There are those who deem this critical argument that is being waged now as “the campaign of our lives,” and there are indeed various signs which attest to the fact that the moment in which a decision on the Iranian issue must be made is fast approaching. Nadav Shragai
In a country where there is never a dull moment, the media this week pushed the really critical issue of Iran off the front pages. The real debate is happening behind closed doors. In simple Hebrew, the dilemma comes down to three words: p’tzatza o’ haftzatza ("An [Iranian] A-bomb or an [Israeli] bombing campaign") but the reality is not that simple. In fact, it is far more complex. Defense Minister Ehud Barak says that Israel is currently “at the point in which security challenges are likely to become no less fateful than the challenges that stood before the founding fathers at the establishment of the state; no less fateful than the challenges that stood before the state’s leaders in the period leading to the start of the Six-Day War; no less fateful than the challenges that stood before the decision-makers who were called upon to lead in the days leading up to and during the Yom Kippur War.” There are those who deem the critical argument that is being waged now as “the campaign of our lives,” and there are indeed signs attesting to the fact that the moment in which a decision on the Iranian issue must be made is fast approaching. It is possible that we are talking about a matter of months. The public is not well-versed in the details, and perhaps it should be this way, but a concise summary of this dilemma is testament to the difficulty of this issue. On the one hand, we have the alarming signals that are ringing louder as the prospect of a nuclear Iran becomes more real. Iran currently possesses 7,000 kilograms of enriched uranium up to 3.5 percent and 160 kilograms of enriched uranium up to 20%. To manufacture an atomic bomb, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his friends need enriched uranium of up to at least 90%. If the Iranians decide to make a sprint — which they have done in the last few months — they could enrich uranium up to 90% within a matter of months. Leon Panetta, the American secretary of defense, confided to Israeli officials his fear that this January could mark the Iranians’ “finish line” in their race to attain the bomb. In the last three months, Iran has enriched 700 kilograms of uranium. Since the current government came to power, the number of centrifuges capable of enriching uranium in Iran has doubled from 5,000 to 10,000. The technological mishap which slowed down the centrifuges caused by the Stuxnet computer virus has already been rectified. There is almost wall-to-wall agreement that a nuclear Iran would render our lives here a living hell while posing a real threat to the existence of the State of Israel. The recent assessments even predict an arms race that would proliferate throughout the region. In response to Iran’s going nuclear, other Muslim countries such as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia would make every effort to get their own atomic weapons. On the other hand, there is the price that Israel would pay — namely, an Iranian threat to retaliate against any Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities — by launching rockets at Israeli cities. The projected number of casualties is vague, although it is expected to include “hundreds of deaths.” There are also threats that a number of other fronts are liable to heat up as a result of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Hezbollah, which is based in south Lebanon, possesses an arsenal of 60,000 rockets capable of hitting any point in the north. It also has a few thousand missiles that are capable of reaching the center of the country, and hundreds that can threaten towns in southern Israel. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas continues to grow stronger. It and other armed organizations possess some 8,000 rockets, a few of which could reach central Israel. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and, more importantly, the recent events in Syria, make the Iranian story even more complex. For Israel’s decision-makers, there are other factors that come into play. If Israel decides to strike Iran, it could find itself under assault on a number of fronts. Attack as long as it’s possible Over the past year, Israel and the West have developed a strategy that Haaretz journalist Ari Shavit calls “the third way” — a combination of economic sanctions and covert activity. The problem is that the third way does not eliminate the Iranian threat. It simply postpones it to a later date. There is a growing sense among members of the Israeli establishment that this option has been all but exhausted. Professor Yehezkel Dror (83), a member of the Winograd Commission which probed the decision-making process up to and during the Second Lebanon War, had firsthand access to two Israeli prime ministers (Yitzhak Shamir and Shimon Peres). His expertise lay in the planning and decision-making process in the