from acquiring nonconventional weapons. Neither we nor the West is at liberty to accept an Iranian nuclear bomb. What I am telling you is not rhetoric and it is not propaganda. A nuclear Iran is a true threat to world peace.”
Crossing red lines
But you yourself are telling me that the Iranians have already crossed most of the red lines. They have swept past the points of no return. Doesn’t that mean that we are now facing the cruel dilemma of bomb or bombing?
“We are not there yet. I hope we will not get there. The international community can still act aggressively and with determination. Other developments are also feasible. But if the question is bomb or bombing, the answer is clear: bomb.
The answer is clear to you but not to me. We survived the Cold War. We also survived the nuclearization of Pakistan and North Korea. Israel is said to possess strategic capability that is able to create decisive deterrence against Iran. Would it not be right to say that just as Europe lived with the Soviet bomb, we will be able to live in the future with the Shiite bomb?
“No and no and again no. The first answer to your question is that if Iran goes nuclear, four or five more countries in the Middle East are liable to go nuclear, too. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan and other Arab states will say that if Iran has a bomb they also need a bomb. The result will be a nuclear Middle East. A nuclear Middle East will not be stable and therefore the world will not be stable. Iranian nuclearization will bring in its wake nuclear chaos.
“The second answer to your question is that a nuclear umbrella will allow Iran to achieve regional hegemony. The Gulf states, finding themselves under that umbrella, will ask themselves which they prefer: distant Washington or nearby Tehran. In my view, they will opt for nearby Tehran. A nuclear Iran is liable to take control of the energy sources in the Persian Gulf and of a very large slice of the world’s oil supply. That will have far-reaching international implications. But a nuclear Iran will also challenge Israel and bring about a series of brutal conventional confrontations on our borders. That will have serious consequences for Israel.
“The third answer to your question is that one day the Iranian regime is liable to use its nuclear capability. That does not mean that the day after the Iranians acquire a bomb they will load it on a plane or a missile and drop it on a Western city. But there is a danger of the use of nuclear weapons by means of proxies. A terrorist organization could smuggle a dirty bomb into the port of New York or the port of London or the port of Haifa. I also do not rule out the possibility of the direct use of nuclear weapons by means of missiles. That risk is low, but it exists. That extreme scenario is not impossible.”
But the Iranians are rational, and the use of nuclear weapons is an irrational act. Like the Soviets, they will never do that.
“A Western individual observing the fantastic ambitions of the Iranian leadership scoffs: ‘What do they think, that they will Islamize us?’ The surprising answer is: Yes, they think they will Islamize us: The ambition of the present regime in Tehran is for the Western world to become Muslim at the end of a lengthy process. Accordingly, we have to understand that their rationality is completely different from our rationality. Their concepts are different and their considerations are different. They are completely unlike the former Soviet Union. They are not even like Pakistan or North Korea. If Iran enjoys a nuclear umbrella and the feeling of strength of a nuclear power, there is no knowing how it will behave. It will be impossible to accommodate a nuclear Iran and it will be impossible to attain stability. The consequences of a nuclear Iran will be catastrophic.”
Bombing too will have catastrophic consequences: a regional war, a religious war, thousands of civilians killed.
“Anyone who has experienced war, as I have, does not want war. War is a dire event. But the question is: What is the alternative? What is the other option to war? I told you once and will tell you again: If it is bomb or bombing, from my point of view it is bombing. True, bombing will have a price. We must not underestimate or overestimate that price. We have to assume that Israel will be attacked by Iranian missiles, many of which will be intercepted by the Arrow system. We have to assume that Hezbollah will join the confrontation and fire thousands of rockets at us. Rockets will also be fired from the Gaza Strip. The probability of Syria entering the fray is low, but we have to deploy for that possibility, too. I am not saying it will be easy. But when you pit all of that against the alternative of a nuclear Iran, there is no hesitation at all. It is preferable to pay the steep price of war than to allow Iran to acquire military nuclear capability. That’s as clear as day, as far as I am concerned.”
How many casualties will we have? Hundreds? Thousands?
“I cannot estimate how many will be killed, but I suggest that we not terrify ourselves. Every person killed is great sorrow. But we have to be ready to pay the price that is required so that Iran does not go nuclear. Again: I hope it does not come to that. I hope that it will be done by others. In the Iranians’ eyes, Israel is only the Little Satan, and the United States is the Great Satan. But as I told you: If I am not for myself, who will be for me? “
Hezbollah scenario
Hezbollah can hit every place in Israel today: population centers, army bases, strategic targets. Doesn’t the scenario of a massive missile attack make you lose sleep?
“My assessment is that Hezbollah will enter the fray. But what happened in the Second Lebanon War will not be repeated. The way to stop the rockets is to exact from the other side a price that will oblige it to ask for a cease-fire. We have the ability to hit Hezbollah with 150 times the explosives that it can hit us with. We can also do it a lot more accurately. If we are attacked from inside Lebanon, the government of Lebanon will bear very great responsibility.”
You answered my question about the home front. But what about the argument that bombing will spark a permanent religious war and will unify the Iranian people around the regime? What about the argument that bombing will in fact cause the collapse of the sanctions and allow Iran to go confrontational and hurtle openly toward nuclear capability?
“First things first and last things last. In regard to a religious war, isn’t the regime in Iran waging a religious war against us today? In regard to the people unifying behind the regime: I do not accept that. I think that an operation could even destabilize the regime. In my estimation, 70 percent of the Iranians will be happy to be rid of the regime of the ayatollahs.
“Let me reply in greater detail to the argument that Iran will hurtle toward nuclearization on the day after the bombing. Those who focus the debate on the narrow technological aspect of the problem can argue that all that will be achieved is a delay of a year or two, not much more. If so, they will say, ‘What did we accomplish? What did we gain?’ But the question is far broader. One of the important elements here is to convince the Iranian regime that the West is determined to prevent its acquisition of nuclear capability. And what demonstrates greater determination than the use of force?
“Therefore, it is wrong for us to view a military operation and its results only from an engineering point of view. I want to remind you that in the discussions of the security cabinet before the Israeli attack on [the nuclear reactor in] Iraq, the experts claimed that Saddam Hussein would acquire a new reactor with a year. They were right from the engineering aspect but mistaken historically. If Iran does go confrontational and tries openly to manufacture nuclear weapons, it will find itself in a head-on confrontation with the international community. The president of the United States has undertaken that Iran will not be a nuclear power. If Iran defies him directly, it will have to deal with him and will embark upon a collision course with the West.”
But the Americans are with us. The Americans will rescue us. Why jump in head-first?
“There is agreement between the United States and us on the goal, and agreement on intelligence and close cooperation. But we are in disagreement about the red line. For the Americans, the red line is an order by [Ayatollah] Khamenei to build a nuclear bomb. For us, the red line is Iranian ability to build a nuclear bomb.
“We do not accept the American approach for three reasons. First, because it implies that Iran can be a threshold-power which, as long as it does not manufacture nuclear weapons in practice is allowed to possess the ability to manufacture them. Second, because in our assessment there is no certainty that it will be possible to intercept in time the precious report that Khamenei finally gave the order to build a bomb . Third, there is a disparity between the sense of threat and urgency in Jerusalem and the sense of threat and urgency in Washington.”
Yet, Israel is not believed either internationally or domestically. The feeling is that Israel is crying wolf and playing a sophisticated game of ‘Hold me back.’
“Let me say one thing to you in English, because it is very important for English speakers to understand it: ‘We are not bluffing.’ If the political-economic pressure is played out and the other alternatives are played out, and Iran continues to hurtle toward a bomb, decisions will have to be made.”
