The recently announced reconciliation accord—or rather “deal” between Israel and Turkey—is utterly unconscionable—and incomprehensible.

By: Dr. Martin Sherman

Published: July 3rd, 2016

The real reason for the rupture of relations with Turkey is not because of anything Israel has (or has not) done. It is a result of what Turkey has become.

Israelis have no conscience, no honor, no pride. Those who condemn Hitler day and night have surpassed Hitler in barbarism. – Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, (7/19/2014)

National honor is not just something people talk of on the street...It has strategic significance - Moshe (Bogey) Yaalon, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister, (8/17/2011).

The recently announced reconciliation accord—or rather “deal” between Israel and Turkey—is utterly unconscionable—and incomprehensible. From an Israeli point of view, it is devoid of any logic on every imaginable level—national, ethical, security and even commercial—except perhaps in the immediate short-term.

Resounding rejection

For this “deal’ to produce any beneficial results for Israel, beyond those that would accrue to it anyway without it, would be extremely implausible, defying all probability, evidence and common sense – a stunning victory for unfounded optimism over sober assessment of prevailing realities.

Just how detrimental the “deal” would be for Israel is underscored by its overwhelming rejection by the Israeli public, reflected in opinion polls conducted just after news of its impending conclusion broke. According to Channel 10, a majority of almost 2 to 1 in the overall population opposed the “deal”. In the Jewish population, the ratio of opponents to proponents rose to almost 3 to 1. By contrast, in the Arab sector, the numbers supporting the “deal” was nearly five times higher than those opposing it!

This is an interesting statistic in assessing the merits (or lack thereof) of the “deal”. After all, unless one ascribes to the (largely non-Zionist) Arab population a more astute grasp of the national interest of the Jewish nation-state than one ascribes to the (largely pro-Zionist) Jewish population, the significance of this finding is crystal clear—for anyone with the moral courage and intellectual integrity to acknowledge it.

The Zoabi index

But perhaps the most reliable measure of the detriments of the “deal” was the undisguised display of joy and satisfaction with which it was received by Arab Knesset member of the anti-Zionist Balad faction, Hanin Zoabi, a de jure Israeli citizen, with full civil rights, who has spent years denigrating her country and consorting with its enemies. Much of Zoabi’s approving glee

was due to what is perhaps the most infuriating and disturbing aspect of this ill-conceived deal: Israel’s agreement to pay compensation of $20 million to the families of the homicidal thugs (whom Zoabi accompanied), killed while attempting to disembowel IDF naval commandoes, after they rappelled onto a Turkish vessel in 2010, to prevent it breaching the legal quarantine of the Hamas-ruled terrorist enclave of Gaza.

Flushed with victory at the macabre precedent of compensation being paid for the consequences of the attempted lynch of IDF combatants, she crowed: “The agreement by Israel to transfer the compensation to Turkey constitutes an admission of guilt to the murder of nine human beings…This shows that they were not terrorists but victims of [unprovoked] violence”.

Regrettably, but inevitably, many will believe her.

All Israel’s denials and explanations that this ill-considered “gesture” does not constitute acknowledgement of wrongdoing on its part will be of no avail. Few will be convinced that, if truly blameless, Israel would consent to pay multi-million dollar compensation, merely to allow its Turkish detractors to establish relations with it, relations which Turkey desires no less (and probably more) than Israel does. Perilous permit

Not less alarming and ominous is the fact that according to the terms of the “deal” Israel will allow Turkey to build infrastructure projects in Gaza, such as a hospital, power station and desalination plant; and to transfer unlimited (!!) humanitarian aid and equipment to Gaza, as long as it goes through the Israeli port of Ashdod.

It is difficult to conceive of a permit more perilous than this. After all, it is clear that with the initiation of these “projects”, huge (indeed, “unlimited”) amounts of dual purpose materials – such as cement, metals and chemicals—will flow into Gaza. Inspections in Ashdod will be of little value—since after any materials enter Gaza, Israel will have little control over what their final destination—or who their end-users—will be.

Furthermore, if the construction of Turkish projects involves the presence of Turkish workers and/or experts in Gaza, another—no less worrying—scenario is likely to arise: If Israel is (again) compelled to use force against the terrorist organizations deployed throughout the area, there is a tangible risk of Turkish civilians—perhaps even Turkish security personnel—being hit, especially if these organizations operate from within (or from underneath) the projects’ perimeters. Clearly, it is not difficult to identify the potential for a dangerous deterioration in the relationship between the two countries. Indeed, even the specter of possible armed clashes (something Erdogan himself has threatened) cannot be discounted.

At minimum, the presence of Turkish citizens and assets in Gaza is liable to constitute a serious constraint, inhibiting Israel’s freedom of action—both political and military—against the terrorist forces that operate in, and out of, Gaza.

Gas as an excuse?

The question of finding export markets has been cited as a major driving force for the “deal” with Turkey, which is robustly seeking to reduce its dependency on Russia, the source of over half its gas requirements.

However, on closer consideration, the matter of gas seems more an excuse than a substantive reason justifying the “deal”. Indeed, it is hard to identify the prudence in a policy, which creates massive dependency on a single customer (that costly construction of conveyance infrastructure would entails), thus mortgaging much of the future of the gas export trade to the vagaries of an inherently inimical, petulant and unpredictable leader. Indeed, with Erdogan at the helm, every crisis or dispute over a range of topics, on which Israel and Turkey may disagree, is liable to bring about a threat to discontinue Turkish purchases.

