Thursday, August 13, 2015

How Iran Plans to Destroy Israel



How Iran Plans to Destroy Israel

EHUD YAARI  the American Interest Volume 11, Number 1 8-1-15

The mullahs seem dead serious about wanting to destroy Israel, but exactly how they plan to go about it remains studiously cryptic.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been committed for the past 36 years to a doctrine aimed at wiping Israel off the map. Statements to this effect still pour out of Tehran almost daily. President Hassan Rouhani has somewhat softened his predecessor’s language, but does not refrain from expressing his loyalty to this objective. All rival factions within the regime, and many outside too,AGREE

 that the destruction of the Jewish State constitutes an important tenet of their devotion to Islam, reflecting a deep ideological conviction in the indispensability of annihilating the “Zionist entity.” 
Now, some pro-Iranian apologists in the West have claimed that the goal of annihilation does not mandate military means to achieve it, the intimation being that Israel will be destroyed through the deployment of truth, faith, and divine power—or through a highly improbable referendum (more on this below). In calling for Israel’s demise, Tehran has adopted the line that Israel is an artificial, weak, and split society that will easily implode under pressure—a “spider web” in the words of Hizballah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. At the same time, the Iranians present Israel to their audience as an aggressive, agile opponent that benefits from generous Western support. At the very least, the regime is signaling that a military effort would be essential to bring about a collapse in Israel. 
Consequently, much rhetoric is devoted toMOBILIZING

 popular support toward achieving this goal. “Death to Israel” is chanted at rallies all across the country, and the mantra is inscribed on a variety of weapons systems in military parades. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s mouthpiece, the daily newspaperKayhan, once summed up Iran’s stance as follows: “The belief that Israel must be eliminated is a condition of our adherence to Islam. . . . [E]ach and every one of our officials should reiterate our responsibility of the need to destroy this cancerous tumor of Israel.” Only some members of the suppressed Green Movement have voiced reservations regarding the regime’s prioritization of aiding Israel’s adversaries.
Besides demonstrating ideological purity, the disciples of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini see practical benefits in their virulent anti-Israeli posture. Through their repetitive, venomous tirades against Israel they posit Iran as the one true, trustworthy champion of Palestinian rights. The token of this policy has beenCONTINUOUS

 Iranian support for Palestinian “resistance” movements, the more radical the better. This they contrast with many Arab regimes that seek accommodation with the enemy. Iran thus presents itself as more dedicated to this noble Arab cause than the Arabs themselves. In this way the regime strives to advance Iranian interests by acquiring popularity among Sunni Arabs, thus driving a wedge between the Sunni “street” and its governments. 
Yet Iran’s policy toward Israel transcendsREGIONAL

 posturing and rhetorical ritual. Over the years Tehran’s hostile activities support theASSESSMENT

 that
Iran is engaged in a sustained campaign to shape the regional landscape for an eventual effort to draw Israel into a doomsday war.
Iran is engaged in a sustained campaign to shape the regional landscape for an eventual effort to draw Israel into a doomsday war. This effort started in 1982 with the establishment of Hizballah and evolved into the creation of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and a military alliance with Hamas. A year ago Iran formed a new militia in Gaza, “al-Sabeerin” (HSN), and more recently it extended itself through attempts to operate proxy groups in Syria along its borders with both Israel and Jordan. Iran has made sure that missiles provided to its partners in the “Axis of Resistance” can reach every coordinate in Israel, and it has invested lavishly in developing and deploying hundreds of long-range missiles capable of hitting Israel from its own territory. These actions testify to the seriousness with which Iran regards its mission. 
The Islamic Republic’s quest for nuclear weapons offers yet more evidence of its intention to take on Israel at some future date, but not necessarily evidence that it will use these weapons to attack Israel directly. It may be that Tehran seeks a nuclear deterrent to Israeli nuclear weapons, so that the “spider web” can be dispatched without danger to the Iranian homeland. Thus from the Iranian perspective, a nuclear weaponization program is not essential to a final confrontation with Israel. Iranian military strategists seem to think they can eventually destroy the Israeli state without using nuclear weapons. 
It is a typical Western liberal conceit to dismiss the threats of autocratic regimes. And it is true that the Iranian regime has proven ready in the past to ignore its declared policies on a variety of issues and change course when politically expedient. Thus, fairly specific threats directed toward the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other actors have been dropped without explanation at different junctures. But its commitment to destroy Israel is a pillar of the Islamic Republic, and so it would seem politically impossible merely to drop it. At the same time, the Iranian regime has consistently refrained from clarifying what role it might play in fulfilling this “religious obligation.” Does Iran plan to spearhead, at the appropriate moment, an offensive against Israel? Would Iranian armed forces be directly engaging Israelis on the battlefield? Or would they rather restrict their contribution to arming other combatants and orchestrating their strategy? In short, does the Islamic Republic aspire to become the “liberator” of Jerusalem, or merely a sponsor from afar? Do Iran’s leaders envision Arabs celebrating in Palestine, or Iranian troops themselves? 
N
o one knows the answers to these questions, including, very likely, the Iranian leaders themselves. Not everything has gone the mullahs’ way, either, in the run-up to achieving their goal. The regime used to have very close relations with Hamas, for example, but the sectarian divisions opened up by the Syrian civil war have introduced great tension into that relationship. Indeed, the deepening of the sectarian divide in recent years has neutered the Iranian attempt to use the Palestine issue to harm Sunni Arab regimes. 
Perhaps such perturbations help explain why over the past four decades Iranian leaders have remained ambiguous, never explicitly threatening an assault on Israel at some future date, but never ruling it out either. They have also studiously avoided clashes with the Israeli military, mounting no retaliation for Israeli attacks on ships loaded with Iranian arms in the Red Sea, strikes against storage facilities for Iranian missiles in Syria and Sudan, and even the killing of an Iranian general on the Syrian Golan. They keep stressing the need for “Muslim unity”, bringing together rival states for the common purpose of attacking Israel. But they have never gone kinetic directly against it.
Needless to say, the call for Muslim unity is widely understood, including in Israel, to be no more than lip service to an elusive dream. More credible is the Iranian emphasis on the potential role of an effective Palestinian “resistance” that would confront Israel aided by allies such as Hizballah. Still, the Iranians themselves never address the question of whether such a coalition would be capable of defeating the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on its own. 
None other than Iran’s favorite proxy, Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah, referred in April to theseUNANSWERED

 questions in a lengthy interview granted to Syrian official television. “We are not claiming that Hizballah is capable of launching a war”, he said.