Is there a danger that the Iranian crisis will reach its peak already in the year ahead?
“There was a time when we talked about a decade. Afterward we talked about years. Now we are talking about months. It is possible that the sanctions will suddenly work. But presently we are in a situation that necessitates a daily check. I am not exaggerating: daily. From our point of view, Iranian ability to manufacture nuclear weapons is a sword held over our throat. The sword is getting closer and closer. Under no circumstances will Israel agree to let the sword touch its throat.”
‘Cruel truth’
Bogie, what happened to you? You are a Mapainik from the Labor-oriented Haifa suburbs, a kibbutznik and a Rabinist from Oslo. Why did you suddenly move to beyond the hills of darkness of the right? Isn’t it odd for you to wake up in the morning and discover that you have become a Likudnik?
“The question is not what happened to me but what happened to the camp in which I grew up. The Labor Movement had Yitzhak Tabenkin and Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin. Even Rabin, from the Oslo process, was never from Peace Now. A month before he was assassinated he spoke in the Knesset about an eternally unified Jerusalem, and about the Jordan Rift Valley under Israeli sovereignty and about a Palestinian entity that would be less than a state. Rabin supported the Allon Plan in the broad sense and was firmly against a withdrawal to the 1967 lines ... Morally, mortal danger overcomes land, but in practice giving up land causes mortal danger. That is the reality we live in. That is the truth, however cruel.”
Let’s assume there is no “land for peace,” but that there is “land for Zionism” - land in return for our ability to maintain a Jewish democratic state that does not commit suicide by occupation and settlements.
“As long as the other side is not ready to recognize our right to exist as the nation-state of the Jewish people, I am not ready to forgo a millimeter. I am not even willing to talk about territory. After land-for-peace became land-for-terror and land-for-rockets, I am no longer willing to bury my head in the sand. In the reality of the Middle East what is needed is stability above all. Stability is achieved not by means of imaginary agreements on the White House lawn but by means of defense, by means of a thick stick and a carrot.”
And we can live like this for another 20 years?
“We can live like this for another 100 years, too.”
But we are rotting away, Bogie. Demographically, politically and morally, we are rotting.
“The demographic argument is a lie. As for the political legitimacy, I prefer to operate against a threatening entity from within the present lines. And morally, as long as the Palestinians do not recognize the right of existence of a Jewish state, they are the aggressor. After all, they do not recognize my right to live in Tel Aviv, either. From their point of view, the occupation did not begin in 1967 but in 1948. Anyone who claims otherwise is throwing sand in your eyes or deceiving himself.”
And what do you propose for the future? Another 100 settlements? A million Jewish settlers in Judea and Samaria?
“The establishment of more settlements touches on political and state sensitivities. But there are now already 350,000 settlers in Judea and Samaria. If the political reality does not change, their number could rise to a million.”
If so, what kind of reality will we be living in 10 years from now? A million Jews in Judea and Samaria, the Palestinians with no state and the two populations intermingled?
“The Palestinians will have autonomy and have their own parliament. I can tolerate that state of affairs. Any other state of affairs will be irresponsible in security terms. Do you want snipers in Jerusalem? Do you want rockets hitting Ben-Gurion airport? It is the Palestinians who are placing us in this difficult situation.
“I was ready to divide the land. They are not ready to divide the land and recognize my right to exist here within some sort of border. Therefore, because they say ‘either them or us,’ I say ‘us.’ Until I hear Abu Mazen [Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas] say there is a Jewish people with a connection to the Land of Israel, and until I see the three-year-old in Ramallah learning that Israel has a right to exist − that is the state of affairs.”
If so, there will be no peace, no withdrawal and no Palestinian state. There will be no two-state solution.
“In the present situation ‘solution’ is a dirty word. One of our biggest problems is that we have become solution-oriented and now-oriented and expect a solution now. We believe that we are omnipotent and have the ability to find a solution to this problem which torments us. But I believe a person should be more modest. What’s needed is not to look for a solution but to look for a path. There are problems in life that have no solution. And at the moment the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a problem with no solution. Anyone who suggests a solution-now of one kind or another is not suggesting a true solution but a false illusion. A golden calf. Self-deception.”
Syrian debacle
Bogie, I understand what you are saying, but it is impossible live with what you are saying. All you are offering me is a wall, an iron wall, a determined stance. There is no hope in your words. No latitude. No movement toward some sort of horizon.
“I am actually very optimistic. I see where my grandfather and grandmother were and where my parents were and where I am and where my children are − and I see that time is not working against us. Time works in favor of everyone who knows how to take advantage of it. That is the secret of Zionism. And when our ethos is to build and the ethos of the other side is to destroy, our ethos will triumph. But what we have to free ourselves of is being solution-oriented and now-oriented and of self-blame. We have to free ourselves of the way of thinking that holds that if I give to the enemy and if I please the enemy, the enemy will give me quiet. That is an Ashkenazi way of thinking; it is not connected to the reality of the Middle East.”
The Damascus regime understands that very well and is defending its honor by killing thousands of innocent civilians. Aren’t you concerned that the chaos in Syria will result in chemical weapons being smuggled out of that country?
“As of now, we are seeing good control by the Syrians of their chemical weapons supplies. But everyone with eyes in his head should prepare for future developments. There is international deployment in this regard. The Western states are focused on securing the stocks of chemical weapons in Syria.”
With your permission, as the interview draws to a close, we will move to a few personal pleasures. Why do you despise Ehud Barak?
“When you live in a military system, you are living within a particular ethical system. There are values, there are codes, there is high regard even when there is no agreement. When you see someone distancing himself from those values, a crisis ensues, and disappointment. It is a moral disappointment.”
At the moment we are going through a serious moral crisis as reflected in the Harpaz affair. Where do you stand in regard to that grave issue?
“It is hard for me to read what is being published. What is being published demands explanations from the two bureaus and from the two people who headed those bureaus. It’s clear that what this affair did not have was a responsible adult. Now it is necessary to complete the clarification process as quickly as possible, whether by completing the state comptroller’s report or by a criminal investigation. If I were defense minister I would have treated the wound when it was small, and not allowed it to become a festering abscess that damages the government, the army and the country’s security.”
But you are not the defense minister; you are a kind of upgraded minister without portfolio. Yair Lapid claims that this is a form of corruption.
“There is a knight-on-a-white-horse phenomenon in Israeli politics: the Democratic Movement for Change, Shinui, the Center Party, Kadima. These knights appear like fireflies and then disappear. Why? Because they do not possess an ideological backbone, only rhetoric that generates white hope of a white knight on a white horse. Regrettably, there are fools who flock to these white knights.
“I certainly welcome everyone who is ready to plunge his hands into the cold water of politics. Truly. But it seems to me a little pretentious to appear on television and write columns in a newspaper and think that you can be prime minister. A little humility, a little responsibility. First work as an MK, then become a minister, prove that you can manage a system. Occupy yourself with questions of life and death, like the ones I dealt with for 37 years. I find the notion that you can move from the media to being the leader of the country a bit childish.”
But you suffer from the opposite problem. You are tough, you are grim. There is a feeling that you are uncomfortable on television and on the stage and in the public arena.
“I am in the game and I have to play by the rules of the game, but it’s possible that people also discern that it’s hard for me.”
And the goal is to win the game: to become prime minister?
“One of the good things in Likud is that when there is a leader, he gets backing. No attempt is made to subvert him. But in the remote future, after a lot more water flows in the Jordan and Benjamin Netanyahu decides that he no longer wants to head the party and the country, we will be in a different situation. I definitely see myself contesting the leadership. The premiership, too.”