Energy expert, Professor Brenda Shaffer, cautions against falling prey to the notion that supplying gas can act as an impetus for improved bilateral relations. She writes (The Marker, (12/ 28/2015): “To date there is not a single case where the lure of supplying gas or oil contributed significantly to resolving conflict…Energy trade does not cause peaceful relations; it reflects peaceful relations”.

She warns: “The trade of gas rarely, if ever, creates dependency [of the importer]...Indeed the trade can in fact produce dependency of the exporter [on the importer]”.

Israel would do well to heed this warning.

The impact on others

The crisis in Turco-Israeli relations led to a blossoming of ties with several other countries, all of whom have some degree of tension in their relationships with Ankara, such as Russia, Greece and Cyprus.

It is highly unlikely that any “deal” that benefits Erdogan will not have some negative impact on the budding bonds with these countries, and the amount of trust they feel can they place in Israel as an ally. Moreover, there can be little doubt that, as Erdogan is a fervent supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, any bolstering of his standing in Gaza will cause rancor and resentment in Cairo, where the amenable Sisi government is under constant threat from the Turkish ruler’s Islamist protégés.

I differ with newly appointed Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman on a range of topics, but I find it difficult to disagree with his critical assessment of the impending entente, expressed several months ago, prior to his joining the coalition: “Erdogan leads a radical Islamic regime, the Turks… are at odds with Russia…We have made considerable efforts in recent years to establish ties with Greece and Cyprus and have reached important agreements with them... [The agreement with Turkey] will harm them…It will also harm our ties with Egypt…”

Impact (cont)

Indeed, in an analysis of the Turco-Israeli “deal”, entitled “After the Israel-Turkey Agreement, Turkey and Hamas Will Still Collaborate”, Yoni Ben Menachem former Director General of the Israel Broadcasting Authority, now a senior Middle East analyst for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, wrote: “Although so far Egypt is keeping mum, in the past it expressed great displeasure at the possibility of Israel giving Turkey any sort of foothold in Gaza.”

There is little reason to believe that Egyptian displeasure with the current deal will be in any way diminished.

Moreover, on Monday (6/28), the Israeli business daily, Globes, warned “Russia, from which Turkey imports 55%-60% of its natural gas, will do everything in its power to prevent this project [Israeli supplying gas to Turkey] from getting off the ground.”

The paper also noted: “The proposed pipeline between Israel and Turkey would pass through Cypriot economic waters–requiring the country’s approval. But relations between Cyprus and Turkey have been frosty [for decades]…A Cypriot energy executive was furious at the deal between Israel and Turkey [saying] ‘a gas export deal between Israel and Turkey is a point of no return for Israeli-Cypriot ties’”. According to the deputy Ambassador of Cyprus to Israel “his country would not authorize the construction of a pipeline…” Quoting a former senior Israeli diplomat, Globes reported that: “The deal with Turkey will hurt relations with Greece and likely Cyprus.” Referring to an agreement, signed in January between Cyprus, Israel and Greece, calling for strengthening trilateral ties, he remarked: “Israel gave Cyprus and Greece the illusion that it was onboard; signing a deal with Turkey is a sort of betrayal.”

Superfluous surrender Even commercially, there seems little point in the “deal”. While political ties between governments may have soured, relations between the two business communities have strengthened considerably.

Thus, despite the breakdown of diplomatic ties, business between the two countries has increased almost five-fold since the pre-Erdogan 1990s, and roughly doubled since 2009 (the year before the Gaza flotilla incident)—reaching almost $5.5 billion in 2014.

But beyond this, if Erdogan has truly undertaken a fundamental reassessment of Turkish interests, and rapprochement with Israel is now perceived as an important national goal, would he really be prepared to sacrifice it for a paltry $20 million dollars compensation or the dubious privilege of providing humanitarian aid to Gaza? There are only two possibilities: Either he would; or he wouldn’t.

If he would, this demonstrates how little store he places in renewed ties with Israel, and should be expected to disrupt them for a myriad of less-than-weighty pretexts in the future. Hence Israel should eschew any concessions to attain such ties.

If he wouldn’t, there is no need for Israel to make any concessions for renewed ties with Turkey, since Ankara would be compelled to establish them anyway—whether the $20 million dollars or the provision of aid to Gaza was forthcoming, or not. Simple logic, isn’t it?

Real reason for rupture

The loss of Turkey as a strategic ally is a huge blow.

But we should not lose sight of the fact that the real reason for the rupture of relations was not because of what Israel has – or has not – done. It is a result of what Turkey has become. Indeed, it would be foolish to believe otherwise, for virtually the only thing unchanged in Turkey since the ascent of Erdogan’s party to power is its geographic location. Today, Turkey is a very different country from what it was in the 1990s, the heydays of the bond between the two countries, when it was a constitutionally decreed secular nation, pro-Western and largely detached from its geographical environment in terms of its aspirations, affiliations and desired future development.

Since then, Turkey has undergone a dramatic metamorphosis in its socio-cultural and political “DNA” –and until it undergoes a comparable “counter-revolution”, the chances of any genuine repair are slim indeed.

However, as long as the principle author of the country’s current Islamist revolution (Erdogan himself) remains in power, the odds on any counter-revolution taking place are negligible.

Accordingly, the most plausible way to promote conditions likely to induce an authentic, durable enhancement of Israeli-Turkish relations, is to undermine Erdogan, let him wallow in the morass of problems his own arrogance and bluster have created for him, so that his domestic adversaries can grow stronger and eventually replace him.