We are incapable of this. Are we expected to lie to the people or to ourselves and say that we are capable of launching a war against Israel and wiping it off the map and liberating Palestine? We have never claimed anything like this.
Nasrallah also stated that, contrary to previous warnings, he cannot promise that Hizballah fighters could capture any part of the Galilee and certainly “not all the area on the way to Tel Aviv and Eilat.” His conclusion was that none of the resistance movements are up to this task, and therefore that a decision to wage a war of this magnitude should be made by “partners who are able to accomplish the goal.” He was clearly implying that said partner would be Iran. On the occasion of the recent Qods Day Nasrallah explicitly said that Iran remains “the only threat” to Israel’s existence.
Nasrallah’s exceptional statement amounts to an open admission that Iran’s active participation in a war against Israel would be indispensable, and therefore the decision to launch a war belongs to Tehran. Although overlooked at the time by most Western media, this interview reveals Nasrallah’s true calculation of the balance of power in the region; it certainly reflects, as well, Hizballah’s significant losses incurred fighting in the Syrian civil war. 
The Iranian government has refrained from all official comment on Nasrallah’s statement, which was mentioned only briefly in the Farsi press. Iranian authorities, it would seem, were not overly pleased with their protégé’s insinuation that, at the end of the day, everything rests in Tehran’s hands. 
Iran’s stated policy, as recently refined by President Rouhani, is to proceed with a strategy of “active deterrence.” Upgrading the accuracy of Iranian missiles is, in his view, both “moral and humane” because it can deter Israeli attack. Yet Iranian officials declare repeatedly that the regime has no desire to threaten or attack anybody, or to seek territorial expansion. Iranian analysts occasionally reinforce these proclamations by noting that for two centuries Iran has not initiated a war on any front. Indeed, the last major Iranian military campaign took place on Iranian soil when Reza Shah recaptured the city of Ahwaz, in Khuzestan province, from its rebellious Arab emir, Sheik Khaza‘al, in 1925. 
With regard to Israel, no record exists of any official military threats beyond the context of retaliation for an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear installations. The Iranians have simply escalated their warnings in line with their growing confidence that Israel either lacks a credible military option or has become less inclined to employ it. Khamenei himself led this escalation of retaliatory threats, which was invariably echoed by the top brass of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular army.
The escalation consisted of four distinct stages. First, Khamenei reacted to the public debate in Israel concerning the wisdom of a preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear installations by declaring that no “hit-and-run” attack against Iran’s atomic program was possible. This was interpreted by the Iranian media as indicating “that there could be no possibility that an attack against Iran would go unanswered.” 
The second stage was Khamenei’s adoption in public of a “threat for threat” posture that signaled, according to pro-regime analysts, “that in addition to being ready to thwart all kinds of threats, Iran was actually posing new threats against its enemies.” The third step occurred on February 3, 2012, when the Supreme Leader proclaimed, following the Pillar of Defense operation in Gaza, that Iran will help and support anyone prepared to engage the Israelis. One Iranian commentator explained that, “these threats against Iran, having failed to push the Islamic Republic into passivity, have further emboldened it to prepare itself for long term and energetic confrontation with its enemies.” 
Shortly thereafter, on March 20, during a public address in Mashhad, Khamenei swore explicitly “to raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground” in response to an Israeli strike. The message is clear: Iran’s missiles are on the alert to hit Israel. Other regime spokesmen pointed to the nuclear reactor in Dimona as an additional likely target for instant retaliation. 
The threat to Dimona is something of an old story. As early as August 17, 2004, General Mohammed Baqer Zolqadr of the IRGC noted: 
If Israel fires one missile at the Bushehr atomic power plant, it should permanently forget about its Dimona nuclear center, where it produces and keeps its nuclear weapons, and Israel would be responsible for the terrifying consequences of this move.
General Yadollah Javani, head of the IRGC’s Political Bureau, said such a retaliatory attack would be carried out by “Shehab-3” long-range ballistic missiles. Other Iranian officials mentioned, among other possible targets, Israeli gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
As such statements attest, in order to obtain robust retaliatory capabilities, Iran is relying on its rapidly growing arsenal of long-range missiles. It has also provided tens of thousands of shorter-range rockets and missiles to clients such as Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas, which could be urged to help respond to an Israeli strike. Iranian officials often take pride in the fact that missiles with ever improving guidance systems stationed in Lebanon—and to a lesser extent in Gaza—can now reach Israel’s entire territory. 
Iran’s missile development in general since 1980 is beyond the scope of this essay; suffice it to say that the leaders have long emphasized to Iranian military commanders the need to develop missiles that can reach Israel in particular. This began with Khamenei’s order for missiles with a 1,000-kilometer range that, if launched from Iran’s western border, could hit Israel. Still later, Khamenei instructed his commanders to acquire missiles with a 2,000-kilometer range, allowing for a successful hit on Israel from most of Iran’s territory. And later still Khamenei personally ordered that the accuracy of the missiles should be dramatically improved. Not surprisingly, therefore, the IRGC’s Aerospace Force and Missile Unit commander, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and his deputy, Majid Mousavi, stated directly that the unit was established in order to attack Israel. Mousavi elaborated last year on the logic of the missile program, saying that, “the Supreme Leader set a particular goal for us based on the assumption that the Zionist regime is our main enemy, and that, if it is decided that we should confront it, missiles with a 2,000-kilometer range would be sufficient.”
According to current estimates, Iran deploys approximately 400 missiles capable of hitting Israel.
According to current estimates, Iran deploys approximately 400 missiles capable of hitting Israel. The missile brigades are based in some two dozen locations in central and western Iran. This would allow the Iranians to fire volleys that compound the challenge to Israel’s Arrow defense batteries. 
Besides their impressive missile arsenal (the largest in the region), the Iranians have so far acquired only limited additional capabilities for engaging Israel directly—other than resorting to terrorist operations. Their aging air force has a poor chance, if any, of reaching Israel. Their new domestically produced ships and submarines would face major difficulties in reaching the Red Sea and Mediterranean but could theoretically attempt to impose, together with the Houthi militias of Yemen, a blockade on Israeli shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, similar to the blockade imposed there by the Egyptian Navy in 1973. Iran’s ground forces for the foreseeable future are unprepared to mount any large-scale multidivisional attack on the distant Israeli frontier, though some elite IRGC units could be sent to Syria to join Hizballah in Lebanon. 
Of course, all this may change if Iran decides to allocate resources, derived from the lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of its financial assets abroad, as a result of a P5+1 nuclear deal, to a major effort to project military power beyond its borders. The S-300 air defense batteries to be supplied from Russia could also greatly improve Iran’s defensive posture, while other deals for offensive weapons systems are being considered, or are at least rumored to be. One such deal is the possible purchase of 250 Sukhoi-30 MKM fighters from Russia and/or J-10s from China, and the purchase of dozens of IL-78 MKI aerial tankers. Yet it is obvious that Iran’s reliance on its long-range missile arsenal will remain for a long time the backbone of its military strategy with regard to Israel. 
As for calls within Iran to take it to Israel offensively, rather than simply prepare to counter an Israeli strike, these have been rare—notably by the now imprisoned former presidential candidate Ahmed Tavakoli—and have received a decidedly cool reception from the regime elite. Instead, that elite, at its very apex, has from time to time spoken in frankly ridiculous terms about how to destroy Israel. The most authoritative, and coldly detached, interpretation of the “death to Israel” slogan came from the Supreme Leader himself in his November 2014 plan titled “9 Key Questions about the Elimination of Israel”, posted on his Twitter account. “The proper way of eliminating Israel”, he wrote, is through a “public referendum” for all of the “original people of Palestine including Muslims, Christians, and Jews wherever they are.” However, the “Jewish immigrants who have been persuaded into emigration to Palestine do not have the right to take part.” Following such a referendum, the new government will have to decide if “non-Palestinian emigrants” can remain in the country. Khamenei commented further that destroying Israel does not mean the “slaughter of the Jewish people in the region” but he then went on to call for “arming the people of the West Bank.” There was no mention of Iranian involvement in forcing Israel to accept the proposed referendum.
T
he “arming of the people of the West Bank” had been articulated as a policy shift even before Khamenei’s nine-point plan arrived. The logic of this approach requires little explanation. Turning the West Bank into a second Gaza, armed with missiles, trained militias, and controlled by the resistance (Hamas and Islamic Jihad), would create a threat to the heart of Israel. And this, at least, has not been empty talk. Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, the IRGC’s “Qods Force” has been smuggling money into the West Bank, mainly through Jordan and Turkey, or via Israeli Arabs, and by using exchange bureaus. Both Hizballah and Hamas are trying to enlist West Bank operatives and furnish them with the know-how to manufacture homemade rockets. The importance allocated by Iranian strategists to the West Bank may explain why Tehran does not rule out the establishment of a rump Palestinian state, since IDF withdrawal from it would enhance the prospects of reviving resistance groups there.