Rally for Egypt's New President Morsi, Israel's New Neighbor…..Link

Rally for Egypt's New President Morsi, Israel's New Neighbor…..Link

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9znepNvkrxI&feature=player_embedded

This video captures the frantic anti-Israel venomous ravings that mere words cannot describe.

Syria's chemical weapons: How secure are they from jihadists?
By Nicholas Blanford June 27, 2012 


Syria has been amassing chemical weapons since the 1980s and is believed to have a larger stockpile than any other country that has faced ethnic civil war

BEIRUT — (TCSM) As Syria slides into ever worsening violence and parts of the country begin to slip out of control of the state, Syria's chemical and biological weapons arsenal, air defense systems, and ballistic missiles could be up for grabs — a potential bonanza for radical militant groups and a massive challenge for the West in attempting to check proliferation.
Hard data on Syria's chemical and biological warfare capabilities is scarce, but the country is believed to have one of the largest chemical agents stockpiles in the world, including VX and Sarin nerve agents. It also has an impressive number of surface-to-surface missiles, such as Scud-Ds which can be fitted with chemical warheads, and modern Russian anti-aircraft missile batteries, including portable shoulder-fired systems.
"This is unknown territory," says Charles Blair, senior fellow for State and Non-State Threats at the Washington-based Federation of American Scientists. "We have never been through the potential collapse via a very bloody ethnic civil war of a country that is likely armed with a very large stockpile of chemical weapons."
Syria is not a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention and denies having a chemical or biological weapons programs. But Western intelligence agencies believe Syria began developing a nonconventional arsenal in the 1980s with the assistance of the Soviet Union.
They believe Syria has amassed sizable quantities of blistering agents, such as mustard gas — widely used in World War I and in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war — as well as Sarin and VX. The chemical agents are designed to be fitted to an array of delivery systems, from Scud-D short-range ballistic missiles to a projectile as small as an artillery shell.
Syria also is suspected of having a biological warfare program, possibly involving anthrax, although few details are known and the scale is thought to be small.
According to a recent report by the US-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, there are five identifiable chemical agent manufacturing plants in Syria. They are located in the following areas: Al Safir, southeast of Aleppo; Latakia, on the Mediterranean coast; near Dumayr, 16 miles northeast of Damascus; Khan Abu Shamat, 22 miles east of Damascus; and Al Furqlus in Homs province.
Diplomats and analysts interviewed for this article estimate that there are several dozen additional storage sites scattered across the country, some of them in hardened underground bunkers dug into the sides of hills, complicating efforts by Western intelligence agencies to identify the facilities and draw up plans to secure or destroy them.
"There are a significant number [of sites] large enough to make it a significant problem," says a Western diplomat with access to intelligence data. "[But] Some who are a little closer to the problem with a more urgent interest have a very good idea where they are," the diplomat added, in a veiled reference to Israel.
ISRAEL'S CONCERN: SCUD MISSILES TIPPED WITH WARHEADS ON ITS BORDER
Israel has been watching the escalating violence in Syria with growing alarm. Even though the Assad regime is a close ally of Iran and the militant Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah, Syria's border with Israel in the Golan Heights has been dormant for almost 40 years under the Assads. Israel, already worried at a deteriorating security situation along its southern border with Egypt, now also faces the possibility of its enemies in the north acquiring chemical weapons or ballistic missiles.
"Syria today is the largest chemical-weapons stockpile in our region," Maj. Gen. Yair Naveh, deputy chief of staff of the Israeli army, told Israel's Hayom newspaper two weeks ago. "These missiles can reach every point in Israel, so we must not relax our vigilance."
Israel worries that Hezbollah in Lebanon may acquire Scud missiles perhaps tipped with chemical warheads to enhance its deterrence posture against Israel.
In April 2010, Israel claimed that Syria had transferred control of some Scuds to Hezbollah at military depots near Damascus, although there were conflicting reports as to whether any of the missiles had been smuggled across the border into Lebanon.
Recent reports in the Israeli media have addressed the threat again. Israel says it regards Hezbollah's acquisition of Scuds as a "red line" requiring a response.
Hezbollah's leadership regularly boasts that nowhere in Israel is beyond the reach of its rocket arsenal, which certainly would be true if the Shiite movement had acquired Scud-D missiles, which have a range of about 435 miles.
But while Hezbollah's rocket arsenal is widely believed to have expanded in quantity and quality since the month-long 2006 war with Israel, some analysts question whether Hezbollah would seek Scud missiles because of the logistical complexities involved.
Smuggling the 37-foot missiles into Lebanon along with their even larger dedicated mobile launcher and storing them safely and in secret would be a formidable undertaking. Furthermore, unlike Hezbollah's arsenal of solid-fueled artillery rockets, which can be quickly set up and fired, Scuds are liquid-fueled which entails a complicated and lengthy launch preparation procedure leaving the batteries vulnerable to being spotted and attacked.