Regrettably, the current “deal” does precisely the opposite! It allows him to boast of achievements and helps extricate himself—even if temporarily—from his current self-made difficulties. As such it serves to bolster his standing and this, necessarily, weakens his opponents, who strive to replace him. Beyond official “spin”

Accordingly, beyond the official “spin” extolling the far-reaching benefits that will allegedly accrue to Israel as a result of this unfortunate and unnecessary “deal”, it is difficult to grasp how it will advance Israel’s interests in any meaningful way. Sadly, it is far more likely that quite the reverse will prove true. 

About the Author: Dr. Martin Sherman served for seven years in operational capacities in the Israeli Defense establishment. He was a ministerial adviser to Yitzhak Shamir's government and lectured for 20 years at Tel Aviv University in Political Science, International Relations and Strategic Studies. He holds several university degrees: a B.Sc. (Physics and Geology), an MBA (Finance), and a PhD in political science and international relations. He was the first academic director of the internationally renowned Herzliya Conference and is the author of two books and numerous articles and policy papers on a wide range of political, diplomatic and security issues. He was born in South Africa and has lived in Israel since 1971. Dr. Martin Sherman (www.martinsherman.org) is founder and executive director of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies (www.strategicisrael.org)

Specifics of the allegations "Hillary Clinton Servers”: Mrs. Clinton by making this information available to her staff who did not have a need to know and in many cases did not have the required level of clearance for the information is much more guilty of a serious transgression than was General Petraeus .

Date: June 28, 2016 

I received this email as guidance from the office of net assessment (my former assignment).It may provide you  with a breakthrough.  I believe this is a story that could make real national headlines for some journalist.

Some of the  materials on Hillary Clinton’s  server are indisputably classified. Hillary made them available to her staff. Some of her staff did not have the clearances necessary for the information. Others did not have the need to know necessary for the information. Staff members  must have both... or it is a crime. See the last paragraph of this email describing why General  Petraeus committed a violation and exactly what his  violation was.

You requested our assessment of the Hillary Clinton E-mail server/classified information situation. Our official policy is a firm:” NO COMMENT”

However, I will comment on the Hillary Clinton campaign statements and attach the New York daily news article which describes the Clinton staff interview with NBC.

The Hillary Clinton campaign staff is undertaking a massive campaign to shape the media perception of the alleged Hillary Clinton security violations.

The most current example is Brian Fallon, Clinton’s national press secretary, interview with NBC News. In that interview he stated the following points:

1.“We have received no indication from any government agency to support these claims, 

2. nor are they reflected in the range of charges that Guccifer already faces and that prompted his extradition in the first place,” 

Fallon said. 3. “And it has been reported that security logs from Secretary Clinton’s email server do not show any evidence of foreign hacking.”

The Fallon statements are an example of "Clinton speak". This means that while the statement is "technically correct" it is misleading. The following points apply:

1. No government agency would communicate to Hillary Clinton and/or to her campaign and/or personal staff any information at all concerning these claims and/or the investigation of these claims. Thus, Fallon is stating an obvious truth: the campaign has received no indication from any government agency… Of anything supporting and/or denying this allegation by a hacker who successfully hacked into Hillary Clinton's secret emails.

2. additional charges might be levied against Marcel Lehel Lazar As

Brian Fallon fully understands at this stage of the investigation of Hillary Clinton and her staff any charges against Lazar would jeopardize the investigation.

3. Current evidence shows that sources in Russia and China have hacked into the servers. It is also believed that the Iranians did also hack into the servers. In addition to the classified information and the disclosure of sources and methods, the unclassified materials gave a clear picture of actions and intentions. So that damage is not only the classified material but also giving adversaries advanced tips as to US positions and  US fallback positions.

General David Petraeus made some of his classified notebooks  available to his biographer,Paula Broadwell. Ms.Broadwell held the required security clearances for this information… However she did not have the need to know. She did not utilize any of this information in her writings nor did she transmit this information to any third party either directly or indirectly.

Thus, Mrs. Clinton by making this information available to her staff who did not have a need to know and in many cases did not have the required level of clearance for the information is much more guilty of a serious transgression than was General Petraeus .

Attachment: Michael Morell: "Foreign governments have Hillary's email”  POLITICO Magazine. 

Former Deputy CIA Director Michael Morell said that he believes some foreign intelligence agencies possess the contents of Hillary Clinton’s private email server. 

“I think that foreign intelligence services, the good ones, have everything on any unclassified network that the government uses,” Morell said Friday in an interview on the Hugh Hewitt Show. 

“I don’t think that was a very good judgment,” he added of Clinton’s decision to use the private server for official State Department business. “I don’t know who gave her that advice, but it was not good advice.”  

Boeing’s Man Pushed for the Iran Nuclear Deal—and Now the Company Is Selling $25 Billion Worth of Planes to Tehran

Boeing is grabbing headlines for its first-of-its-kind, $25 billion deal with Iran Air, Tehran’s state-owned airline.

But the American aerospace giant isn’t exactly publicizing the fact that it paid a lobbying firm to “monitor” the nuclear agreement that made its $25 billion sale to Tehran possible. Or that Boeing has on its payroll a former top Clinton administration official who used his clout to garner support in the corridors of powers for the Iran deal.

Thomas Pickering, one of the country’s most respected diplomats and a and former ambassador to Israel and the United Nations, has been quietly taking money from Boeing while vocally supporting the Iran nuclear deal—testifying before Congress, writing letters to high-level officials, and penning op-eds for outlets like The Washington Post.