The Iranians are likewise investing much effort lately to establish a “resistance” base for operations along parts of the Golan Heights frontier. The goal is to extend the Hizballah-Israeli front in South Lebanon to the Syrian Golan. Though this effort has not been crowned with great success so far, the Iranians seem bent—together with Hizballah—on using Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s dependence on their support to turn southern Syria into a new arena of operation against Israel. Under IRGC commanders, Hizballah is busy recruiting local Druze and others to stir up the Golan frontier by planting IEDs and lobbing occasional mortar shells. Iranian commentator Amir Moussavi summarized this new effort as being aimed at turning the Golan into “a free military area”, thus abandoning Assad’s traditional objection to heating up the front.
The Iranians’ short-term vision thus has Israel squeezed by four fronts ofmoqawama(resistance): Lebanon, southern Syria, Gaza, and, most importantly, the West Bank.
The Iranians’ short-term vision thus has Israel squeezed by four fronts ofmoqawama (resistance): Lebanon, southern Syria, Gaza, and, most importantly, the West Bank. Such a scenario would provide them with plenty of opportunities to keep their proxies engaged with Israel, paving the road to a long-term war of attrition masterminded by Tehran and backed by its missile arsenal, with or without nuclear warheads. As Khamenei put it last year, “the only solution is its [Israel’s] annihilation and liquidation. Of course, until that moment, the determined and armed Palestinian resistance and its spread to the West Bank are the only way to deal with that bestial regime. . . . [T]herefore, it is my belief that the West Bank should be armed just like Gaza.” Affirming this commitment in July 2014, Basij commander Mohammed Reza Naqdi urged all resistance factions to conclude a defense pact against Israel to resurrect the old, pre-Syrian civil war military cooperation agreement between Hizballah and Hamas and expand it to include other resistance factions. The objective would be to present Israel with the specter of a two- or three-front challenge in any future outbreak of fighting in Gaza or on the Lebanon-Syrian front.
Assuredly, it is no easy task to topple the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank or to achieve freedom to mobilize underground networks and then deliver arms to them. But the Iranians claim that even under the current circumstances they have devised smuggling routes to transfer weapons to the West Bank. Still, so far, security cooperation among Israel, the PA, and Jordan has managed to foil Hamas’s attempt to resurrect a military wing in the West Bank. Several attempts to establish workshops for missile production in the West Bank have been uncovered at an early phase. 
Iran’s idea of besieging Israel with a “resistance wall” constitutes yet another dimension of its thinking. Some Iranians imagine the creation of a land corridor from Iran through Shi‘a regions in Iraq to its desert al-Anbar province and from there to Syria and Lebanon. Establishing such a corridor would require at least the tacit cooperation of the authorities in Bagdad (where Iran already enjoys predominance) or the power brokers in Iraq’s southern provinces. It would definitely require the Iran-sponsored “Popular Mobilization” units and the various other IRGC-backed Shi‘a militias to overcome the Islamic State’s current control over key sectors of western Iraq so that it could link up with the Euphrates River Valley in Syria. As yet, the deployment of Shi‘a militias into western Iraq has only been tentative, but the issue is under debate. Some militiamen have made it all the way to Damascus to protect that capital from a Sunni onslaught, so anything is possible.
If ISIS loses ground in Anbar and eastern Syria as a result of U.S.-led coalition strikes, and if Damascus remains a member of the “Axis of Resistance”, the Iranian corridor to the Israeli frontier could come about in due course, allowing in the more distant future the transport of military supplies and even personnel through the desert to the frontlines. Such a development might even encourage Iranian planners to contemplate launching an expeditionary force in the event of a confrontation. 
T
he Islamic Republic regards its commitment to the destruction of Israel as a long-term project that would require major shifts in the regional political landscape. While displaying a great deal of ambiguity concerning its direct role in a decisive confrontation with Israel, for obvious reasons, Tehran emphasizes its ongoing effort to improve the capability of Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian resistance movements to face Israel. The main, immediate target is turning the West Bank into a solid base for military operations. Obviously, the Iranians are well aware that Israel is determined to prevent a takeover of the West Bank by hostile groups. At the same time, they realize that, despite their enormous investment in Hizballah, the group cannot be expected to carry out a “final” war with Israel, especially when it is spending most of its blood and treasure fighting and dying in Syria. 
The Iranians are bent on strengthening their influence in the Arab world, with a priority on achieving a land link from Iran to the Mediterranean through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Such a link, once obtained, would allow Iran not only to beef up the resistance movements with Iraqi and Syrian militias, as well as volunteers from far away Afghanistan, but also to open the way to the ultimate introduction of Iranian troops to the lines of confrontation, especially on the Golan. Not for no reason have Iranian generals been strutting around up there lately (and sometimes meeting an untimely demise).
For the United States, which wants to avert an eventual Iran-Israel war, a major priority should be preventing the creation of this land corridor. This will require further efforts to strengthen the government in Baghdad and diminish the power of Iranian-led Shi‘a militias operating there. Helping the Iraqi army achieve effective control of Anbar province is likewise crucial. But, as has been shown lately, this is far from easy. 
Weakening and ultimately ousting the Assad regime should also remain a top U.S. priority, despite the temptation to discount Damascus as a threat given the danger of ISIS. Iran’s strategic planning would suffer a severe blow if the Assad regime were toppled and Syria no longer served as an ally of Hizballah and a base for Iranian supplies. 
The recent setbacks suffered by pro-Assad forces present an opportunity to increase military pressure on the regime and its Iranian sponsors.
The recent setbacks suffered by pro-Assad forces present an opportunity to increase military pressure on the regime and its Iranian sponsors. On this count, the most promising sector for a rebel push toward Damascus is southern Syria, where combinations of rebel militias have managed to block the regime’s counter-offensive and maintain positions close to the capital’s southern outskirts. As Nasrallah himself put it bluntly in May, the fall of Assad and his Iranian allies would mean the “fall of Hizballah, too”, since it will be locked into a small enclave within Lebanon.
Naturally, Jordan must be assisted in its efforts to frustrate Iranian activities aimed at undermining the Kingdom and recruiting local Palestinians and east Jordanians along Israel’s longest border. Indeed, Jordan’s precarious stability would be worsened by Iranian hegemony over neighboring Syria and Iraq. Until now, Tehran has been cautious in its effort to obtain followers and influence in Jordan, but few doubt that Jordan is regarded by Iran as an important potential staging area for future operations against Israel.
Finally, it is absolutely imperative to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Here one need only to recall the infamous statement by ex-president Hashemi Rafsanjani on Qods Day, December 14, 2001:
If one day, the Islamic World is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.
Such a statement has not been repeated since, given consistent Iranian denials about seeking a nuclear weapon. However, Rafsanjani’s declaration evoked Palestinian warnings—including by Hamas leader Khaled Meshal—that Iran should take into account that not only Israelis, but many Palestinians, would die in a nuclear bombing of Israel. 
Whatever the risks, nuclear bombs will boost Iran’s claim to hegemony in the region and will encourage its leaders to pursue even more aggressive and adventurous policies with respect to Israel. Such policies will be advanced by a coalition of terrorist groups, equipped with thousands of state-of-the-art missiles under a nuclear umbrella. One should assume that if Israel concludes that such a threat is imminent, it will see itself as having no other choice than to undertake a preemptive military strike that would trigger a wide confrontation. 
Iran, then, must be kept away from nuclear weapons and at the same time kept as far as possible from Israel’s borders, if Washington and its allies wish to avoid a direct Iran-Israel confrontation. Along these lines, a nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 might keep Iran from a breakout for a decade or so, but it will at the same time allow Iran to improve its pursuit of different weaponization options, once a decision is made to proceed along those lines.
In the meantime, efforts should be directed at curtailing Iran’s drive to broaden the “Resistance Wall” around Israel. This requires not only Israeli measures to insulate the West Bank from Iranian penetration and foil attempts to establish a new front on the Golan Heights, but also a determined U.S.-led effort, together with regional allies, to prevent an Iranian victory in Syria and curb Iranian predominance in Iraq. A direct connection exists between the battle for the Levant and the danger of a war between Iran and Israel. The emergence of an Iran-led “Shi‘a crescent”, as depicted first by Jordan’s King Abdullah, will surely energize the Islamic Republic’s oath to destroy Israel. 