diplomatic, security, and public spheres. Behind the scenes, he helped craft a number of strategic processes of great importance for the State of Israel. A few weeks ago, Dror authored a policy paper on behalf of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. In short, Dror came out in favor of an attack on Iran, adding that he recommended combining a military offensive with a regional diplomatic overture for peace. The position articulated by Dror — who is renowned as one of the world’s foremost thinkers in the field of administrative science and policy doctrine thanks to many years of research which he devoted to the topic of decision-making processes, policy planning, statesmanship, defense doctrine, and Jewish policy — rocked the establishment. Dror’s views, which have at times been critical of the manner in which sensitive decisions are made in Israel, carry great weight. Up to a year ago, Dror believed that Israel could live with a nuclear Iran. He thought Israel’s deterrent capability and the threat of a nuclear second strike was enough to make Iran think twice before attacking. Now he thinks differently. “A sometimes expressed view is that initiating a preventive war is morally wrong, all the more so when one cannot be sure that without it a harsh war is sure to occur in the future,” Dror writes. “However, this view, though honorable, is primitive and should be rejected. It lacks understanding of the nature of policy as a tool that, by nature, must deal with the future, which is never certain; and it does not give any weight to the important value of preventing pain in the future. Furthermore, such a view clings to what is ‘certain,’ ignoring what ‘may come’ even when very likely or very significant, thus further negating every effort to influence the future, which is always contingent and uncertain.” “The possession of nuclear weapons by Iran poses serious dangers to Israel because of the real possibility that the rulers of Iran may use them, directly or indirectly, against Israel,” he writes. “There also exists the likelihood that Iranian nuclear weapons will cause nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, further increasing the danger. Hopefully, international sanctions will prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or the U.S. will launch a pre-emptive attack if necessary. But Israel cannot leave the future of its national security to the uncertain decision making of others. If Iranian advances towards construction of a nuclear weapon are not halted, Israel will have no choice but to attack Iranian nuclear and military facilities while they are still vulnerable.” The professor acknowledges that while one can expect a violent reaction from Iran in the case of an Israeli attack, assessments of the damage should not be exaggerated. “Even pessimistic assumptions about the scope of Iranian retaliation make it clear that the expected damage to Israel will be less, by many orders of magnitude, than the destructive potential of an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel,” he writes. Dror’s arguments stirred up a firestorm, with many wondering whether it was possible to place the public’s faith in the hands of the current leadership. Just a few years ago, Dror said that Israel’s leaders were problematic and mediocre. Now, he posits: “If we cannot trust our leadership with regards to an attack against Iran, we cannot trust them also in the event that they refrain from taking a decision for such an attack.” “The decision to refrain from attacking bears consequences and repercussions to the same extent as deciding to attack,” Dror told Israel Hayom. “Both of these decisions are far-reaching. So it’s irrelevant if I trust [the leadership] more or less. My personal tendency is to trust the current leadership. These are serious people who have plenty of experience. I don’t know, but I am convinced that they are doing very thorough staff work on this issue.” In contrast with the criticism that others interviewed for this article have expressed regarding the public nature of the discussions surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue, Dror actually welcomes the debate. “On the one hand, as someone who filled a number of senior positions in the defense establishment, I told myself that once I left these positions I wouldn’t conceive of criticizing the government,” he said. “On the other hand, if those same people think that this is a dangerous decision, it is their duty to say so. As long as they don’t reveal classified information, it is their right.” Still, Dror makes clear that public opinion is not a factor in his thinking. “The public knows nothing, and it has no factual basis to judge these things, and it is also impossible to present the public with all the facts on this issue,” he said. “So its opinion has no weight in my mind.” Dror also doesn’t shy away from taking political considerations into account. “People at the time thought that taking action against the Iraqi nuclear reactor was motivated by electoral considerations,” he said. “I worked in Shamir’s office, and