INCREASED ACTIVITY AT KNOWN MISSILE STORAGE SITES IN SYRIA
Western diplomatic sources contacted for this story say that increased activity has been detected at Syrian military bases where Scud missiles are stored, including the movement of rockets, the construction of new underground bunkers and the expansion of existing facilities. The diplomatic sources assess that the activity is a sign that the Assad regime is attempting to safeguard its ballistic missiles to prevent them falling into the hands of the armed opposition.
The hills on either side of the highway linking Damascus to Homs contain numerous underground military bases. Some of them, such as those near Adra, Dumayr, and between Al Qastal and An Nasrriyah, are widely believed by military analysts to be missile storage and launch sites. The protected entrances to the underground tunnels are clearly visible on satellite images carried by the Google Earth portal. Another underground facility appears to be under construction six miles south west of Al Qastal, with at least six new tunnel entrances.
Still, even if Hezbollah has acquired Scud missiles, the organization has not fired a shot at Israel in six years and analysts believe it does not seek a renewed confrontation at the present time. That restraint does not necessarily apply to Al Qaeda, however.
HOW LIKELY THAT AL QAEDA WILL OBTAIN CHEMICAL WEAPONS?
The main concern in the West is that Al Qaeda-affiliated groups fighting in Syria will attempt to obtain chemical agents from Syrian stockpiles.
Al Qaeda has been seeking chemical and biological weapons since at least the late 1990s. Documents seized by US troops in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that Al Qaeda was working on acquiring weapons of mass destruction, possibly attempting to weaponize biological agents. In 2009, a British tabloid reported that an Al Qaeda group in Algeria was forced to abandon a training camp after experiments to weaponize bubonic plague led to the deaths of 40 militants.
Anwar al-Awlaki, a prominent Al Qaeda ideologue who was killed last September in a drone missile strike in Yemen, was posthumously quoted in a recent edition of Al Qaeda's English-language Inspire magazine as condoning the use of chemical and biological weapons.
"The use of poisons or chemical and biological weapons against population centers is allowed and strongly recommended due to its great effect on the enemy," Mr. Awlaki was quoted as saying.
The extent of Al Qaeda penetration into Syria is unclear, although there are indications that elements of the armed opposition — Arab volunteers and Sunni Syrians alike — are becoming radicalized and adopting distinct religious and Islamist rhetoric, with many hailing the campaign to unseat the Assad regime as a "jihad."
Analysts say that some chemical agents, such as mustard gas, or biological agents, such as the causative agent for anthrax, are relatively robust and therefore potentially easier to weaponize by nonspecialist militants.
"Violent nonstate actors could come across weaponized artillery shells and through trial and error, and probably some unnecessary deaths through handling the agents, they could figure out enough to be able to use certain agents in ways that could cause great harm," says Mr. Blair of FAS. He added that a "wild card" in such a scenario is a Syrian military chemical/biological warfare expert selling his expertise to militants to facilitate exploiting the agents for attacks against civilian targets.
FEW GOOD OPTIONS FOR WEST
There are few good options facing the West in preventing chemical weapons falling into the hands of Al Qaeda-linked groups. In February, CNN cited a Pentagon report as estimating that it could take 75,000 troops to secure Syria's chemical weapons arsenal, an undertaking that meets with little enthusiasm in the West. Assuming that all the storage facilities can be identified in the first place, an alternative option of preemptive air strikes also carries dangers given Syria's extensive array of anti-aircraft missile systems.
"Air strikes against chemical weapons facilities means you first have to take out the Syrian air defense network. It would require a full coalition for something of this scale and will be very difficult," says a senior European military officer.
The proliferation threat is not limited to chemical and biological agents and ballistic missiles. The US mounted an intensive program in Libya last year to prevent the spread of MANPADS — portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile systems which could be used by militants to shoot down passenger jets. Syria has a large number of Russian MANPADs that are equally vulnerable to proliferation.
"If the Syrian government collapses, there is a risk that Syrian weapons would flow into volatile regions like Lebanon, Turkey, and Kurdistan," says Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher of the arms transfers program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden. "The situation in these countries is very different from North Africa [and the Libya case]... Still it would be good if the international community prepares itself in advance and not afterward as in the case of Libya."
Ultimately, however, given Western reluctance to mount a full-scale invasion of Syria to secure WMDs and prevent weapons proliferation, it is almost certain that some armaments including chemical or biological agents will be lost, analysts say.
"Even in the most spectacular definitions of success, I would find it very hard to believe that when an inventory is finally able to take place that some of the agents had not gone missing," says Mr. Blair.