[Note: After this article went to press, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei published a 416-page book with the title “Palestine.” His directions on how to proceed toward the destruction of Israel support most of the preceding arguments concerning Tehran’s strategy.]

Ehud Yaari is an Israel-based Lafer International Fellow of the Washington Institute and a Middle East commentator for Israel’s Channel Two television.









Wednesday, August 12, 2015

Why Obama should welcome a ‘No’ vote on the Iran deal
 David Suissa    Aug. 11, 2015





I don’t know any proponent of President Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear deal who doesn’t believe the deal can be improved. They would love the inspections regime, for example, to be closer to the “anytime, anywhere” ideal, so that we could be sure to catch the world’s best cheaters when they cheat.
And they would love to close those tricky loopholes, so we can ensure that the “snap-back sanctions” really do snap back and we can impose real penalties for cheating. Otherwise, what’s the point? If it’s so hard to catch the Iranians cheating, and it’s so hard to punish them when they do, can we really muster much love for this deal?
The truth is, there’s not much love for this deal even among my friends who support it. Rather, there’s grudging acceptance that, even with all its flaws, the deal is better than any alternative in terms of stopping, or at least slowing, the mullahs from getting their nuclear bomb.
It’s important not to demonize the proponents of the deal, who also want what’s best for America, Israel and the world. I may see things differently than they do, but I can’t impugn their motives. They think this is the best deal we can get; I think we can do a lot better.
President Obama is no fool. Deep down, he probably knows his deal is full of loopholes and could be improved. And he knows he’ll need more leverage if he wants to improve it. That’s why I think he shouldn’t be afraid of getting a rejection by Congress. What better leverage than the world’s most powerful and independent legislature saying no and asking for a better deal?
“Hey, don’t kill the messenger,” Obama would tell the mullahs. “Our Congress plays a very important role. They overrode my veto and are now asking for a better deal. Here is their list — let’s talk.”
Why are we so sure the Iranians would blow up the agreement if Congress rejects the deal and things do, indeed, go murky? Why are we so sure they would rush to build a nuclear bomb and forfeit all the international goodwill and legitimacy that this deal would provide?
I know, that’s easier said than done. A rejection in Congress would certainly create a big mess. As Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy writes, it would lead to a “murky” situation — not necessarily worse, but murky.
But you know what? Murky is what the Iranians do. It’s their comfort zone. Nothing they do is clean and simple. Their archetype is not the “Say what I mean, mean what I say” American ideal, but the merchant in the souk who, when negotiating, never says what he means or means what he says.
Why are we so sure the Iranians would blow up the agreement if Congress rejects the deal and things do, indeed, go murky? Why are we so sure they would rush to build a nuclear bomb and forfeit all the international goodwill and legitimacy that this deal provides?
The Iranians are not stupid. They can count. They know that a $23 trillion economy that controls so much of the world’s financial system can do plenty of damage to their sanctions relief. Why jeopardize their $150 billion payday now that they’re so close to a dream deal that will make their terror-sponsoring regime a legitimate international player?
As far as reopening negotiations after a deal has been “finalized,” my Iranian friends tell me this is a mullah specialty. They wait until you’re thoroughly invested in the deal … and then they pounce. That’s exactly what they did in Vienna. As soon as the Americans thought they had a deal, the Iranians ambushed them with some last-minute demands. 
So, what’s wrong with giving them a taste of their own medicine? It might even earn us a little respect: Hey, those Americans are not so naive, after all.
Instead of playing so tough with Congress and with his critics who want a better deal, President Obama should direct his toughness toward enemies who routinely and brazenly shout, “Death to America.” We must stop acting as if we are the weaker party with no leverage. 
I know — it’s messy. It would be so much easier to just approve the deal and move forward. That’s the American way. We love closure. We love neatness. 
This deal, however, is anything but neat, and it’s anything but over. Our dance with the Iranian mullahs has been a long and messy one. A rejection by the American Congress would continue this dance — only now, it would make clear who the lead dancer is.

COMMENT ON ARTICLE:
The Iranian game  is  simple: to achieve regional domination and to be a major player on the world scene. the Iranian game plan is to secure a 100% certain path to their regional and international aspirations and and  at the same time retain their ability to choose whether they want to become a nuclear power (or just benefit from the status of being a nuclear capable nation-Just a screw driver turn away from possessing  operational nuclear weapons}.

What Iran has done through these negotiations with the Obama administration is to  trade its “agreement” to temporarily slow down its progress on what it claims is a nonexistent program, for a substantial  nearly immediate increase, in resources and recognition of Iran's legal  ability to walk away from any “agreement” at any time   of its choosing  by violating any terms of the agreement.}

In addition , Iran is  now using the leverage that has obtained to generate   an international campaign seeking the dismantlement of the Israeli nuclear deterrent. [ See:  "Iran has signed a historic nuclear deal– now it’s Israel’s turn"by Javad Zarif ,The Guardian, 7-3-15  } 

The term “agreement ” is  in quotation marks since in this  part of the world true negotiations only begin after the agreement is signed.and many more concessions will  be demanded, on the long  path to what will never be a" final settlement". Further,the Iranians have announced that they will be governed by the supreme leader's interpretation of each clause.  Can it be any clearer that they will interpret the agreement to their satisfaction?


Many observers believe  that Iran will likely cheat around the margins of clauses which Iran  will argue are ambiguous. This allows a creeping redefinition of the agreement.

  If Iran is caught cheating and sanctions are in any way "snapped back” this  agreement gives Iran the right to withdraw  their compliance  from all  of the obligations that  they have undertaken.  Thus,  the incentive  is for  Iran  to generally observe the provisions of this agreement  until the Iranian economy is moving, then to cheat around the edges, and then to walk away from the entire agreement if and when they want to (completely based on their desires and their timetable).