Pickering confirmed via email—from his Boeing corporate email address—that he was on staff at the company from 2001 to 2006 and has been a paid consultant for them ever since.

“I was a Boeing employee from 1/2001 to 6/2006,” he emailed. “I was a direct consultant to Boeing from 7/2006 until 12/2015 when‎ contract for consulting was moved to Hills for my work.”

“Hills” refers to Hills & Company International Consultants, where Pickering is a principal. In a previous email, Pickering referred to his “contract arrangement with Boeing” in the present tense.

He didn’t respond to a follow-up email asking if he disclosed his relationship with Boeing when discussing Iran with members of Congress and with the press. The Daily Beast found no evidence that he made a habit of making such a disclosure, and will update this piece if we do.

News of the impending sale highlights just how much Boeing and Iran’s state-owned airline both stand to benefit from the nuclear agreement for which Pickering advocated. The fact that Pickering did not regularly disclose his relationship with Boeing—which, as is now obvious, had a massive financial interest in the implementation of the Iran nuclear agreement—has drawn criticism from government transparency advocates, who consider it to be a violation of ethical standards.

Neil Gordon—an investigator for the Project on Government Oversight, a Washington watchdog organization—said Pickering should have been upfront about his work for Boeing when testifying before Congress on the deal and making the case for it in op-eds for major publications.

“In Pickering’s case, he has a direct connection to Boeing, which I think should be disclosed,” he said.

“I think it’s necessary for the public debate,” Gordon added. “It’s necessary for the public to fully realize the participants’ financial interests. Some of them might have a direct financial stake in a particular outcome.”

Boeing, he added, clearly had a financial interest in the Iran nuclear agreement. The deal reopened the door to American business dealings with Tehran, which time and again had looked to restock its aging fleet of planes with newer, Western models.

Gordon compared it to a controversy in 2013, when many think tank scholars and military experts arguing for a U.S. military presence in Syria didn’t disclose that they had financial ties to defense companies that stood to benefit from the intervention. Media outlets presented these commentators as independent, Gordon noted, when they weren’t. And, he added, Pickering’s situation is similar.

Over the past few years, Pickering has been one of the most vocal and visible advocates for the nuclear agreement with Iran. On June 19, 2014, he testified before the House Armed Services Committee about his views on the need for a comprehensive agreement with Iran. He did not mention Boeing in the disclosure form he provided to the committee prior to his testimony. Boeing also isn’t mentioned in his bio that the House kept on file.

Besides testifying before Congress, Pickering also signed a letter on July 7, 2015, to congressional leadership, along with other former diplomats, urging them to support the nuclear agreement. That letter didn’t disclose his connection to Boeing, and it drew broad media coverage, including from the Huffington Post, Politico, and the AP. None of those reports noted his work for Boeing. The White House also cited the letter in its publication “The Iran Nuclear Deal: What You Need to Know About the JCPOA.” Boeing is not mentioned anywhere in that document.

Rep. Mark Takai cited “hours discussing the matter with Amb. Thomas Pickering” in a press release announcing his support for the Iran deal, and Sen. Dick Durbin name-checked him in a Senate speech arguing for the deal.

Additionally, Pickering co-authored a Washington Post op-ed arguing that the deal “could help save Iraq”—and, of course, without disclosing his ties to Boeing. And he wrote an op-ed for Tablet on July 27, 2015, called “A Guide for the Perplexed: The Iran Nuclear Agreement” arguing for the deal. Again, no mention of Boeing. Tablet described him as a former diplomat—and not as a current consultant to a company that stood to make billions off the agreement.

His bio at the National Iranian American Council, which generally backs a cooling of tensions between Washington and Tehran and where he serves as an advisory board member, notes that he worked at Boeing until 2006 but does not note that he still consults for the company. Same for his bio at the anti-nuclear weapon group Global Zero. His bio at The Iran Project doesn’t mention Boeing at all.

Pickering wasn’t the only person on Boeing’s payroll who closely followed the Iran nuclear agreement. A lobbying report filed with the government on Oct. 19, 2015, shows the company paid Monument Policy Group LLC between $5,000 and $50,000 between July 1 and Sept. 30, 2015, to do lobbying work on the agreement, as well as other issues. A separate report—accessible, like the first one, through a public database—shows Boeing spent between $5,000 and $4,956,000 lobbying from Oct. 10, 2015, through the end of that year. It lists “U.S.-Iran Relations” as an issue it worked on. The Washington Free Beacon noted these reports in a story published Jan. 29 of this year.

Tim Neale, a spokesman for Boeing, said the company did not take a position on or lobby for the Iran nuclear deal and the negotiations that preceded it.

“Monument Policy Group passively monitored congressional debate on the nuclear agreement for Boeing, but did not engage congressional offices on the agreement,” he added. “Our own lobbying activity in Q4 was in response to questions we were getting about the potential for airplane sales to Iran, plus misconceptions about the potential for Ex-Im Bank financing of such sales, which we felt were important to correct.”

Boeing’s decision to sell planes to Iran Air has already generated some controversy in Congress. Rep. Peter Roskam, an Illinois Republican, wrote an editorial for USA Today promising to do everything he can to stop the deal from going through.

“Boeing says it must go wherever Airbus goes,” he wrote, citing the fact that the company’s European competitor recently signed a deal to sell planes to Iran Air. “But history is a merciless disciplinarian to those who make themselves complicit in evil because ‘someone else was doing it.’”