I also got to know Begin. I think that this is slanderous. On the Iranian issue, I believe that the aspects are weighed independent of political considerations, and the decision will be taken purely with the best interests of the future of the State of Israel in mind. Other factors, if they exist, will be particularly marginal, and they will not make the difference.” Fact-checking and agreement Dror is one of a number of public figures from whom we sought comment this week in an effort to examine the decision-making process during two other critical periods in Israel’s history — the days leading up to the Six-Day War and the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor — and to compare them with the critical juncture in which Israel currently finds itself as it relates to the Iranian nuclear issue. Yeshayahu Gavish served as GOC Southern Command in 1967. He remembers well the tremendous pressure that the generals placed on the government to start the war after the Egyptians closed the Straits of Tiran and essentially cut off Israeli shipping to Africa and the east. Gavish acknowledges that he is not privy to sensitive information today, though he does note that at the time the key question was gauging the risk. “Under these circumstances, you have to take into account, among other things, if you go with a pre-emptive strike or if you absorb an enemy blow,” he said. “In the Yom Kippur War, we didn’t hit them with a pre-emptive strike. In the Six-Day War, we saw this as the right solution. The question is not just risk assessment, but who is doing the assessment. In 1967, the generational gaps between the ministers and the generals were especially significant. The generals were young, 40-year-old men who were experienced in warfare. The ministers, almost all of them, were not born in the country, and they were relatively older.” “We had to convince the government that there was no other solution,” he said. “Ben-Gurion was adamantly against the war, and he really had a moderating effect on Yitzhak Rabin, who was chief of staff at the time. I remember the major fear among the ministers who kept asking me whether I was certain of victory, and how we could be so certain we would succeed. They had serious concerns, but the argument was not public. The awareness of the importance of guarding defense secrets was much higher in those days. Today the excessive preoccupation and discussion of the Iranian issue doesn’t contribute to a weighty, serious discussion, in my opinion. Another key factor which we had to deal with then — and I assume that this is the case today as well — is the position of the U.S. Abba Eban, who was foreign minister at the time, thought that the U.S. would oppose our plan. It was only after Meir Amit returned from abroad that it became clear this wasn’t exactly the case.” Shlomo Nakdimon, a journalist and renowned researcher, chronicled the decision-making processes in his book about the Six-Day War (“Towards the Zero Hour”) and the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor (“Tammuz in Flames”). He, too, notes the importance of the debate that unfolded between the generals and the politicians in those days. “One of the generals, Ezer Weizman, even threw his ranks down on the desk of the director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office,” he said. “The other generals, among them Ariel Sharon and Avraham Yoffe, lobbied hard, while Levi Eshkol, who wanted to exhaust all diplomatic options, told them: ‘Patience, children.’” As for “Tammuz,” as the Iraqi nuclear reactor was known, Begin oversaw the portfolio from the moment he received it from his predecessor, Rabin. It was Begin who personally handled the affairs of this issue from that moment all the way until the actual bombardment. Begin left no stone unturned, even going so far as to appoint an external committee of inquiry headed by Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv. Coordination with the U.S., which the Israeli leadership sought to attain in each of the three cases, is certainly the common denominator. Today, Netanyahu naturally wishes to reach an accommodation with the U.S. to the greatest extent possible. Nakdimon notes that the plan to bomb the Iraqi reactor was kept secret, while today the public freely discusses the consequences of an attack on Iran. “With regards to the Iraqi reactor, everything was under Begin’s control, and the key people who helped him were the commander of the air force, David Ivry, and the chief of staff, Raful (Rafael Eitan),” he said. “Today, Netanyahu is the minister responsible for the Mossad, and, with Ehud Barak, the defense minister, he is perfectly in synch. They are functioning flawlessly together, as if they were Siamese twins.” “They have an outstanding group of seven ministers, three of whom have all the time in the world to devote to national security issues: Dan Meridor, Benny Begin, and Bogie Ya’alon,” he said. “They are also helped by the head of the National Security Council, Maj. Gen. Yaakov Amidror.” This is the spearhead that will accompany Netanyahu every