Sunday, August 9, 2015


Edwin Black  8-7-15

On February 17, 2015, a number of America’s most vituperative anti-Israel activists woke up to discover that they had been named and spotlighted by a mysterious new website called Canary Mission, visible at www.canarymission.org.
The site boldly aggregates the public statements, videos, and photographs of leading members of the organized movement against Israel in their most telling and often most demonstrative moments. The profiled individuals span a gamut of track records ranging from those with leadership roles with such intensely anti-Israel groups as Students for Justice in Palestine and the Muslim Student Association to unaffiliated campus agitators who regularly advocate for the destruction of Israel and even the murder of Jews. All its profiles are compiled from public Internet sources such as social media, You Tube, Twitter, press releases, news clips, and interviews.
In essence, Canary Mission took a card from the New Israel Fund, which some years ago helped finance the Coalition of Women for Peace that created the Who-Profits database that acted as a global compass of Israeli commercial activity for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions strategies. Canary Mission flipped the card and blacklisted the blacklisters.
Because Canary Mission works beneath a complete shroud of secrecy, it has been called “shadowy.” It is commonly labelled as McCarthy-like in its actions within the pages of leading Jewish and mainstream media, as well as political websites, even though its modus operendi is obviously the opposite of McCarthyism. Even as sources as tenuous as Wikipedia define McCarthyism as “the practice of making accusations of subversion or treason without proper regard for evidence,” as was done during the anti-Communist scare of the 1950s.
But Canary Mission relies on vetted, publicly visible pictures, protest placards, open statements, and video clips that speak for themselves and are primarily drawn from previously well-publicized activities. In other words, Canary Mission aggregates publicly verifiable information into a single place. It is not clear why media outlets have not made the historical distinction or provided context.
At press time, more than 120 individuals and six leading anti-Israel organizations are pictured in the Canary Mission alphabetized gallery, with more being added daily. The site’s database is searchable by name, organization, college, or “other.” For example, when “UCLA” is searched, the results show news, developments, and pictured individuals associated with UCLA in one combined list.
Canary Mission does not hide its intent of ensuring that the virulently anti-Israel and anti-Semitic protest actions, disruptions, defamation campaigns, and intimidation tactics follow the perpetrators beyond the campus into their settled-down jobs and career years. A Canary Mission You Tube video invites prospective employers to consider the past record of demonstrative anti-Semitic and anti-Israel conduct. For example at 00:23, the Canary Mission You Tube video screens a 2009 hijab-wearing Ft. Lauderdale protestor chanting at pro-Israel supporters: “Go back to the ovens. You need a big oven, that’s what you need.”
It wasn’t long before Canary Mission became theTARGET of extreme obscenity-laced anti-Semitic comments as well as open threats of violence. The hacker group Anonymous publicly vowed to retaliate against the website and even opened an attack Twitter account,#opcanarymission. Quickly, Canary Mission became even more reticent about revealing its identity or even any information about its physical location. “Many of our detractors just want to know who we are so they can physically harm us,” Canary Mission wrote on its blog, justifying its secrecy.
With threats of violence and intimidation, Canary Mission vastly restricted its communication with all journalists and inquiring souls to email and social media. Voice contact became strictly verboten. Typical was an article in one prominent Jewish newspaper which related, “A person named Joanna responded via email to a request for comment from the group, agreeing to an interview but then not calling this reporter over two days. Joanna also did not respond to a list of questions submitted about the group.” A few moments after this writer read that newspaper article, I sent a four-word email “contact me back thanks” submitted at the Canary Mission website contact link. Within a half hour, the same Joanna emailed back: “Would love to be in touch.” That began a months-long stream of continuous almost daily journalistic communications involving emails long and short, Skype sessions long and short, as well as fileDOWNLOADS and text exchanges getting many answers to many questions. During that time, I was able to verify Canary Mission’s location, the size and shape of its operation, as well as its mindset. The effort yielded an inside look into the Jewish community’s most opaque and hidden public activist group.
Who is Canary Mission? The group of students, ex-students, and others that comprise the Canary Mission movement works out of a single, non-descript, medium-sized office located in an American city identified by this reporter. Numerous computer workstations are sprinkled around the office, using certain specialized web-based software, identified by this reporter, to do its work. The entire operation is headed by one main individual, James, referred to as “the CEO,” but under the coordination of Tom, referred to as “the general manager.” Work is done mainly from its office, which people visit from time to time as they review and add profiles of anti-Israel agitators and bullies, and engage a roaring constellation ofSOCIAL MEDIA. However, remote participation is also common by some of the small group of Canary Mission warriors.
James is the boss. He hires and fires. He speaks with the voice of experienced authority describing the organization and its perilous situation. “Most of our staff is American,” he says. “We have a policy of keeping a low profile. We want to keep as many barriers as possible between us and [hacker group] Anonymous, and any of those who are against us. When we find out who they [anti-Israel agitators] are — we just put out the facts. But when they find out who we are — they literally want to kill us. Because that is what they are like.”
A Canary Mission team member says, “People on this project genuinely believe that there a physical risk with doing this. Look around the world. You see ISIS, Hamas and Hezbollah. It doesn’t matter if you’re Shiite or Sunni. You see home-grown terrorism in America and in Europe. It’s a real thing. Just look at Charlie Hebdo.” But, he qualifies, Canary Mission differs radically from Charlie Hebdo, “because we are not trying to attack any religion. We are not into that. When a radical says something, we report it. But, we are not religious extremists in any way, we are simply democrats.”
When one Canary Mission staffer was asked, “Do you harbor any animus toward Islam?” the reply was swift. Not at all. We do not believe in any form of Islamophobia, any form of racism. We are simply fighting racism. And if you want to be specific, we are fighting anti-Semitism.”
Canary Mission’s gestation began late in 2014. Asked if there was one straw that broke the back, igniting the movement, James replied, “There wasn’t one particular straw. There just seems to be an ongoing demonization of people who support Israel on US and Canadian campuses. That is unacceptable. There is no reason why people who care about democracy or Israel should be physically harmed or abused. Therefore, we have to stand up against the anti-democratic forces and against anti-Semitism. It is our genuine belief that it is us [the Jews] today — and everyone else tomorrow.”
Asked about the veracity of public profiles, James replied, “Everything has to be fact-checked. We are not into making false claims, the kind of stuff the other side does. They deal with lies and we deal with truth. If it was shown that we made a mistake, we would not be very happy. We would correct it as soon as possible. We let the truth speak for itself.”
Amid all the media speculation about big donors lurking behind Canary Mission’s operation, James stressed the grassroots nature of the organization. While some staffers are paid, many volunteer. “It’s amazing what you can do when you care,” quips James. “People can get away with not having vast amounts of money. Everyone’s looking for some huge donor who’s backing us. It’s a silly exercise – looking for things that don’t exist.” Despite that statement, and assurances that tiny donations come via the website’s Donation button, this reporter could not get a clear denial that no major funder has enabled the group.
While James functions as “the boss,” general manager Tom is responsible for vetting all profiles. “As content manager,” says Tom, “before anything goes live, it goes through me. I am the one who hits the button, and from oneCOMPUTER. Normally, minimally, one new profile, often more, is posted every day.” TomCONTINUES, “Then we send out a notification on who is new to approximately 1,000 names on our mailing list and to many on more social media.”
One profile being readied for uploading during our interviews was that of Raja Abdulhaq. His profile is being scheduled to go live in late August. A preview of that profile spotlights Abdulhaq as a computer engineering grad and co-founder of the recently formed Islamic Movement for Justice. The IMJ works closely with BDS groups and rallies the African-American community in anti-police actions, such as those seen in Ferguson. At a boisterous Times Square anti-Israel rally in July 2014, Abdulhaq shouted into the stage microphone that the US was supporting Israel solely “to massacre and mass murder innocent people in Palestine,” this to cheers from a crowd filled with “Apartheid Israel” placards. He added that Israel was a “great monster” and “a terrorist state.” Abdulhaq has also helped organize a protest of a New York City Council session showing solidarity with Israel, according to news reports and a Facebook event page for the demonstration listing him as host. In an interview with this reporter, Abdulhaq quipped, “So far I’m not lucky enough to be on the Canary Mission website. When asked about efforts to create a two-state solution, he objected to “Jewish Zionists sharing any portion of Palestine,” adding that the Palestine Authority did not have the right to finalize such an agreement because the PA was “a traitor serving Israel.”
After finishing the Abdulhaq profile, not yet uploaded, Tom explained that he was motivated to join Canary Mission because “I consider myself a human rights activist and because I identify as Jewish. In college, I was always standing up against racism and antisemitism. I saw what was happening on campus. Someone gave me an opportunity to join Canary Mission. I did. Antisemitism is something close to me, and there is no one else doing this type of thing. I want a make an impact, make a difference. I did not know what the impact would be when I started. But the results are quite believable.”
Tom is Jewish. But he wasn’t sure about other Canary Mission team members and couldn’t understand a question on the topic. “I think it is rude to ask,” he explained. He has not traveled to Israel since he visited as a child. “This is not about being Jewish,” he explained. “This about fighting antisemitism.”

Edwin Black is the award-winning New York Times bestselling author of IBM and the Holocaust, The Transfer Agreement, and Financing the Flames.

Saturday, August 1, 2015

THE ACTUAL IRAN (RUSSIA) -US (p5+1) DEAL...WINNERS AND LOSERS

1.     WHAT IS THE IRANIAN GAME? WHAT IS THE IRANIAN GAME PLAN?

The Iranian game  is  simple: to achieve regional domination and to be a major player on the world scene. {See note *,below.}

An often repeated statement is that: "The Iranian's play chess while the United States plays checkers”.