State Department spokesman John Kirby said on Tuesday that it “welcomes” Boeing’s plan to sell planes to Iran. And backers of the Iran deal say the sales are an integral part of realizing the promise of sanctions relief.

Trita Parsi—the president of the National Iranian American Council—said Boeing’s deep interest in the agreement didn’t surprise him. Nor did the company’s desire to keep a low profile on this issue.

“Obviously Boeing wants this deal with Iran, but it’s a tricky one,” he said. “It has a lot of political dimensions. That is something Boeing would probably prefer not to deal with.”

“Once the deal was approved, I’m not surprised that Boeing would step things up a little bit,” he said of the company’s additional lobbying in the months after the U.S. signed on to the Iran nuclear agreement.

Parsi also said Boeing could have drawn unwelcome criticism from the public and from Congress if it publicized its support for the nuclear agreement.

“I think more than anything else, they were trying to make sure they would put up some sort of buffer against too many members of Congress jumping on the train of condemning Boeing for doing something that it is now legal for them to do,” he said.

Parsi added that Boeing’s tentative agreement to sell planes to Iran Air will be critical to the success of the Iran nuclear agreement. If Boeing and Iran Air can finalize and successfully implement the multibillion-dollar sale, it will be easier for other American companies to do business with Iran, he said. On the other hand, if criticism from political leaders and the public makes completing the deal too politically costly for Boeing, then other companies will be unlikely to follow its lead. And if that happens, then Iran’s sanctions relief will be in word only—the country won’t benefit from the U.S. decision to lift some sanctions, and that could disincentivize its leaders from holding up their end of the agreement.

“If the Iranians end up de facto not getting sanctions relief, the deal will collapse,” he said. “That’s right now the biggest threat to the sustainability of the deal.”

A Holocaust Love Story

Rabbi Yosef Wallis, director of Arachim of Israel, talks to Project Witness about his father, Judah Wallis, who was born and raised in Pavenitz, Poland.

While he was in Dachau, a Jew who was being taken to his death suddenly flung a small bag at my father, Judah Wallis. He caught it, thinking it might contain a piece of bread. Upon opening it, however, he was disturbed to discover a pair of tefillin. Judah was very frightened because he knew that were he to be caught carrying tefillin, he would be put to death instantly. So he hid the tefillin under his shirt and headed for his bunkhouse.

In the morning, just before the appel [roll call], while still in his bunkhouse, he put on the tefillin. Unexpectedly, a German officer appeared. He ordered him to remove the tefillin, noted the number on Judah’s arm.

At the appel, in front of thousands of silent Jews, the officer called out Judah’s number and he had no choice but to step forward. The German officer waved the tefillin in the air and said, "Dog! I sentence you to death by public hanging for wearing these."

Judah was placed on a stool and a noose was placed around his neck. Before he was hanged, the officer said in a mocking tone, "Dog, what is your last wish?"

“To wear my tefillin one last time," Judah replied.

“The officer was dumbfounded. He handed Judah the tefillin. As Judah put them on, he recited the verse that is said while the tefillin are being wound around the fingers: "Ve’eirastich li le’olam, ve’eirastich li b’tzedek uvemishpat, ub’chessed, uv’rachamim, ve’eirastich li b’emunah, v’yodaat es Hashem – I will betroth you to me forever and I will betroth you to me with righteousness and with justice and with kindness and with mercy and I will betroth you to me with fidelity, and you shall know God."

It is hard for us to picture this Jew with a noose around his neck, wearing tefillin on his head and arm – but that was the scene that the entire camp was forced to watch, as they awaited the impending hanging of the Jew who had dared to break the rule against wearing tefillin.

Even women from the adjoining camp were lined up at the barbed wire fence that separated them from the men’s camp, forced to watch this horrible sight.

As Judah turned to watch the silent crowd, he saw tears in many people’s eyes. Even at that moment, as he was about to be hanged, he was shocked. Jews were crying! How was it possible that they still had tears left to shed? And for a stranger? Where were those tears coming from? Impulsively, in Yiddish, he called out, "Yidden, I am the victor. Don’t you understand, I am the winner!"

The German officer understood the Yiddish and was infuriated. He said to Judah, "You dog, you think you are the winner? Hanging is too good for you. You are going to get another kind of death."

“Judah, my father, was taken from the stool and the noose was removed from his neck. He was forced into a squatting position and two huge rocks were placed under his arms. Then he was told that he would be receiving 25 lashes to his head – the head on which he had dared to position his tefillin. The officer told him that if he dropped even one of the rocks, he would be shot immediately. In fact, because this was such an extremely painful form of death, the officer advised him, "Drop the rocks now. You will never survive the 25 lashes to the head. Nobody ever does."

Judah’s response was, "No, I won’t give you the pleasure."

At the 25th lash, Judah lost consciousness and was left for dead. He was about to be dragged to a pile of corpses , after which he would have been burned in a ditch, when another Jew saw him, shoved him to the side, and covered his head with a rag so people didn’t realize he was alive. Eventually, after he recovered consciousness fully, he crawled to the nearest bunkhouse that was on raised piles and hid under it until he was strong enough to come out under his own power. Two months later he was liberated.

During the hanging and beating episode, a 17-year-old girl had been watching the events from the women’s side of the fence. After liberation, she made her way to Judah. She walked over to him and said, "I’ve lost everyone. I don’t want to be alone any more. I saw what you did that day when the officer wanted to hang you. Will you marry me?”

