Subject: Israel's Future Through Moderate Islamic Eyes

Background

At a recent meeting, the chief operating officer of a large Middle Eastern (primarily Arab) organization and a Iranian trained nuclear scientist (very familiar with the Iranian nuclear program and its key individuals) summarized the observations provided to them by hundreds of reporters and stringers stationed in 18 countries throughout the Middle East and by nuclear scientists from numerous Islamic countries concerning their expectations for Israel's future.

Near-term expectations

They are skeptical concerning any "peace negotiations".  

They listed several negotiation alternatives that had been bruited about and presented their evaluations. These were:

1 The "Saudi Arabian Peace Initiative." The "Saudi Proposal" was first carried to Israel, to the United States and to the West by Tom Friedman. It was not officially signed by Saudi   ~~ Arabia. Friedman was selected as the plan's bearer after careful consideration by the Saudi foreign policy advisor because of his high level government and extensive media contacts both within Israel and the United States and the Saudi's belief that Friedman's ego would make Friedman relish what he would perceive as his playing a critical role in changing the entire history of the Middle East. They claimed that if the Saudis and the other Arab states were really interested in proposing this "solution", they would have invited Prime     — Minister Sharon to speak in front of the then pending Arab Summit.

The Saudi plan was described as follows: "Israel must first satisfy all of the current (and future) demands (e.g. territorial, water rights, etc.) of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon (Hezbollah). Israel must also agree to the unlimited right of return to Israel of all the Palestinian refugees and all of their descendants (as they self-identify). Israel must pay compensation to all refugees and all of their descendants who choose not to exercise their right of return. Only after Israel complies with each and every one of these demands (to the satisfaction of all of the Arab countries involved) will Saudi Arabia and the other Arab nations then consider recognition of Israel and normalizing relations with Israel."

2. .Bush's vision as announced at Annapolis: Obama's vision as announced in Cairo , at AIPAC , etc. The US State Department calls for a "resumption" of peace talks. The plans they espouse are, in fact, radical departures from the dynamics of the original roadmap. (The original agreed-upon roadmap had a series of reciprocal, tangible, measurable benchmarks ,e.g.: stop the terror and violence; disarm the armed non-government forces; develop a functioning legal/justice system; etc.) President Obama's version replaces the roadmap with a fixed end point goal and a deadline. This enables the Palestinians to exert pressure on Israel and the US by threatening to halt the talks, relieves the Palestinians from having to deliver anything tangible, and would compel Israel to deliver to the Palestinians, on or before some date certain, all or most of the West Bank, part of Jerusalem, control of many places holy to Jews, etc. In return, the Arab League, Hamas and Palestinian President  Abbas are adamant that they will never recognize Israel as a "Jewish State". Thus, a implementation of President Obama's approach would deny Israel both security and peace.

3. One democratic, secular nation for two peoples. Increasingly, the Arab League, individual Arab governments and the Palestinians are threatening to support a "one state solution" as their final objective. When evaluating this proposed "solution", both the Israelis and the Arabs are well-aware of the comparative Palestinian and Israeli birth rates, with both expecting that any democratic "one state" would soon have a Palestinian majority. (Current Arab Palestinian birthrates have dropped substantially and the Palestinian "demographic bomb" may not be anywhere as large as previous estimates concluded.)    Both sides are also well-aware that "secular" is the code word for the end of a Jewish state and termination of the currently existing world-wide Jewish right of citizenship in Israel. Presently, within the Palestinian controlled areas of the West Bank, within Gaza and within Jordan anyone accused of even contemplating selling land to a Jew would be murdered. A one state solution would make the entire West Bank, parts of Jerusalem (and possibly some parts of the current state of Israel) "Jew-free".