 It is worse. While the Obama administration's game plan appears to be limited to  to focusing America's  attention on  Israel (standing in the way of world peace; attempting to thwart US diplomatic initiatives, etc.) and on the  ever changing minutia  of the "agreement" { number of centrifuges; percentage of enrichment; who actually takes the soil and air samples at various sites,;etc. }   the Iranian game plan is to secure a 100% certain path to their regional and international aspirations and and  at the same time retain their ability to choose whether they want to become a nuclear power (or just benefit from the status of being a nuclear capable nation.}

In addition , Iran is  now using the leverage that has obtained to generate   an international campaign seeking the dismantlement of the Israeli nuclear deterrent. [   "Iran has signed a historic nuclear deal – now it’s Israel’s turn"by Javad Zarif ,The Guardian, 7-3-15         http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/31/iran-nuclear-deal-israel-vienna-treaty-middle-east-wmd}

{Note *   Many defenders of the Iranian regime claim that Iran has no use for nuclear weapons and does not want nuclear weapons. What Iran has done through these negotiations with the Obama administration is to  trade its “agreement” to temporarily slow down its progress on what it claims is a nonexistent program, for a substantial  nearly immediate increase, in resources and recognition of Iran's legal  ability to walk away from any “agreement” at any time   of its choosing  by violating any terms of the agreement.}




2.     THE IRANIAN THREAT IS DIRECTED PRIMARILY  AGAINST THE UNITED STATES,,THE GREAT SATAN.  To Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, his circle of ruling mullahs and the entire command structure of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, destroying Israel is, to them , just an added bonus AND a religious obligation.

 This deal , by providing substantial additional income to Iran, materially assures the strength and permanence of the hold of the existing government over the Iranian population: 

a)    by increasing the resources that can be  allocated to the internal security apparatus; 

b)    by allowing for  substantial increases in expenditures for infrastructure, economic development, health etc. {This  will reduce restlessness of the younger generation whose discontent is much more economic than political. The implicit deal has been made that 'we will not crack down upon you for transgressions ( within bounds)that you commit in private as long as  your resistance is not public.']

c)     removes an existing  current source of tension concerning financial allocations and national priorities between the ruling clerics and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps by substantially increasing the “terror budget”. This increases the IRGC's operational abilities  in Iraq and through proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Sinai, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain,  Saudi Arabia, etc. This will also increase Iran's already extensive penetration in Central and South America. {Joint Subcommittee Hearing: Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere; Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere Mar 18, 2015   http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-iran-and-hezbollah-western-hemisphere }

3.      INCONVENIENT FACTS FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

 a.  In this  part of the world true negotiations only  begin after the agreement is signed.  How many more concessions will  be demanded for what  will never be a final settlement?

b. The Iranian  Parliament does not vote on this agreement until after the U.S. Congress votes.Will the US be called back to sweeten the pot?

 c. The Iranians have announced that they will be governed by the supreme leader's interpretation of each clause.  Can it be any clearer that they will interpret the agreement to their satisfaction?

d. Iran will be  actually doing the ground monitoring for the UN inspectors/ observers at all of  the current known sites.  The Iranians  will provide their readings as the “situation on the ground” from which the UN inspectors  will draw their conclusions

e All sides agree that Iran will likely cheat around the margins which they will argue are ambiguous. This allows a creeping redefinition of the agreement.

 f.. If Iran is caught cheating and sanctions are in any way "snapped back” this  agreement gives Iran the right to withdraw their compliance  from all their obligations that  they have undertaken.  Thus,  the incentive  is for  Iran  to strictly observe the provisions of this agreement  until the Iranian economy is moving, then to cheat around the edges, and then to walk away from the entire agreement if and when they want to (completely based on their desires and their timetable).




4.     PRES. OBAMA  IGNORED  THE ADVICE OF THE US MILITARY WHO HAVE BEEN VERY VOCAL IN EXPRESSING THEIR CONCERN AND OPPOSITION TO THIS AGREEMENT. 

For example see the congressional testimonies of both the  outgoing  and the incoming chiefs of the joint Chiefs:

 a) These military purchases from China and Russia are just the 1st wave of a major upgrade of Iran's offensive and defensive capabilities. Also, these purchases provide both China and Russia with additional  financial resources ( purchase dollars +increased fleet sizes) which  enable  both China and Russia  to  invest in upgrades which will  directly benefit the Chinese and Russian military forces. 

b) Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford, President Obama's nominee to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  "Iran directly linked to deaths of  more than 500 U.S. troops in Iraq, Afghanistan."

 And c)  The   Iran Task Force, a  bi-partisan team made up of leading military, national security, and policy experts, has been a leading voice about the danger that this bad deal will allow Iran to become a nuclear state. See:




5. RUSSIA AND PUTIN ARE THE IMMEDIATE AND LONG-RANGE BIG WINNERS FROM THIS DEAL. 

   This deal directly and materially helps Russia's unchecked aggression in its continuing campaign to  dominate Eastern Europe [  http://www.newsweek.com/russias-european-neighbors-rattled-putins-expansionism-334616…..Ukraine, Poland, Georgia,  and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania].

This deal places the US  main land at direct risk  of ICBM. attack. 

 a)  Russia has also announced that it will upgrade that portion of its own  IBM force both qualitatively and quantitatively that is aimed at the United States. And b)  Iran does not need ICBMs to attack Israel. ICBMs in the hands of Iran with a nuclear weapon are a threat to the entire East Coast of the United States

Russia has announced that it will sell Iran ICBM technology. Iran does not need ICBMs to attack Israel. ICBMs in the hands of Iran with a nuclear weapon are a threat to the entire East Coast of the United States. They still shout “death to America” in Iran. Several days ago Pres. Rouhani led a parade through the streets of Tehran whose theme was very vocal: “death to America”. 

Russia claims that it plans to upgrade that portion of its own  IBM force, both qualitatively and quantitatively , that is aimed at the United States. Money coming from weapons and other sales to Iran will help finance this enhancement of Russian capability which will improve Russia's  position as they announced in terms of their assaults against Ukraine, and in their announced aggravations against  Poland and Latvia. 

Russia has also announced that they will sell Iran short-range attack missiles which place US naval forces in danger and give Iran a lock control over the essential waterways {Straits of Hormuz;  Bab el- Mandeb} which control  approximately 50% of all of the petroleum that is shipped in the world.

Russia has also announced that they will sell advanced air defense missiles and communications to Iran which would make any nuclear/missile force impregnable to attack.   

6.     ANOTHER MAJOR CONCERN IS THAT IRAN WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED RESOURCES TO DEVOTE TO TERROR AND PENETRATION OPERATIONS WHICH DIRECTLY THREATEN AMERICAN LIVES AND AMERICAN INTERESTS..... THE DEAL PERMITS THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS TO EXPAND THEIR ALREADY CONSIDERABLE PENETRATION OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA.


There are no restrictions on the money that will be released to Iran. There is only "hope"that it will be spent for internal economic  and social improvements. 

Currently Iran is the major funder of international terrorism. They are active in South America and Central America. They are  active in Jordan, Yemen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, etc.

 Since April 2015 the Obama administration has released $700 million per month to Iran. Unfortunately, a substantial percentage of these released funds have gone to fund internal security operations within Iran and to finance increased operations of the IRGC throughout the world.  According to the sworn congressional testimony of Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford, President Obama's nominee to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  "Iran  is directly linked to deaths of  more than 500 U.S. troops in Iraq, Afghanistan."