concerning Egypt--- hope for the best... and prepare for the worst. Preparing for Egypt's worst Alexander Bligh 6-27-12

As I  wrote to you  concerning Egypt---  hope for the best... and prepare for the worst.

 This is not a profound document. However ,it gives some useful  background information.

Bligh  expects  war.... both you and I (I believe) expect provocation--  For lots of reasons, Israel cannot afford   a war   with Egypt. 




 Preparing for Egypt's worst 
 Alexander Bligh   6-27-12

In the long weeks leading up to the Six-Day War the song "Nasser is waiting for Rabin" became popular; expressing that war was expected to break out between Israel and Egypt after the latter committed a casus belli. Israel, almost from its inception as a state, had established where its red line was: blocking its maritime trade.

Israel gritted its teeth and suffered the shutting down of the Suez Canal to Israeli ships, which violated every international treaty, up until Egypt decided to close off the Straits of Tiran as well, which it did in 1956 and 1967.

Israel responded militarily both times. In the Yom Kippur War in 1973 Egypt again tried blocking Israeli ships, but did so from off the coast of Yemen at the entrance to the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean.

The military defeats Egypt suffered each time it tried destroying Israel forced it into signing the peace treaty in 1979. The treaty was the pinnacle of President Jimmy Carter's success, and maintaining it has since been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The peace treaty was almost a carbon copy of the 1978 Camp David accords, which included "a framework for peace in the Middle East." Included within this framework for peace was the creation of an autonomous territory for the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, as indeed was created (the treaty does not speak in any way of a Palestinian state), coming to a permanent solution within five years, and that the normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt would act as a precedent for striking peace deals with the other Arab countries.

Regardless, the treaty that Israel and Egypt signed included full diplomatic, economic and cultural relations. Egypt has only partially upheld its end of the deal: It has frozen diplomatic relations during crises in the region and has never met even one criterion for normalization. Moreover, Egypt has consistently violated stipulations regarding limitations to its military deployment in the Sinai Peninsula.

The only guarantee that Israel would receive an early warning about Egyptian troop movement into the Sinai would likely come from the 1,600-man Multinational Force and Observers stationed there, comprised of soldiers and officers from 12 countries, including the U.S. and Canada.

These factors, along with the fact that Israel hasn't viewed Egypt as an enemy country since the signing of the peace treaty, currently put Israel's decision-makers in a precarious position. On the one hand, Israel has thus far refrained from any action that could be interpreted by the U.S. or Egypt as an attempt to undermine or avoid its responsibilities within the peace agreement. On the other hand, a military conflict with Egypt is inevitable. The only question is the timing.

Egypt's economic situation today doesn't allow it to provide for over 85 million of its citizens. This means that a scapegoat must be found for the people to focus their rage against. The new regime will not be able to hide behind the old regime's shortcomings for very long.

What's more, every military conflict in the region has always been followed by U.S. mediation efforts, including substantial economic packages. We must not forget that U.S. foreign aid to Egypt is allocated mostly toward its military (some $1.5 billion), while some $800 million goes toward the civilian sector. This means that the U.S. is strengthening Egypt's armed forces, not its economy. Such an aid package, therefore, could very well tempt the new regime to act hastily. In light of all this, military conflict is the most reasonable possibility.

Therefore Israel must redefine its parameters for what constitutes a casus belli and notify the United States and other leading countries accordingly; the strength of deterrence lies in making your red lines known. In addition to such a public move, we should define, discreetly, our own goals.

Israel must display its commitment to the peace treaty, despite its deficiencies, practice extreme caution against being drawn into provocations and make its red lines very clear and public.

In the meantime, Israel needs to quietly prepare for any possibility — from amplifying all aspects of its military efforts to dealing with the increasingly hostile population in the Sinai — for when the day comes and the order is given.

There is no doubt that Israelis hope and wish that such a day never comes, but if it does come, God forbid, we'd better be well prepared.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012



Syria's chemical weapons: How secure are they from jihadists?
By Nicholas Blanford June 27, 2012 






Syria has been amassing chemical weapons since the 1980s and is believed to have a larger stockpile than any other country that has faced ethnic civil war





BEIRUT — (TCSM) As Syria slides into ever worsening violence and parts of the country begin to slip out of control of the state, Syria's chemical and biological weapons arsenal, air defense systems, and ballistic missiles could be up for grabs — a potential bonanza for radical militant groups and a massive challenge for the West in attempting to check proliferation.
Hard data on Syria's chemical and biological warfare capabilities is scarce, but the country is believed to have one of the largest chemical agents stockpiles in the world, including VX and Sarin nerve agents. It also has an impressive number of surface-to-surface missiles, such as Scud-Ds which can be fitted with chemical warheads, and modern Russian anti-aircraft missile batteries, including portable shoulder-fired systems.
"This is unknown territory," says Charles Blair, senior fellow for State and Non-State Threats at the Washington-based Federation of American Scientists. "We have never been through the potential collapse via a very bloody ethnic civil war of a country that is likely armed with a very large stockpile of chemical weapons."
Syria is not a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention and denies having a chemical or biological weapons programs. But Western intelligence agencies believe Syria began developing a nonconventional arsenal in the 1980s with the assistance of the Soviet Union.