My parents walked over to the Klausenberger Rebbe and requested that he perform the marriage ceremony. The Klausenberger Rebbe, whose Kiddush Hashem is legendary, wrote out a kesubah [marriage contract] by hand from memory and married the couple. I have that handwritten kesubah in my possession to this day.

By Rabbi Yosef Wallis, Via Aish

Discussion of the plan entitled “Security First”, proposed by “Commanders for Israel’s Security”, which claims to “Improve Israel’s Security and International Standing”….  Imbecility squared – Part 2  By Martin Sherman 

[  Brief  review of Part I]

With changing patterns of Arab enmity, the major challenge to Israel’s existence as the Jewish nation-state is no longer repulsing invasion, but resisting attrition

A comprehensive Israeli policy declaration [a]ccepting, in principle, the Arab Peace Initiative (API), with requisite adjustments to accommodate Israel’s security and demographic needs, as a basis for negotiation.

Key political measure in plan entitled “Security First”, proposed by “Commanders for Israel’s Security”, which claims to “Improve Israel’s Security and International Standing”.

The Arab Peace Initiative does not need changing or adjusting, it is on the table as is…Why should we change the Arab Peace Initiative? I believe that the argument the Arab Peace Initiative needs to be watered down in order to accommodate the Israelis is not the right approach. – Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, Paris, June 3, 2016.

Last week I began a critical analysis of a plan put forward by a group calling itself “Commanders for Israel’s Security” (CIS) comprised of over 200 former senior officers/officials from the IDF and other security services. Part I

To recap briefly:

I argued that the plan, which purports to offer a formula “to extricate Israel from the current dead end and to improve its security situation and international standing”, is a deeply flawed policy prescription, both in terms of the political principles on which it is based and the practical details which it presents.  As such, it is highly unlikely to achieve the objectives it sets itself. Indeed, it is far more likely to precipitate precisely the opposite outcomes, exacerbating the very dangers it claims it will attenuate.

To recap briefly, the major political components which comprise the plan call for Israel to:

(a)  Proclaim, unilaterally, that it forgoes any claim to sovereignty beyond the yet-to-be completed security barrier, which, in large measure, coincides with the pre-1967 “Green Line”, adjusted to include several major settlement blocks adjacent to those lines; but,

(b)   Leave the IDF deployed there—until some “acceptable alternative security arrangement” is found – presumably the emergence of a yet-to-be located pliant Palestinian-Arab, who will pledge to recognize Israel as the Jewish nation-state; and

(c)    Embrace the Saudi Peace Plan–a.k.a. Arab Peace Initiative (API), subject to certain—but significantly, unspecified—changes which the Arabs/Saudis recently resolutely refused to consider.

Learning lesson of Gaza; ignoring lesson of South Lebanon

CIS claims (pp.28-29) that it has learnt the lesson of the unilateral Gaza disengagement, when the IDF evacuated the territory, allowing the Islamist Hamas to take over. Accordingly, their plan “calls for the IDF to remain in the West Bank and retain complete security control until a permanent status agreement with the Palestinians ushers in alternative concrete, sustainable security arrangements.”

So while CIS may indeed have learnt the lesson of Gaza 2005, it seems to have forgotten the lesson of Lebanon 2000.

Indeed, as I underscored last week, the combination of the first two elements—the forswearing of claims to sovereignty over Judea-Samaria, on the one hand; and the continued deployment of the IDF in that territory, on the other—replicate precisely the same conditions that prevailed in South Lebanon until the hasty retreat by the IDF in 2000.  This unbecoming flight was orchestrated by then-PM, former IDF chief of staff and Israel’s most decorated soldier, Ehud Barak, under intense pressure from Left-leaning civil society groups such as “Four Mothers”, to extricate the IDF from the “Lebanese mud” and “bring our boys back home”.  Thus abandoned to the control of Hezbollah, the area was swiftly converted into a formidable arsenal, bristling with weaponry capable of hitting almost all major Israeli cities.

Unsustainable political configuration

Today, after the poorly conducted military campaign by the mighty IDF against a lightly armed militia, left defiantly undefeated after five weeks of fighting, this arsenal has reportedly swelled almost ten-fold in quantity and improved immensely in terms of quality/precision.  Indeed, were not Hezbollah mercifully distracted by the need to support its erstwhile benefactor, the beleaguered Bashar Assad, it is far from implausible that this terrible stockpile would have already been unleashed against Israel.

For anyone with a modicum of foresight, it should be clear that CIS’s prescription of deploying the IDF for an indeterminate period in territory over which it lays no sovereign claim—and hence, by implication, acknowledges that others have such claims to it—creates an unsustainable political configuration, which sooner or later will generate irresistible pressure on Israel to evacuate it—leaving the country exposed to the very dangers the IDF deployment was intended to obviate.

Indeed, as pointed out last week, if implemented, CIS’s proposal would, in a stroke, convert Judea-Samaria from “disputed territory” to “occupied territory” and IDF from a “defense force” to an “occupying force”. Worse, it would do so by explicit admission from Israel itself.

Formula for open-ended occupation

Moreover, by conditioning the end of IDF deployment on the emergence of “a permanent status agreement with the Palestinians [which] ushers in alternative concrete, sustainable security arrangements”, what CIS is in fact promoting is a formula for open-ended occupation, whose duration is totally dependent on the Palestinian-Arabs.