    According to various administration spokespersons' interpretations of, this agreement,It:

         a. has already  taken  those who have been found guilty of murdering Americans and have been penalized by US courts completely off the hook and has granted them  complete freedom from these judgments and verdicts.  


         b.  obligates  the US  to assist and train Iran in preventing any sabotage against its  nuclear facilities. This obligates the US to protect the Iranian nuclear and missile programs from cyber attack and may require the US to share cyber protection technology with the Iranians.

         c.  states that the US may not impose any new sanctions on Iran for any other reasons.  So if next year Iran's terrorists were to attack a US embassy , the US would not be allowed to sanction Iran for such aggression{. If you think this is far-fetched consider the attack by Iran on the Jewish center in Argentina and the current lack of follow-up by the Argentine government. Also, it is public record that the US did not report Iranian transgressions and violations of the current agreement to the UN in order not to jeopardize “progress” on the negotiations with Iran. Further, the US refused to accept the evidence that the reactor under construction in Syria which had been financed by Iran and was utilizing North Korean technology was in fact a nuclear reactor until after Israel destroyed it and the exact nature of the installation could no longer be denied by US intelligence/State Department.}







THE AYATOLLAH'S PLAN FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE
 Amir Taheri   July 31, 2015 



  • The book has received approval from Khamenei's office and is thus the most authoritative document regarding hisPOSITION on the issue.
  • Khamenei makes hisPOSITION clear from the start: Israel has no right toEXIST as a state He claims his strategy for the destruction of Israel is not based on anti-Semitism, which he describes as a European phenomenon. His position is based on "well-established Islamic principles."
  • ACCORDINGto Khamenei, Israel, which he labels an "enemy" and "foe," is a special case for three reasons. The first is that it is a loyal "ally of the American Great Satan" and a key element in its "evil scheme" to dominate "the heartland of the Ummah."
  • Khamenei describes Israel as "a cancerous tumor" whose elimination would mean that "the West's hegemony and threats will be discredited" in the Middle East. In its place, he boasts," the hegemony of Iran will bePROMOTED."
  • Khamenei's tears for "the sufferings of Palestinian Muslims" are also unconvincing. To start with, not all Palestinians are Muslims. And, if it were only Muslim sufferers who deserved sympathy, why doesn't he beat his chest about the Burmese Rohingya and the Chechens massacred and enchained by Vladimir Putin, not to mention Muslims daily killed by fellow-Muslims across the globe?
  • In the early days of his mission, the Prophet Muhammad toyed with the idea of making Jerusalem the focal point of prayers for Islam. HeSOON abandoned the idea and adopted his hometown of Mecca. For that reason, some classical Muslim writers refer to Jerusalem as "the discarded one," like a first wife who is replaced by a new favorite. In the 11th century the Shiite Fatimid Caliph, Al-Hakim evenORDERED the destruction of Jerusalem.
  • Dozens of mapsCIRCULATE in the Muslim world, showing the extent of Muslim territories lost to the infidel that must be recovered. These include large parts of Russia and Europe, almost a third of China, the whole of India and parts of the Philippines and Thailand.
"The flagbearer of Jihad to liberate Jerusalem."
This is how the blurb of "Palestine," a new book, published by Islamic Revolution Editions last week in Tehran, identifies the author.
The author is "Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Husseini Khamenei," the "Supreme Guide" of the Islamic Republic in Iran, a man whose fatwa has been recognized by U.S. President Barack Obama as having the force of law.
Edited by Saeed Solh-Mirzai, the 416-page book has received approval from Khamenei's office and is thus the most authoritative document regarding his position on the issue.
Khamenei makes his position clear from the start: Israel has no right toEXIST as a state.
He uses three words. One is "nabudi" which means "annihilation". The other is "imha" which means "fading out," and, finally, there is "zaval" meaning "effacement."


Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei (center), is shown meeting in May 2014 with Iran's military chief of staff and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. (Image source: IRNA)

Khamenei claims that his strategy for the destruction of Israel is not based on anti-Semitism, which he describes as a European phenomenon.
HisPOSITION is based on "well-established Islamic principles", he claims.
One such is that a land that falls under Muslim rule, even briefly, can never again be ceded to non-Muslims. What matters in Islam is control of a land'sGOVERNMENT, even if the majority of inhabitants are non-Muslims. Khomeinists are not alone in this belief.
Dozens of maps circulate in the Muslim world, showing the extent of Muslim territories lost to the infidel that must be recovered. These include large parts of Russia and Europe, almost a third of China, the whole of India and parts of the Philippines and Thailand.
However, according to Khamenei, Israel, which he labels as "adou" and "doshman," meaning "enemy" and "foe," is aSPECIAL case for three reasons. The first is that it is a loyal "ally of the American Great Satan" and a key element in its "evil scheme" to dominate "the heartland of the Ummah."
The second reason is that Israel has waged war on Muslims on aNUMBER of occasions, thus becoming a "hostile infidel" ("kaffir al-harbi").
Finally, Israel is a special case because it occupies Jerusalem, which Khamenei describes as "Islam's third Holy City." He intimates that one of his "most cherished wishes" is to one day pray in Jerusalem.
Khamenei insist that he is not recommending "classical wars" to wipe Israel off the map. Nor does he want to "massacre the Jews." What heRECOMMENDS is a long period of low-intensity warfare designed to make life unpleasant if not impossible for a majority of Israeli Jews so that they leave the country.
His calculation is based on the assumption that large numbers of Israelis have dual-nationality and would prefer emigration to the United States or Europe to daily threats of death.
Khamenei makes no reference to Iran's nuclear program. But the subtext is that a nuclear-armed Iran would make Israel think twice before trying to counter Khamenei's strategy by taking military action against the Islamic Republic.
In Khamenei's analysis, once the cost of staying in Israel has become too high for many Jews, Western powers, notably the U.S., which has supported the Jewish state for decades, might decide that the cost of doing so is higher than possible benefits.
Thanks to President Obama, the U.S. has already distanced itself from Israel to a degree unimaginable a decade ago.
Khamenei counts on what he sees as "Israel fatigue." The international community would start looking for what he calls "a practical and logical mechanism" to end the old conflict.
Khamenei's "practical and logical mechanism" excludes the two-state formula in any form.
"The solution is a one-state formula," he declares. That state, to be called Palestine, would be under Muslim rule but would allow non-Muslims, including some Israeli Jews who could prove "genuine roots" in the region, to stay as "protected minorities."
Under Khamenei's scheme, Israel plus the West Bank and Gaza would revert to the United Nations' mandate for a brief period during which a referendum would be held to create the new state of Palestine.
All Palestinians and their descendants, wherever they are, would be able to vote, while Jews "who have come from other places" would be excluded.
Khamenei does not mention any figures for possible voters in his dream referendum. ButSTUDIES by the Foreign Ministry in Tehran suggest that at least eight million Palestinians across the globe would be able to vote, against 2.2 million Jews "acceptable" as future second-class citizens of the new Palestine. Thus, the "Supreme Guide" is certain of the results of his proposed referendum.
He does not make clear whether the Kingdom of Jordan, which is located in 80 percent of historic Palestine, would be included in his one-state scheme. However, a majority of Jordanians, who are of Palestinian extraction, would be able to vote in the referendum and, logically, become citizens of the new Palestine.
Khamenei boasts about the success of his plans to make life impossible for Israelis through terror attacks from Lebanon and Gaza. His latest scheme is to recruit "fighters" in the West Bank to set-up Hezbollah-style units.
"We have intervened in anti-Israel matters, and it brought victory in the 33-day war by Hezbollah against Israel in 2006 and in the 22-day war between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip," he boasts.
Khamenei describes Israel as "a cancerous tumor" whose elimination would mean that "the West's hegemony and threats will be discredited" in the Middle East. In its place, he boasts, "the hegemony of Iran will bePROMOTED."
Khamenei's book alsoDEALS with the Holocaust, which he regards either as "a propaganda ploy" or a disputed claim. "If there was such a thing," he writes, "we don't know why it happened and how."
Khamenei has been in contact with professional Holocaust deniers since the 1990s. In 2000, he invited Swiss Holocaust-denier Jürgen Graf to Tehran and received him inPRIVATEaudiences. French Holocaust-denier Roger Garaudy, a Stalinist who converted to Islam, was also feted in Tehran as "Europe's' greatest living philosopher."
It was with Khamenei's support that former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad set up a "Holocaust-research center" led by Muhammad-Ali Ramin, an Iranian functionary with links to German neo-Nazis who also organized annual "End of Israel" seminars.
Despite efforts to disguise his hatred of Israel in Islamic terms, the book makes it clear that Khamenei is more influenced by Western-style anti-Semitism than by classical Islam's checkered relations with Jews.
His argument about territories becoming "irrevocably Islamic" does not wash, if only because of its inconsistency. He has nothing to say about vast chunks of former Islamic territory, including some that belonged to Iran for millennia, now under Russian rule.
Nor is he ready to embark on Jihad to drive the Chinese out of Xinjiang, a Muslim khanate until the late 1940s.
Israel, which in terms of territoryACCOUNTS for one per cent of Saudi Arabia, is a very small fry.
Khamenei's shedding of tears for "the sufferings of Palestinian Muslims" are also unconvincing. To start with, not all Palestinians are Muslims. And, if it were only Muslim sufferers who deserved sympathy, why doesn't the "Supreme Guide" beat his chest about the Burmese Rohingya and the Chechens massacred and enchained by Vladimir Putin, not to mention Muslims daily killed by fellow-Muslims across the globe?
At no point in these 416 pages does Khamenei even mention the need to take into account the views of either Israelis or Palestinians regarding his miracleRECIPE. What if Palestinians and Israelis wanted a two-state solution?
What if they chose to sort out their problems through negotiation and compromise rather than the "wiping-off-the-map" scheme of he proposes?
Khamenei reveals his ignorance of Islamic traditions when he designates Jerusalem as "our holy city." As a student of Islamic theology, he should know that "holy city" and "holy land" are Christian concepts that have no place in Islam.
In Islam, the adjective "holy" is reserved only for Allah and cannotAPPLY to anything or anyone else. The Koran itself is labeled "al-Majid" (Glorious) and is not a holy book as is the Bible for the Christians.
The "Supreme Guide" should know that Mecca is designated as "al-Mukarramah" (the Generous) and Medina as "al-Munawwarah" (the Enlightened). Even the Shi'ite shrine cities of Iraq are not labeled "muqqaddas" (holy). Najaf is designated as "al-Ashraf" (the Most Noble) and Karbala as "al-Mualla" (the Sublime).
In the early days of his mission, the Prophet Muhammad toyed with the idea of making Jerusalem the focal point of prayers for Islam. HeSOON abandoned the idea and adopted his hometown of Mecca, where the black cube (kaabah) had been a magnet for pilgrims for centuries before Islam. For that reason, some classical Muslim writers refer to Jerusalem as "the discarded one" (al-yarmiyah) like a first wife who is replaced by a new favorite. In the 11thcentury, the Shiite Fatimid Caliph, Al-Hakim, evenORDERED the destruction of "discarded" Jerusalem.
The Israel-Palestine issue is not a religious one. It is a political conflict about territory, borders, sharing of water resources andSECURITY. Those who, like Khamenei, try to inject a dose of religious enmity into this already complex cocktail deserve little sympathy.