They believe Syria has amassed sizable quantities of blistering agents, such as mustard gas — widely used in World War I and in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war — as well as Sarin and VX. The chemical agents are designed to be fitted to an array of delivery systems, from Scud-D short-range ballistic missiles to a projectile as small as an artillery shell.
Syria also is suspected of having a biological warfare program, possibly involving anthrax, although few details are known and the scale is thought to be small.
According to a recent report by the US-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, there are five identifiable chemical agent manufacturing plants in Syria. They are located in the following areas: Al Safir, southeast of Aleppo; Latakia, on the Mediterranean coast; near Dumayr, 16 miles northeast of Damascus; Khan Abu Shamat, 22 miles east of Damascus; and Al Furqlus in Homs province.
Diplomats and analysts interviewed for this article estimate that there are several dozen additional storage sites scattered across the country, some of them in hardened underground bunkers dug into the sides of hills, complicating efforts by Western intelligence agencies to identify the facilities and draw up plans to secure or destroy them.
"There are a significant number [of sites] large enough to make it a significant problem," says a Western diplomat with access to intelligence data. "[But] Some who are a little closer to the problem with a more urgent interest have a very good idea where they are," the diplomat added, in a veiled reference to Israel.
ISRAEL'S CONCERN: SCUD MISSILES TIPPED WITH WARHEADS ON ITS BORDER
Israel has been watching the escalating violence in Syria with growing alarm. Even though the Assad regime is a close ally of Iran and the militant Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah, Syria's border with Israel in the Golan Heights has been dormant for almost 40 years under the Assads. Israel, already worried at a deteriorating security situation along its southern border with Egypt, now also faces the possibility of its enemies in the north acquiring chemical weapons or ballistic missiles.
"Syria today is the largest chemical-weapons stockpile in our region," Maj. Gen. Yair Naveh, deputy chief of staff of the Israeli army, told Israel's Hayom newspaper two weeks ago. "These missiles can reach every point in Israel, so we must not relax our vigilance."
Israel worries that Hezbollah in Lebanon may acquire Scud missiles perhaps tipped with chemical warheads to enhance its deterrence posture against Israel.
In April 2010, Israel claimed that Syria had transferred control of some Scuds to Hezbollah at military depots near Damascus, although there were conflicting reports as to whether any of the missiles had been smuggled across the border into Lebanon.
Recent reports in the Israeli media have addressed the threat again. Israel says it regards Hezbollah's acquisition of Scuds as a "red line" requiring a response.
Hezbollah's leadership regularly boasts that nowhere in Israel is beyond the reach of its rocket arsenal, which certainly would be true if the Shiite movement had acquired Scud-D missiles, which have a range of about 435 miles.
But while Hezbollah's rocket arsenal is widely believed to have expanded in quantity and quality since the month-long 2006 war with Israel, some analysts question whether Hezbollah would seek Scud missiles because of the logistical complexities involved.
Smuggling the 37-foot missiles into Lebanon along with their even larger dedicated mobile launcher and storing them safely and in secret would be a formidable undertaking. Furthermore, unlike Hezbollah's arsenal of solid-fueled artillery rockets, which can be quickly set up and fired, Scuds are liquid-fueled which entails a complicated and lengthy launch preparation procedure leaving the batteries vulnerable to being spotted and attacked.
INCREASED ACTIVITY AT KNOWN MISSILE STORAGE SITES IN SYRIA
Western diplomatic sources contacted for this story say that increased activity has been detected at Syrian military bases where Scud missiles are stored, including the movement of rockets, the construction of new underground bunkers and the expansion of existing facilities. The diplomatic sources assess that the activity is a sign that the Assad regime is attempting to safeguard its ballistic missiles to prevent them falling into the hands of the armed opposition.
The hills on either side of the highway linking Damascus to Homs contain numerous underground military bases. Some of them, such as those near Adra, Dumayr, and between Al Qastal and An Nasrriyah, are widely believed by military analysts to be missile storage and launch sites. The protected entrances to the underground tunnels are clearly visible on satellite images carried by the Google Earth portal. Another underground facility appears to be under construction six miles south west of Al Qastal, with at least six new tunnel entrances.
Still, even if Hezbollah has acquired Scud missiles, the organization has not fired a shot at Israel in six years and analysts believe it does not seek a renewed confrontation at the present time. That restraint does not necessarily apply to Al Qaeda, however.
HOW LIKELY THAT AL QAEDA WILL OBTAIN CHEMICAL WEAPONS?
The main concern in the West is that Al Qaeda-affiliated groups fighting in Syria will attempt to obtain chemical agents from Syrian stockpiles.
Al Qaeda has been seeking chemical and biological weapons since at least the late 1990s. Documents seized by US troops in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that Al Qaeda was working on acquiring weapons of mass destruction, possibly attempting to weaponize biological agents. In 2009, a British tabloid reported that an Al Qaeda group in Algeria was forced to abandon a training camp after experiments to weaponize bubonic plague led to the deaths of 40 militants.
Anwar al-Awlaki, a prominent Al Qaeda ideologue who was killed last September in a drone missile strike in Yemen, was posthumously quoted in a recent edition of Al Qaeda's English-language Inspire magazine as condoning the use of chemical and biological weapons.
"The use of poisons or chemical and biological weapons against population centers is allowed and strongly recommended due to its great effect on the enemy," Mr. Awlaki was quoted as saying.
The extent of Al Qaeda penetration into Syria is unclear, although there are indications that elements of the armed opposition — Arab volunteers and Sunni Syrians alike — are becoming radicalized and adopting distinct religious and Islamist rhetoric, with many hailing the campaign to unseat the Assad regime as a "jihad."
Analysts say that some chemical agents, such as mustard gas, or biological agents, such as the causative agent for anthrax, are relatively robust and therefore potentially easier to weaponize by nonspecialist militants.
"Violent nonstate actors could come across weaponized artillery shells and through trial and error, and probably some unnecessary deaths through handling the agents, they could figure out enough to be able to use certain agents in ways that could cause great harm," says Mr. Blair of FAS. He added that a "wild card" in such a scenario is a Syrian military chemical/biological warfare expert selling his expertise to militants to facilitate exploiting the agents for attacks against civilian targets.
FEW GOOD OPTIONS FOR WEST
There are few good options facing the West in preventing chemical weapons falling into the hands of Al Qaeda-linked groups. In February, CNN cited a Pentagon report as estimating that it could take 75,000 troops to secure Syria's chemical weapons arsenal, an undertaking that meets with little enthusiasm in the West. Assuming that all the storage facilities can be identified in the first place, an alternative option of preemptive air strikes also carries dangers given Syria's extensive array of anti-aircraft missile systems.
"Air strikes against chemical weapons facilities means you first have to take out the Syrian air defense network. It would require a full coalition for something of this scale and will be very difficult," says a senior European military officer.
The proliferation threat is not limited to chemical and biological agents and ballistic missiles. The US mounted an intensive program in Libya last year to prevent the spread of MANPADS — portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile systems which could be used by militants to shoot down passenger jets. Syria has a large number of Russian MANPADs that are equally vulnerable to proliferation.
"If the Syrian government collapses, there is a risk that Syrian weapons would flow into volatile regions like Lebanon, Turkey, and Kurdistan," says Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher of the arms transfers program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden. "The situation in these countries is very different from North Africa [and the Libya case]... Still it would be good if the international community prepares itself in advance and not afterward as in the case of Libya."
Ultimately, however, given Western reluctance to mount a full-scale invasion of Syria to secure WMDs and prevent weapons proliferation, it is almost certain that some armaments including chemical or biological agents will be lost, analysts say.
"Even in the most spectacular definitions of success, I would find it very hard to believe that when an inventory is finally able to take place that some of the agents had not gone missing," says Mr. Blair.