The bottom line in evaluating the feasibility of any possible "solution" is the likely on-the-ground response of the Palestinians. Results of recent polls conducted by Palestinians show that: a) 57% of Palestinians would support armed actions (terror, missile and rockets attacks) against Israel while negotiations are being conducted; and b) even if Israel would meet each and every Palestinian demand (including the West Bank, Jerusalem, right of return, etc.), 45% of Palestinians would still strongly oppose any recognition of Israel.

Long-term expectations

After the current negotiations were reviewed, the discussion proceeded to Israel's future. Here, the expectations are chilling. The participants made it clear that their close contacts (Hezbollah, Hamas, Fatah and the ruling inner-clique in Iran) state that Israel will be "totally annihilated by a nuclear weapon." They personally believe that the State of Israel will be physically destroyed well before January 1, 2020. Many speculated that the attack on Israel will not be launched by Iran, but rather by Egypt or Syria (or even Jordan).

This was mapped out as follows:

1 .Iran will continue to develop nuclear weapons, a missile force to deliver these weapons,

and nuclear warheads capable of being carried by Iran's currently developed medium range missiles. (Although a recent, publicly released, "consensus" US Intelligence report stated that Iran had halted its nuclear warhead development activities in 2003, the opposition group that had first exposed Iran's previously undetected 18 year clandestine nuclear weapons development program is now reporting that Iran did not stop these developments, but rather that Iran currently has an operating facility near Tehran which is actively developing nuclear missile warheads.)

2. Iran's progress toward developing operating nuclear weapons and means for their
delivery will be a lot more rapid than is currently estimated by US intelligence. They pointed
out the dismal history of US intelligence in making these kinds of estimates. US intelligence
vastly underestimated the technical capabilities of the Soviet Union and they vastly
overestimated the time that they thought would be required for the Soviets to successfully
complete their atomic bomb as well as their hydrogen bomb programs. US intelligence
completely missed Saddam's alternative, pre-1991 nuclear weapons development
program. (After they gained access to Iraq, US and international inspectors reported that
Saddam had been within six months to one year of obtaining operational nuclear weapons,
and they concluded that had Saddam waited to obtain these weapons, his forces would
have been unstoppable in Kuwait, and then later in their conquest of Saudi Arabia.) US
intelligence had been surprised by the Indian, Pakistani, Libyan and North Korean nuclear
programs. Further, my informants emphasized that the help that had been provided by the
Kahn network was substantial and effective and that North Korea had  provided technical support and on-the-ground assistance for missile development and for nuclear weapons development to both Syria and Iran. "You can't un-ring the scientific knowledge bell."

1. Iran's nuclear development program will trigger a nuclear arms race throughout the Middle East. Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria will all begin nuclear weapons development programs. Saudi Arabia will also attempt to obtain nuclear weapons.
2. Islamic fundamentalists, in the name of Islamic religious purity, will seize control of one or   more nuclear armed governments in the Middle East and thus, the fundamentalists will obtain access and control of one or more nuclear weapons. Prime candidates for such a seizure of control include Egypt, Jordan and Syria.
3. Most moderate Muslim groups will not resist this fundamentalist seizure of power, but will      . accept the fundamentalists control of governments and societies.
4. The various extremist groups will compete in burnishing their credentials as the most faithful (extreme) of the "true believers." The ultimate crown of truest believer will be accorded to the group that succeeds in destroying Israel.
5. Muslim casualties that would be caused by their nuclear attack on Israel or that would result

from retaliatory attacks by Israel will not in any way deter these fundamentalist groups from        attacking and attempting to destroy Israel.

8. There is nothing that Israel can do to avoid this fate. No concessions, no accommodations    
and no peace agreements will protect Israel.

Additional lessons for Israel: "The future will be very much a repeat of the past."

           1. Israel will never be able to locate a negotiating partner who will be willing to recognize        ~Israel as a "Jewish state" and who will be able to effectively guarantee Israel peace and security "within recognized boundaries". Nearly all Islamic factions seek the political and physical elimination of the "Jewish state". This is the more immediate, absolute goal of Hezbollah, Hamas and the other rejectionist groups. For even the "moderates", the demise of Israel is the highly preferred outcome.