step of the way toward the final decision on whether to bomb Iran. It is a group that includes the chief of staff, the head of military intelligence, and the head of the Mossad. Nakdimon views the many years during which the Iranian nuclear issue was examined, the run-up to the Six-Day War, and the “nearly six-year-long” period during which the authorities carefully weighed and examined the circumstances surrounding the Iraqi nuclear reactor as a necessary time of due diligence. Col. (res.) Ami Gluska, the author of “Eshkol, Give the Order!,” filled a number of senior positions in the military and civilian leadership. He notes that in contrast to the Six-Day War, in which the civilians held back while the generals agitated, the situation today is different. The military is holding back, while the civilians are hawkish. “Nonetheless, it is clear to all that if the government makes the decision, the army will do the deed,” he said. Enough public chatter One of the key figures who closely followed Begin just prior to the decision on bombing Saddam's nuclear reactor was former minister Moshe Nissim, who today works as a private attorney and who is also an advisory member of the committee that recommends senior appointments in the civil service. He notes that disagreements over the bombardment of the reactor crossed military-civilian lines. “The head of the Mossad, Yitzhak Hofi, was completely against,” he said. “His deputy, Nachum Admoni, was in favor. The chief of staff, Raful, was in favor. The head of military intelligence, Yehoshua Sagi, fought bitterly against it. His deputy, a former Hashomer Hatzair youth movement member Aviezri Ya’ari, was in favor. Mottke Tzipori, the deputy defense minister, opposed. Simha Erlich, a political dove, was very much in favor. Shustak Hentz was opposed.” “Back then, there were also fears as to how the Iraqis would respond,” Nissim said. “There was a fear that Iraq would retaliate by bombing the reactor in Dimona, or by launching missiles at the civilian population, or launch a regional war. Those who opposed the plan were also concerned that Egypt may abrogate the peace treaty with Israel or that the U.S. might impose sanctions on us. The supporters, chief among them Begin and myself as well, were of the opinion that the U.S. would ‘punish’ us lightly, and that the chances for successfully carrying out the mission were quite high, and that Iraq did not possess the capability to retaliate. Obviously, the factors that one needs to take into consideration today [with regards to Iran] are much weightier.” Nissim is incapable of understanding how public figures take it upon themselves to openly discuss the Iranian issue. He is particularly furious with former Mossad chief Meir Dagan and former Shin Bet director Yuval Diskin. “What is going on today is an open-air market, and the statements made by Diskin and Dagan are irresponsible and they are causing immeasurable damage to Israel,” he said. “As people who occupied senior posts, they mustn’t be permitted to speak publicly.” Deception as a tool Gavish recalls that two hours before Israel’s opening salvo in the Six-Day War, then-Defense Minister Moshe Dayan appeared on a radio broadcast and declared that Israel had no desire for war. Gavish does not rule out the possibility that the Israeli leadership is using a similar tactic today, assuming a bellicose posture while behind the scenes spurring the U.S. and the international community to take action. “Deception is one of the tools used in this game,” he said. In a detailed paper entitled “For a Slightly Different Mode of Thinking,” Dror raises the possibility that “it would behoove the U.S. for Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear installations, a move which would minimize the damage to U.S. interests.” “The U.S. will intervene after the fact in order to ‘restore the peace,’ and it will take preventative measures to ensure that Iran does not restart its nuclear program,” he wrote. Dror adds: “Many who oppose an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear installations on moral grounds, preferring to avoid exacting casualties in the present over the possibility of preventing even more massive casualties in the future, are enthusiastic supporters of taking definitive security risks in the present for the sake of a peace that is uncertain.” Nonetheless, he says: “Mapping out a responsible policy requires avoiding this flawed line of thinking, both on a moral and a practical level, certainly when the topic at hand is one involving the fate of the nation.” Dror recommends that “we give great weight to preventing risks in the future, even at the price of taking risks in the present.” Barak backed up this opinion recently, saying: “Refraining from action ensures that Iran goes nuclear, and dealing with a nuclear Iran will be more dangerous than stopping it today. In other words, whoever says ‘later’ may find that ‘later is too late.’” |
Friday, July 27, 2012
The decision that will change everything: 1948, 1967, 1973…. 2012?
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