Tuesday, June 26, 2012


Banned! Speech for ZOA: Pamela Geller speaks after Jewish Federation LA caves to Islamic demands



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xJZqsS4xE9U&feature=player_embedded
Diplomatic and Legal Aspects of the Settlement Issue

Jeffrey Helmreich, JCPA 2003 (6-26-12)

One may legitimately support or challenge Israeli settlements in the disputed territories, but they are not illegal, and they have neither the size, the population, nor the placement to seriously impact upon the future status of the disputed territories and their Palestinian population centers.

The outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada in the fall of 2000 began to erode the orthodoxy that settlements were driving Palestinian anger and blocking peace. New York Times foreign affairs analyst Thomas L. Friedman wrote in October 2000: “This war is sick but it has exposed some basic truths.” In particular, Friedman wrote, “To think that the Palestinians are only enraged about settlements is also fatuous nonsense. Talk to the 15-year-olds. Their grievance is not just with Israeli settlements, but with Israel. Most Palestinians simply do not accept that the Jews have any authentic right to be here. For this reason, any Palestinian state that comes into being should never be permitted to have any heavy weapons, because if the Palestinian had them today, their extremists would be using them on Tel Aviv.”
In recent months, however, the settlements have re-emerged as an explanation for the failure of nearly every ceasefire and diplomatic effort to quell the conflict. The Mitchell Report in 2001 and recent remarks by visiting U.S. senators have raised the question of settlements (though not directly blaming them for the conflict), and the UN General Assembly concluded its 2002 session with over 15 agenda items condemning “illegal” Israeli settlements. Settlements have also become a focal point in the Quartet’s December 2002 “road map.”
In fact, since their establishment nearly three decades ago, settlements have been the cause celebre of critics seeking to attribute the persistence of the conflict to Israeli policy. The criticism falls into two categories: moral/political arguments that settlements are “obstacles to peace,” and legal claims that settlements are illegitimate or a violation of international norms. The pervasiveness of these claims masks the fact that, upon closer scrutiny, they are false, and they hide the true source of grievances and ideological fervor that fuel this conflict.