2. Violence will continue. Terror, attacks against Jewish targets in Israel and throughout the world; missile , rocket and mortar attacks covering both North in South Israel; and on-and-off negotiations will be some of the tools employed (sometimes alternately, sometimes simultaneously) to sap Israel's emotional and economic strength. Arab violence does not just happen, nor is it merely the result of a "cycle of violence." The violence is planned and employed in order to create pandemonium, demonstrate the inability of Israel's government to defend the safety of Israel's citizens, make demands (such as for the release of prisoners), establish the group's reputation within Arab circles or on the world stage, cement relationships with other terrorist organizations, etc.

[Recorder's notes: Specific terror examples were described in detail in order to illustrate Palestinian utilization of targeted violence. Several early operations ordered by Yassir Arafat and conducted by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) included: the Avivim school bus massacre (5/8/70); the Munich Olympic massacre (9/5/72); the Ma'alot school massacre (5/15/74). Arafat launched the second "Intifada" in the fall of 2000 to prevent President Clinton's peace process from having any chance of success. Arafat personally ordered and financed the purchase and importation of numerous shipments of weapons and explosives (including 50 tons of sniper rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, etc. from Iran -Kahne A, 1/02) to be used for terror attacks against Israel. The Lod Airport massacre (5/30/72), an operation planned by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and conducted by the Japanese Red Army (JRA), illuminates that there is extensive international cooperation among terrorist organizations.]

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3. Israel's government (and the US and Western Europe) will be confounded by the
continued use of traditional Middle East negotiating techniques, such as: a) present a long list
of grievances and demands; b) use proxies, back channels, US allies and other third parties
to pressure Israel to negotiate on only some of the Palestinian grievances and demands and
also to pressure Israel to defer some of Israel's counter-demands (until some future
negotiations); c) use proxies, back channels, off-the-record interviews, etc. to create the
impression that the Palestinians are willing to make reciprocal concessions on one or more of
Israel's major concerns, thus getting some elements in Israel and the US to conclude that
completing a partial deal is nearly within reach; d) recess or terminate the negotiations; e) at
that point, take off the table the concessions that were made by Israel and maintain that
these offered concessions are merely the starting point for negotiations that will take place in
the future; and f) then add to and extend the previous list of grievances and demands. The
underlying rationale of this approach is: "If a person can be made to make one step
backwards, then he can be made to take one thousand steps backwards."

4. The Islamic world believes that there are many large divisions (fault lines) within Israel
(between the political left and the political right, between the religious and the secular,

between different orthodox groups, between various economic, social and ethnic groups,
etc.) as well as between the national interests of Israel and the national interests of the US.                             The Arab world is also witness to much robust Jewish self-examination which tends to focus

on Israel's historical and current flaws. Israel's government and most government officials, including Prime Minister Netanyahu are viewed as weak and ineffective. All of these factors are evaluated by the Palestinians as major vulnerabilities of Israel and as good sources of useful ammunition which will help them to undermine Israel's case for legitimacy and continued existence.

       Thus, suggestions that Israel should offer certain concessions to the Palestinians which are floated by outside parties (especially suggestions that originate from groups within the Jewish community) will probably be interpreted by the Palestinian negotiators as a sign that Israel's resolve is weakening and these suggestions will most likely encourage the Palestinian negotiators to toughen their bargaining stance by making increased demands. This effect is described as "the bleat of the lamb excites the lion."