After all, according to CIS’s plan “the IDF [is] to remain in the West Bank and retain complete security control”, until some suitable Palestinian  interlocutor appears, sufficiently pliant to satisfy Israel’s demands for said “permanent status agreement and concrete sustainable security arrangements”, but sufficiently robust to resist more radical domestic rivals, who oppose any such agreement/arrangements.

And what if such an interlocutor fails to emerge? Clearly, CIS’s plan prescribes persisting with the Israeli military presence in the territory because, as CIS itself concedes: “The situation on the West Bank require …continued deployment of the IDF until satisfactory security arrangements are put into place within the framework of a permanent status agreement”. 

Therefore all the Palestinian-Arabs need to do to ensnare the IDF in what will inevitably become the “West Bank mud”, an easy target for guerilla attacks by a recalcitrant population backed by armed Palestinian internal security services, is…well, nothing.  All they need to do is wait until mounting IDF casualties in a “foreign land” create increasing domestic pressure to “bring our boys back home”, and mounting international  impatience with open-ended “occupation” create growing external pressure, which make continued IDF deployment no longer tenable—and withdrawal becomes inevitable, without any “permanent settlement” or “concrete sustainable security arrangements”.

Renege or replace?

But even in the unlikely event that some Palestinian partner could be located, who agrees, in good faith, to conclude a permanent status agreement and implement acceptable security arrangements that allows the IDF to evacuate Judea-Samaria, how could Israel ensure this agreement will be honored and these arrangements maintained over time? Clearly it could not!

Once the IDF withdraws, Israel has no way of preventing its Palestinian co-signatories to any accord from reneging on their commitments—whether of their own volition, due to a change of heart, or under duress from extremist adversaries. Even more to the point, barring intimate involvement in intra-Palestinian politics, Israel has no way to ensure that their pliant peace-partner will not be replaced—whether by bullet or ballot—by far more inimical successors, probably  generously supported by foreign regimes, who repudiate their predecessors pledges. Indeed, it is more than likely that it would be precisely the “perfidious” deal struck with the “nefarious Zionist entity” that would be invoked as justification for the regime-change.

But whichever of these outcomes emerges in practice, Israel is likely to be confronted with a situation where it no longer has security control in Judea-Samaria and a hostile regime perched on the hills overlooking the runways of Ben-Gurion airport, adjacent to the trans-Israel highway, and within mortar range of the nation’s capital.

It would be intriguing, indeed, to learn how CIS members, given their cumulative 6,000 years of experience in Israel’s various security agencies, see this situation as one that would  achieve their plan’s principle goal: “to enhance personal and national security.”

Resisting attrition; not repulsing invasion 

To be fair, CIS do assure us that: The IDF [as] by far the most potent military force in the region… can provide effective security and address all challenges within … any future borderline as agreed-to by our government and endorsed by our people…”

But of course, the question is not only whether the IDF can secure the borders, but at what cost in terms of both resources and casualties (both military and civilian).

It is of course true that, for over four decades, Israel has not faced a tangible threat of large-scale invasion by conventional Arab forces. However, today, with the changing pattern of Arab enmity, the major challenge to Israel’s existence as the Jewish nation-state is no longer repulsing invasion, but resisting attrition.

The Arab stratagem is no longer the cataclysmic annihilation of the Jewish state, but the ongoing erosion of Jewish will to maintain the Jewish state, by making Jewish life in it unbearable – both physically and psychologically.

Attrition vs Invasion (cont.)

Of course, the looming specter of a nuclear Iran may, on the one hand, reinstate the cataclysmic approach; on the other, it may “merely” provide a protective umbrella under which attrition can continue with greater intensity – and impunity.

Indeed, one of the most explicit expressions of this attrition-oriented intent came from Yasser Arafat in Stockholm, in an address to Arab diplomats, barely a year after being awarded the Noble Peace Prize: “The PLO will now concentrate on splitting Israel psychologically into two camps…We will make life unbearable for Jews by psychological warfare… I have no use for Jews. They are and remain Jews…”  This overt admission of malice, echoed repeatedly elsewhere by other Palestinian-Arab spokespersons, should have removed any doubt as to what lay ahead.

Now, imagine if after forgoing sovereignty beyond the security barrier as per  CIS’s prescription, the IDF pulled out of Judea-Samaria –whether pursuant to some accord or a combination of domestic pressure and international chagrin. Imagine, if in the absence of any agreement or despite prior agreements, this territory falls—as it almost inevitably will—to the control of some radical regime with no commitment to any understandings—implicit or explicit—with the “Zionist entity” Imagine how much more ominous and onerous that attrition would be along the almost 800 km frontier, abutting Israel’s heavily populated coastal plain  and from the heights commanding its urban and commercial centers.

Capitulation masquerading as “initiative”

No less disturbing is CIS’s embrace of what is perversely called the “Arab Peace Initiative” (API), which prescribes: (a) Complete withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines including the Golan Heights (b) a “just solution” to the problem of Palestinian refugees, a clear allusion to the “Right of Return”; (c) the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on “the Palestinian territories occupied since 4 June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital”.

Alarmingly, on its website, CIS declares: “We believe that the government of Israel can and should formulate a regional initiative based on an appropriate response to the positive potential encapsulated in the Arab Peace Initiative.”