An Obstacle to Peace?
  1. Settlements make up less than 2 percent of the West Bank. According to Peace Now, which opposes Israeli settlement in the territories, the built-up areas of the settlements take up only 1.36 percent of the West Bank (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2000). B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights watchdog group, places the figure slightly higher, at 1.7 percent. The much larger numbers often used to describe the land comprising Israeli settlements are reached only by including roads and adjacent areas, as well as land between settlements or between settlements and roads, nearly all of which is unpopulated. In truth, settlements simply do not comprise enough land to be serious obstacles to any political or geographic eventuality in the area, be it a Palestinian state or a continuation of the Oslo process.
  2. Settlements do not block the eventual establishment of a contiguous Palestinian entity. Some critics charge that settlements prevent peace by blocking the potential for a contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank, which is proposed in most peace plans. This claim ignores certain basic realities.
    1. The settlers would not block a peace agreement. Most Jews living in the West Bank express a deep love of the land and an attachment borne over two millennia when Jews yearned, prayed, and at times sought to return to their ancestral homeland. This natural bond has led to the view, popular in some Western circles, that these Jews prefer land to life, and would sacrifice the blood of Palestinians and fellow Jews on the alter of their biblical vision. This image — while dramatic and a neat counterpart to the image of Islamic fundamentalism — is simply untrue of the settlers today.
      A majority of the settlers have already indicated a willingness to relocate if a final agreement should require it, according to a poll taken by Peace Now (Agence France Presse, July 31, 2002). Even if such polls are disputed by opponents of Peace Now, such data indicates a far more pragmatic approach on the part of large numbers of settlers than has been allowed them by their critics.
      Recall that the residents of Yamit in the Sinai were relocated as a result of the peace agreement with Egypt. Thousands of Israelis were involved in this operation. The Yamit community was removed by none other than Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon when he served as minister of defense in the second Begin government.
    2. The overwhelming majority of settlers, close to 80 percent, live in communities such as Elkana, Maale Adumim, Betar, and Gush Etzion, located close to, if not contiguous with, pre-1967 Israel, and which can be connected geographically to the “Green Line” without involving Palestinian population centers. For separate reasons, the settlements in the strategic Jordan Valley do not impede the contiguity of the main Palestinian population centers, or prevent their expansion — the Jordan Valley is, after all, sparsely populated by Palestinians, with the exception of Jericho, which is today under full Palestinian control.
    3. Most settlements are concentrated in a few areas that, for security reasons, Israel cannot afford to cede. For example, the settlement of Ofra is located next to Baal Hatzor, the highest point in the West Bank and the location of the main early warning station for the Israeli air force. It was from high points along the West Bank hill ridge that neighboring Arab armies twice invaded Israel’s low-lying heartland, in 1948 and in 1967, which was then nine miles wide and completely exposed.
      The late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, architect of the Oslo Peace agreements, coined the term “security settlements” to describe those communities, in order to emphasize those settlements located on strategic terrain essential to Israel’s security interests. And yet, as noted above, these areas make up barely two percent of West Bank territory and nearly all of them do not encroach upon Palestinian population centers or block their contiguity. Moreover, Israel cannot, in any event, afford to withdraw from these small but strategic points even if they were entirely unpopulated. Thus, the presence of settlements in such locations is not the reason Israel remains in these areas.

Settlements are Not Illegal
  1. The settlements are not located in “occupied territory.” The last binding international legal instrument which divided the territory in the region of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza was the League of Nations Mandate, which explicitly recognized the right of Jewish settlement in all territory allocated to the Jewish national home in the context of the British Mandate. These rights under the British Mandate were preserved by the successor organization to the League of Nations, the United Nations, under Article 49 of the UN Charter.
  2. The West Bank and Gaza are disputed, not occupied, with both Israel and the Palestinians exercising legitimate historical claims. There was no Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip prior to 1967. Jews have a deep historic and emotional attachment to the land and, as their legal claims are at least equal to those of Palestinians, it is natural for Jews to build homes in communities in these areas, just as Palestinians build in theirs.
  3. The territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was captured by Israel in a defensive war, which is a legal means to acquire territory under international law. In fact, Israel’s seizing the land in 1967 was the only legal acquisition of the territory this century: the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank from 1947 to 1967, by contrast, had been the result of an offensive war in 1948 and was never recognized by the international community, including the Arab states, with the exception of Great Britain and Pakistan.

The Settlements are Consistent with Resolution 242
Many observers incorrectly assume that UN Security Council Resolution 242 requires a full Israeli withdrawal from the land Israel captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Some may have a hidden agenda aimed at depriving Israel of any legal rights whatsoever in the disputed areas. In either case, they use this misinterpretation to conclude that settlement activity is unlawful because it perpetuates an “illegal” Israeli occupation.
The assumption and the conclusion are deeply flawed. Resolution 242 calls for only an undefined withdrawal from a portion of the land — and only to the extent required by “secure and recognized boundaries.” Israel has already withdrawn from the majority of the land it had captured, and nearly all of the areas in which it retains communities are essential to “secure and recognized boundaries.” The specific location of Israeli settlements was determined by Israel’s Ministry of Defense over the last 30 years, not by the settlers themselves, and they were set up in order to strengthen Israel’s presence in those few areas from which it cannot, militarily, afford to withdraw.

Settlements are Consistent with the Geneva Conventions
In three recent emergency special sessions of the UN General Assembly, Israeli settlement was cited as a violation of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. These international humanitarian instruments, forged in the ashes of the Holocaust to prevent future genocidal brutality and oppression, were never invoked in 50 years until the case of condominium construction in Jerusalem during 1998. Was such construction — any settlement construction — a violation of the Geneva Convention?
No. The relevant clause, Article 49, prohibits the “occupying power” from transferring population into the “occupied territory.” Aside from the fact that the territory is not occupied, but disputed, Morris Abrams, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, had pointed out that the clause refers to the forcible transfer of large populations. By contrast, the settlements involve the voluntary movement of civilians. The U.S. Department of State, accordingly, does not view Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as applicable to settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For that reason, the official U.S. position has been over the years that settlements are legal, even though successive administrations have criticized them on political grounds. (Only the Carter administration for a short time held that settlements were illegal; this position was overturned by the Reagan administration.)

Settlement Growth Never Violated Oslo
Although certain Palestinian negotiators demanded a settlement freeze, the peace agreement ultimately reached by Israel and the Palestinians at Oslo, along with the Interim Agreement of 1995, allow settlement growth as well as the growth — and creation — of Palestinian communities in the disputed territories. The Palestinians acquired planning and zoning rights in Area A, while Israel retained the same rights in Area C where the settlements were located. Indeed, their legal status was to be addressed and decided only in the final status negotiations which, unfortunately, never took place. Until this point is reached, settlement growth remains within the legal scope of the Oslo Agreements.
At the October 5, 1995, session of the Knesset at which the Interim Agreement was ratified, the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin proclaimed that we “committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth” (Israel Foreign Ministry, http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00te0). On the basis of this understanding of Oslo II, the Knesset voted to approve the Agreement.

Conclusion
One may legitimately support or challenge Israeli settlements in the disputed territories, but they are not illegal, and they have neither the size, the population, nor the placement to seriously impact upon the future status of the disputed territories and their Palestinian population centers.

*     *     *

Jeffrey S. Helmreich is the author of numerous articles on Israel for American newspapers and journals.