 5. The Palestinians (and Hezbollah) have already defeated Israel in the international public     relations war.

a) The Palestinians have gained control of the reporting of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the world media by gaining control of the words, phrases and definitions that the world media currently utilizes in describing underlying political, military and social conditions and in explaining their causation; in describing events on-the-ground; in presenting alternative negotiating positions; in evaluating proposed solutions; etc. Some examples include:

•occupation, occupying power, illegal occupation, brutal occupation;

West Bank, occupied territories, Palestinian territories, Palestinian West Bank;

•militants (referring to those Palestinians committing acts of terror) rather than using the term "terrorists";

•catastrophic economic conditions in Gaza caused by Israel's economic blockade, the economic and health catastrophe now occurring in Gaza, collective punishment, high unemployment rate which makes it difficult for Palestinians to feed their families, cuts in electrical power distribution which greatly curtails factories, inability to run hospitals

due to the lack of electrical power and basic medical supplies;

•disproportionate response, innocent civilian casualties, women and children killed;

                   • military check-points that choke Palestinian development, daily humiliation,        humiliate Palestinian residents, prevent Palestinians from seeking medical care.

b) The Palestinian's usually get their version of the story out first and their spokespersons

stay "on message." Even when, as is frequently the case, the Palestinian-issued accounts

prove to be false, their story gains worldwide headlines. On the other hand, Israel's

response pattern is to hold back until they can demonstrate the validity of their information.

Then the Israeli story, if it's covered at all, is relegated at best to the inside pages of

newspapers or to the tail end of TV news broadcasts.

[Recorder's notes: Israel's government and media were criticized for Israel's ineptness in making its own case and in responding to various Palestinian and Hezbollah accusations, thus creating, by default, substantial victories for the Palestinian and Hezbollah public relations machines. Three of Israel's major public relations defeats were described in detail: 1) The Palestinian-generated fires that damaged the Church of the Nativity's interior during Israel's siege of Palestinian gunmen who had taken up positions inside the church; 2) The deaths of civilians (mostly women and children) when an apartment building in Kana, Lebanon collapsed several hours after an Israeli air attack on nearby Hezbollah missile firing positions; and 3) Israel's incursion into Jenin. The discussion of the world's media coverage of Israel's April, 2003 military incursion into Jenin was cited as the most illustrative: Palestinian spokespersons (Saeb Erekat, Yasser Abed Rabdo, Ahmed Abdel Rahman) claimed that Israel had carpet bombed and destroyed the entire Jenin camp, that Israel had massacred thousands (500 to 3000, "half of them women and children"), that the Israeli invasion army bulldozers had buried the "martyrs" in mass graves in order to conceal the massacre, and that 60 to 70 Palestinians had been summarily executed by the Israeli military. For several weeks, these and similar stories dominated the world news media and the editorial pages of much of the world press (Agence France Press, Associated Press, BBC, CBS, CNN, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, NBC, United Press International, United Nations press releases, etc.). Nearly two weeks elapsed before Israel began to respond: in fact, only about 10% of the buildings in the camp had been destroyed, nearly all due to the intense building-by-building, hand-to-hand combat that took place (this was confirmed by satellite photographs, interviews with PLO fighters and independent on-the-ground NGO observers); there had been no summary executions; the total Palestinian death toll was set at 56 (nearly all of them fighters) by the Palestinian medical authorities and was confirmed by Fatah's director for the Northern West Bank (Kadoura Mousa Kadoura). However, the early false stories of Palestinians killed and massive destruction still dominates the public's memory of the incident]

c) The Palestinians (and Hezbollah) exercise extremely tight operational control over all

media access in nearly all areas that are controlled by the Palestinians or Hezbollah. In order

to obtain any information on events occurring in these areas, the western media is forced to

rely nearly entirely on the inputs generated by local stringers (who are usually allied with the

local extremist establishment). Should any member of the media report any "unfriendly

information" then the reporter's physical safety is explicitly threatened and the reporters'

organization will be threatened with denial of all future access. The western media, by

continuing its presence in these areas, has demonstrated its willingness to comply with these

restrictions on its reporting and it has also demonstrated that it will not reveal these restrictive

and bias-inducing conditions to their audiences.

[Recorder's notes: some of the news organizations that have readily accepted these Palestinian and Hezbollah demands were listed. However, since I do not have any independent ability to confirm this information, I did not include this list in these notes.]