Sadly, the growing acceptance of the API does not, as CIS would have it, reflect faith in military strength but rather psychological weakness. It is not a sign of confidence but a symptom of resignation, even desperation. Indeed, its acceptance is driven by the fact that the API is the only thing that the Arabs do not reject. Thus, to reject the API is to admit the unpalatable truth that there exists no path to a mutually agreed resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Indeed, for all intents and purposes, the API is a document of capitulation. It reflects acquiescence to virtually all Arab demands that successive governments, over a decade and a half, have rejected as unacceptably hazardous. It forgoes virtually all the gains of the 1967 Six Day War, and imperils some of those of the 1948 War of Independence. Willingness to agree to it, even as a basis for negotiations, is a clear signal that every Israeli “No,” however emphatic initially, is in effect a “Maybe” and a potential “Yes” in the future.

Reservations rejected.

Apparently aware that, as currently formulated, the API is too pernicious to be approved by the Israeli public, CIS tries to preempt criticisms of its acceptance of the so called “peace initiative” by adding a proviso that it should be adjusted “to accommodate Israel’s security and demographic needs, as a basis for negotiation”.

But suggestions that “adjustments” might be made were rapidly and resolutely rejected by both the Saudis, who authored the initiative and the Arab League, who endorsed it. And why wouldn’t they? For as CIS’s proposal clearly shows, continued Arab intransigence is sure to engender further Israeli compliance …

To be continued.

Tel Aviv Terror Attack Shatters Five Myths  Stephen M. Flatow   June 13th, 2016

http://www.jewishpress.com/indepth/opinions/tel-aviv-terror-attack-shatters-five-myths/2016/06/13/

The June 8 terrorist massacre in Tel Aviv exposed all five of the major myths that cloud discussions of Israel and the Palestinians.

Myth #1: “The problem is the settlements”

This was not a massacre of “settlers.” The attack did not take place in some disputed territory. Nobody can claim that the victims “provoked” the violence by living in some predominantly Arab area. These were people drinking coffee in the heart of Tel Aviv.

Myth #2: “It was a reaction to the occupation”

The attackers are residents of the village of Yatta. The Israeli occupation of Yatta ended when Israeli troops withdrew from the territories where 98 percent of the Palestinians reside in late 1995. Yatta has been under the rule of the Palestinian Authority for nearly 21 years.

Although Israel’s critics continue to falsely claim that the Palestinians live under “Israeli occupation,” the Israeli public knows better. The Israel Democracy Institute/Tel Aviv University monthly Peace Index survey for May 2016 found 71.7 percent of Israeli Jews say it is wrong to categorize Israel’s status in the territories (it rules the areas where Jews reside) as “occupation.”

Myth #3: “The Palestinian Authority condemned the attack”

The Palestinian Authority (PA) never calls such attacks “terrorism,” and always brackets the attacks on Israelis together with Israeli actions against terrorists, thereby justifying the attacks on Israelis. Its response to the Tel Aviv massacre was no different. It declared: “We condemn violence and attacks against civilians on both sides, whatever the justification.” The PA “not only condemned the attack in south Tel Aviv early on Monday morning, but also the recent Israel Defense Forces strikes on Gaza, and attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank and in Jerusalem,” according to Israel’s Channel 10 television network.

Fatah, which is chaired by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, explicitly defended the massacre. According to the Palestinian news agency Ma’an, Fatah issued a statement calling the attack “a natural response” to Israeli actions.

Fatah media committee head Munir al-Jaghoub explained, “Israel must realize the consequences of its persistence to push violence, house demolition policies, forced displacement of Palestinians, raids by Israeli settlers to the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, and the cold-blooded killing of Palestinians at checkpoints.”

That’s the equivalent of the Democratic Party defending the San Bernardino massacre of 2015. Imagine U.S. Rep. Debbie Wasserman-Schultz (D-Fla.), head of the Democratic National Committee, saying the killings in southern California were the “consequences” of President Barack Obama sending drones to carry out the “cold-blooded killing” of al-Qaeda members.

Myth #4: “Ordinary Palestinians are against terrorism”

Israel Hayom reports that, “In Ramallah, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Jenin, and other cities, people danced in the streets, set off fireworks, and handed out treats while praising the attacks.” When the PA’s schools, newspapers, television stations constantly praise terrorists as “heroes” and “martyrs,” it is no wonder ordinary Palestinians have come to feel the same way.

The cities where the celebrations took place would be the heart of a future Palestinian state. They are just a few miles down the road from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Can those who celebrate massacres be trusted with a sovereign, independent state next door to Israel?

Myth #5: “The major American news outlets are staffed by objective, professionally trained journalists; if their coverage of Israel is unflattering, that’s because of Israel’s own policies, not because of media bias”

CNN’s Twitter announcement of the attack put the word “terrorists” in quotation marks, stating, “Two ‘terrorists’ captured after Tel Aviv attack, Israeli police spokesman tweets.” The Washington Post’s correspondents in Israel, William Booth and Ruth Eglash, exhibited the same bias. They described the terrorists as “gunmen,” “assailants,” and “attackers”—but never as terrorists, and only indirectly as Palestinians. And the headline-writers at Washington Post headquarters came up with this gem: “4 Killed in Tel Aviv Market Shooting that Officials Labeled Terrorist Attack.”

Perhaps copies of the Washington Post should bear labels of their own: “Warning: The reporting in this newspaper may be hazardous to the truth. It is often slanted for the purpose of protecting the Palestinian cause against criticism”

About the Author: Stephen M. Flatow, an attorney in New Jersey, is the father of Alisa Flatow, who was murdered in an Iranian-sponsored Palestinian terrorist attack in 1995.