 On the Ground in Iraq….the Stealth Iranian Takeover Becomes Clear
 Jonathan Spyer  July 31, 2015 




In June, I TRAVELED among the militias and discovered who they really take orders from.




In late June, I traveled to Iraq with the purpose of investigating the role being played by the Iranian-supported Shia militias in that country.
Close observation of the militias, theirACTIVITIES, and their links to Tehran is invaluable in understanding what is likely to happen in the Middle East following the conclusion of the nuclear agreement between the P5 + 1 powers and Tehran.
An Iranian stealth takeover of Iraq is currently under way. Tehran’s actions in Iraq lay bare the nature of Iranian regional strategy. They show that Iran has no peers at present in the promotion of a very 21st century way of war, which combines the recruitment and manipulation of sectarian loyalties; the establishment and patient sponsoring of political and paramilitary front groups; and the engagement of these groups in irregular and clandestine warfare, all in tune with an Iran-led agenda. With the conclusion of the nuclear deal, and thanks to the cash about to flow into Iranian coffers, the stage is now set for an exponential increase in the scale and effect of theseACTIVITIES across the region. So what is going on in Iraq, and what may be learned from it?
Power in Baghdad today is effectively held by a gathering of Shia militias known as the Hashed al-Shaabi (PopularMOBILIZATION). This initiative brings together tens of armed groups, including some very small and newly formed ones. However, its main components ought to be familiar to Americans who remember the Iraqi Shia insurgency against the U.S. in the middle of the last decade. They are: the Badr Organization, the Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Kataeb Hizballah, and the Sarayat al-Salam (which is the new name for the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr). All of these are militias of long-standing. All of them are openly pro-Iranian in nature. All of them have their own well-documented links to the IranianGOVERNMENT and to the Revolutionary Guards Corps.
The Hashed al-Shaabi was founded on June 15, 2014, following a fatwa by venerated Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani a day earlier. Sistani called for a limited jihad at a time when the forces of ISIS were juggernauting toward Baghdad. The militias came together, under the auspices of Quds Force kingpin Qassem Suleimani and his Iraqi right-hand man Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
Because of the parlous performance of the Iraqi Army, the Shia militias have become in effect the sole force standing between ISIS and the Iraqi capital.
Therein lies the source of their strength. Political power grows, as another master strategist of irregular warfare taught, from the barrel of a gun. In the case of Iraq, no instrument exists in the hands of the electedGOVERNMENT to oppose the will of the militias.
The militias, meanwhile, in their political iteration, are also part ofTHE GOVERNMENT.
In the course of my visit, ITRAVELLED deep into Anbar Province with fighters of the Kataeb Hizballah, reaching just eight miles from Ramadi City. I also went to Baiji, the key front to the capital’s north, accompanying fighters from the Badr Corps.
In all areas, I observed close cooperation between the militias, the army, and theFEDERAL police.
The latter are essentially under the control of the militias. Mohammed Ghabban, of Badr, is the interior minister. The Interior Ministry controls the police. Badr’s leader, Hadi al-Ameri, serves as the transport minister.
In theory, the Hashd al-Shaabi committee answers to Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi. In practice, no one views the committee as playing anything other than a liaison role.
The real decision-making structure for the militias’ alliance goes through Abu Mahdi al Muhandis and Hadi al-Ameri, to Qassem Suleimani, and directly on to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
No one in Iraq imagines that any of these men are taking orders from Abadi, who has no armed force of his own, whose political party (Dawa) remains dominated by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his associates, and whoseGOVERNMENT is dependent on the militaryPROTECTION of the Shia militias and their political support. When I interviewed al-Muhandis in Baiji, he was quite open regarding the source of the militias’ strength:
We rely on capacity and capabilities provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The genius of the Iranian method is that it is not possible to locate a precise point where the Iranian influence ends and the “government” begins. Everything is entwined. This pro-Iranian military and political activity depends at ground level on the successful employment and manipulation of religious fervor. This is what makes the Hashed fighters able to stand against the rival jihadis of ISIS. Says Major General Juma’a Enad, operational commander in Salah al-Din Province:
The Hashed strong point is the spiritual side, the jihad fatwa. Like ISIS.
So this is Tehran’s formula. The possession of a powerful state body (the IRGC’s Quds Force) whose sole raison d’etreis the creation and sponsorship of local political-military organizations to serve the Iranian interest. The existence of a population in a given country available for indoctrination and mobilization. The creation of proxy bodies and the subsequent shepherding of them to both political and military influence, with each element complementing the other. And finally, the reaping of the benefit of all this in terms of power and influence.
This formula has at the present time brought Iran domination of Lebanon and large parts of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Current events in Iraq form a perfect study of the application of this method, and the results it can bring. Is Iran likely to change this winning formula as a result of the sudden provision of increased monies resulting from the nuclear deal? This is certainly the hope of the authors of the agreement. It is hard to see on what it is based.
The deal itself proves that Iran can continue to push down this road while paying only a minor price, so why change? Expect further manifestations of the Tehran formula in the Middle East in the period ahead.


Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, and a fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is the author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).






















FM